UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

PHILOSOPHICAL PARALLELISMS IN SIX ENGLISH NOVELISTS

THE CONCEPTION OF GOOD, EVIL AND HUMAN NATURE

GEORGE ROGERS SWANN

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
1929

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

PHILOSOPHICAL PARALLELISMS IN SIX ENGLISH NOVELISTS

THE CONCEPTION OF GOOD, EVIL AND HUMAN NATURE

GEORGE ROGERS SWANN

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
1929

R. UNIV.
BIBLIOTHEEK
LEIDEN

If, as it has been maintained, every philosopher is to some extent an unconscious artist, to a still greater extent, every genuine artist is an unconscious philosopher. He may not have any interest in ethics, logic, or science, yet an unconscious world view penetrates and interfuses itself with the whole, transforming even the manner and organization, these classifiable elements of the sensible vesture. Such formal characteristics, then, are the guide to the understanding of the embodied philosophy. They fall into two divisions, the external form and the internal. The distinction between these is important but difficult of statement. The external form embraces the so-called artistic structure of the work, the organization and proportions of the whole. The internal structure is the interpretation of these data in general terms. It forms the transition to the philosophical principles embodied in the total work of the artist. On the one hand, the individual element characteristic of each work of art is maintained, while on the other, these individual elements are subsumed under general principles. In the subsequent discussion a^1 b^1 c^1, etc., will stand for the artistic external struction, a^2 b^2 c^2, etc., for the internal ethical structure and a^3 b^3 c^3, etc., will stand for the philosophic principles which emerge as the result of the exposition.

Of course, in art forms such as Music, where the form is to a large extent non-representational, it is much more difficult to arrive at the philosophic principles it embodies, than in poetry, drama, or the novel. It is this peculiarity which made Hegel give to music a lower place in the scale of arts than poetry and drama. In the latter, form and substance are completely united, so that the ideal content has an equal place with the artistic form. If this is the criterion, the novel is the highest form of art. Such a position it deserves for more than one reason. It is the most plastic, most universal in appeal, capable of the more diversity in unity, than any other form of art. And where as each art embodies one set of philosophic principles, one branch of philosophy better than another, to the novel is given the conception of human nature and its desires and wishes in relation to the whole of its environment as its particular field.

The purpose, then, of this thesis is in the briefest compass possible, having ascertained certain typical conceptions of human nature held by the different schools of philosophic thought, to make a study of certain leading English novelists in order to discover their internal philosophical positions, especially in regard to the conception of human nature. Then, having done this, it is to show the parallelism between the art of each novelist and the system of a chosen philosopher. In the exposition of the novelist care must be taken to distinguish between the overt didacticism of the conscious, ethical religious teaching which will, however, serve as the introduction and the unconscious didactic.

The starting point, then, is those influences which have been educative in the growth of the thought life of the author. After this will naturally follow a brief treatment of the religious and ethical teaching which he tried to propound. From this the passage will naturally be made to the artistic structure which is peculiar to each book, thence to that which is characteristic of the author's works as a whole, but embodied in various forms in particular books, and thence to the philosophic structure of the whole of the author's work. Each of these three fall into three divisions. In the case of the artistic structure there is the initial situation that is the complex of characters in their peculiar environment, in relation to each other, and the environment as a whole. There is the complicating factor, or factors, which sets the plot in motion and the resolving factor which brings about the solution of the plot. When an attempt is made to get at the fundamental moral and ethical questions which underlie the artistic structure, the three elements given above, a^1 b^1 c^1, are resolved into a^2, problem, b^2, working out of problem, and c^2, solution of problem. This working out involves a movement from a state of complexity to a state of simplicity or the reverse. This initial problem may be from good to evil or from evil to good. To judge from all the novels with which I am acquainted, in every novel there is a movement not circular but in the direction of the desirable or undesirable. This is the ethical foundation of the novel. There must be a change of condition either in one direction or the other, the change or solution being the goal of the process. This brings out the three fundamental conceptions in which a^2 is resolved into a^3, that is, the conception

of human nature in its relation to environment—physical, biological, social and economic. For the novel the complicating factor is usually something undesirable in relation to man. In most novels the ending is good, so that c^2 is resolved into c^3 or the desirable in relation to man. The philosophic structure in most novels is usually a^3 thru $a^3b^3c^3$ to a^3c^3. Sometimes it is a^3 thru $a^3b^3c^3$ to a^3b^3. It is at once seen that human nature in its environment is the central problem or central position. Closely connected with this is the relation between nature and circumstances considered actively or the question of freedom. But the question of human nature and its environment can be resolved into one of human nature since society is but a complex of human natures. An analysis of human nature reveals that it can be reduced to three categories, the ground or constitution, the motivation, and the field of action or mode of expression. Evil is resolved into the problem of its location and nature. The same analysis applies to the good which is resolved into location and nature.

The above may serve as an outline of the treatment of the subject. The method to be used is as empirical as possible, the attempt being made to let the results appear in the course of study, the natural and logical sequences following from the data presented. Hence it will be impossible to give any of the results flowing from the exposition at this point in the dialectic. The most that can be stated will be the outline given above.

I. Fundamental Philosophic Conceptions of Human Nature.

II. Study of Novelists and Comparison with Philosophers.
   a. Sources of Thought
   b. Didactic Elements
   c. Artistic and Ethical Structure
   d. Human Nature
      (a) Its ground, (b) Motivation, (c) Field
   e. Nature and Location of Evil
   f. Nature and Location of Good
   g. Comparison with a selected philosopher on each of the above points.

III. Summary and Conclusion.

In regard to the choice of novelists the attempt has been made

to select six representative English novelists, three from the eighteenth century and three from the nineteenth, representing six distinct artistic impulses, yet influenced by each other and moved to the solution of largely the same problems. As a representative of the realistic novel of adventure, Defoe is chosen; as an example of the psychological, dramatic novel, Richardson is chosen; while Fielding may stand as the representative of the realistic novel of social types. Dickens will represent the reform impulse; Meredith, the influence of science and idealistic Personalism on the novel, while Hardy may serve as the representative of philosophical radicalism.

But to treat adequately the conception of human nature as has been elaborated in the history of philosophy would unduly lengthen this discussion and lead it too far from its main theme. It will, therefore, be necessary to assume a knowledge of these conclusions of the history of Philosophy and to present them in brief, only so far as is necessary to the subject of this paper.

In regard to the question of the constitution of human nature which is the key to the whole, the earliest position elaborated is that of Plato who proclaimed the dualism between the emotional and sensuous, and the rational. This was based upon a metaphysical dualism. This passed through a series of stages through the Stoics, Neo Platonists, Cartesians, Spinoza, and Kant in his earlier period. The final form of this doctrine which attempted to combine Plato, Kant, Spinoza and Hegel is found in von Hartmann who discovered the dualism to be one between the will and the reason, although he declared these two to be aspects of the same reality.

The second series of answers asserting the plurality of elements in human nature as ultimate is to be discovered beginning with Epicurus and being revived through the English Empericism is formulated by Hume and revaluated by J. S. Mill. Human nature is built up out of sensations. The early upholders of the school seem inclined to confine the term feelings and emotions to those arising from the animal organism. Mill modified this doctrine to include the whole range of feelings.

The third main solution is found in the attempt to ground human nature in the will. This movement drew its inspiration

from Kant, who is its typical representative. Kant's starting point is a dualism between will and feeling, but this he tends increasingly to overcome. Fichte and again Schopenhauer developed these aspects of Kant, while Neitezsche developed Schopenhauer.

The fourth answer is the conception of Personality or the conception of the Rational Person. Of these are Aristotle, Augustine, the Scholastics, Leibniz, Schelling and Hegel. There is discovered two distinct types of this theory, the one held by Aristotle emphasizing the individualistic elements, while modern Personalism emphasized the evolutionary and social elements.

We are thus enabled to arrive at six distinct positions as representative of the whole number of solutions. There is Aristotle, the representative of realistic and individualistic Personalism; Hegel, the representative of idealistic and sociological Personalism; Kant, the representative of Ethical Idealism and Volunterism; Hume, the representative of Individualistic Empericism; J. S. Mill, the representative of Social Empericism, while von Hartmann stands as the best or at least the most modern representative of Rationalistic Dualism. In the present discussion therefore I shall compare Defoe with Aristotle, Richardson with Kant, Fielding with Hume, Dickens with J. S. Mill, Meredith with Hegel, and Hardy with von Hartmann. In making this statement I have so far broken with the inductive principle which I have professed. The proof, however, of this anticipation will lie further on in this work.

II.

DEFOE AND INDIVIDUALISTIC REALISM.

Defoe marks the transition between the old picaresque novel of adventure and the modern realistic novel of character. Hence it follows that his works in regard to form, material, and plot structure evince a transitional character which renders the material for discussion difficult of classification. Moreover, Defoe was above all else a journalist whose work in that field at times more than verged upon the domain of fiction. However, modern criticism has, with an approach to unanimity, agreed in the choice of the five books, beginning with the first part of Robinson Crusoe and ending with Roxana, as Defoe's genuine contribution to the evolution of the English novel. In Robinson Crusoe, Part 1, Captain Singleton, Moll Flanders, Colonel Jacque, and Roxana, there is found an increasing complexity of plot and an increasing emphasis upon character until, in Roxana, there is discovered a definite plot structure marking the transition from the fictitious biography to the novel.

After a brief consideration of the influences tending to produce his intellectual standpoint, this discussion of Defoe, as well as that of the other writers treated in this thesis, will have as the point of departure, the general ethical and religious beliefs and teaching as they are present in the author's consciousness. This must be clearly distinguished from the merely didactic element or the moralizings designed to render the work palatable to the sermon-loving public. Only as a didactic element is woven into, and affects the structure of the work as a whole, will it be regarded as suitable for consideration in this thesis.

Defoe's intellectual position is in many respects interesting as an example of the transition from the theological attitude of the early sixteenth century to that of the modern scientific epoch. He shows no trace of the sceptical rationalism of the mid-eighteenth century. He has deep and implicit faith in witches, demons, signs and portents. He had been educated at an academy for dissenting ministers where he had been grounded in the Calvinistic theology which then prevailed both in the Anglican and dissenting

groups. Time seems to have softened the strenuosity of these doctrines and to have brought him nearer to the latitudinarian school. Despite this, he remained to the end an intense believer in the fundamentals of Christian doctrine. On the other hand, due to his participation in political affairs, and by his affiliation with the commercial interests of the city, he became deeply interested in the economic and sociological studies which were at the time being cultivated by some of the leading minds of the period. It is in regard to such matters that he is at his best so far as original contributions to English thought and science are concerned. Christian theological doctrine and the early eighteenth century social theory, modified by his own experiences, form the intellectual foundations of Defoe's work.

These interests, the nature of which has been outlined in the above paragraph, give to his ethical teaching its character. In the first place, he is realistic in his ethical outlook. Nothing could better illustrate this viewpoint than his attitude to the question of love, courtship, and marriage. This problem is always a crucial one which tends to give the direction to the whole of the individual's social outlook. The orthodox religionist either tends to regard marriage as a sacrament, or more vaguely as a divine institution. The romantic spirit looks upon the question through a glow of emotion. Fielding regards it as one of the passions of the animal organism. The spirit of the Restoration prefers to look upon it as occasion for gallantry. To Defoe the emotion, the animal passion, the gallantry, even the divine ordinance, furnished but the outworks of the problem. The real matter is a biological and economic issue. His analysis reveals that the male represents the biological side of the problem. True, the economic does enter into the question in that money is often the attraction which draws a man to a woman. But at the basis, it is the physical attraction a woman has to a man. This is the woman's power. On the other hand, the physical question with the woman is subordinated to the economic. A woman needs the social and economic backing of the man. Whatever money she has comes from him and in general the only way to get it is through marriage. It is also the way to social standing. The question of courtship and marriage is therefore to be regarded as a game with the

woman's body and the man's economic and social standing as the prizes. A woman is silly who is governed by her emotions. Moll Flanders felt that way and ever after she warns women to make the best bargain they can.

This economic realism is shown in his treatment of the question of the double standard which had been brought into the light by the Restoration Drama. According to Defoe, the double standard rests on the fact of the economic superiority of the male sex. If a woman has money and courage, she can rise superior to the standard.

A classic example of this Defoe gives in Roxana. When Roxana has become engaged in an intrigue with a friend and benefactor of hers, despite his desire, she refuses to marry him. She is willing to be his mistress but not his wife. Her reason for her refusal is based upon the fact that while she is single she is free, but when she is married she comes legally under the supremacy of her husband. According to the old English law, her property becomes his. When her lover declares he is willing to waive the latter right, she declares that she values her freedom too highly. A married woman is a slave, a head servant. "A single woman is masculine in her political capacity"—"and if she has a mind to gratify her mind as to the sexes she might entertain a man as a lover, as a man does a mistress. Nor need you argue affection for that makes slaves of women." No argument is adduced against this, except that of custom. Moreover, Defoe seems to have recognized its validity. For when, in the latter part of the book, Roxana does marry the merchant out of love and desire for his title, she loses her money and freedom.

The second characteristic of the ethic of Defoe is its individualism. One is responsible for one's own conduct. One has to work for one's self. The more one realizes his own freedom from the bonds which are put upon one by social environment, the freer one is. Crusoe finds his happiness realized upon the island. When on his return he finds it inhabited, its charm is gone, and he does not care to stay there. Defoe's stories deal with the welfare of individuals. Here lies his interest as well as his sympathy. After all, Defoe feels that the chief defect in women lies in their failure to develop their individuality and self-assertiveness.

Not that they did not possess these qualities. His female characters are always more highly endowed intellectually than the male. Roxana is much more intelligent than Captain Singleton, while Moll Flanders overshadows Colonel Jacque. But education and temperament keep them from utilizing their capacities and realizing their characters.

These two elements, the realistic outlook on the interpretation and choice of objects and ends, and the individualistic standard of action, constitute two fundamental elements of prudence which is Defoe's cardinal virtue. Prudence in Defoe consists in the clear perception of the end desired and the wise choice of means to that end. What that end is, we shall discover.

Benevolence is strictly a secondary virtue in Defoe's ethics. True, one cannot read his work without finding evidences of kindness of heart. None of his heroes or heroines care to injure any person or thing. There is a touch of the later humanitarian spirit in the plea for the little boys in the ashes of the glass house, or that for kind treatment of slaves in Colonel Jacque. But even in the latter case the argument is based on a practical consideration, that kind treatment improves the character of the work. Taken all in all, it would seem that Benevolence is a negative virtue consisting rather in the refraining from doing unnecessary injury to others, rather than that of doing positive good.

On the other hand, Defoe is the most religious of the great English novelists. It would not take much work to turn Robinson Crusoe into a tract. He is orthodox to the core, though there is great tolerance for all the great varieties of Christianity. Even the Catholics are regarded with favor, and in Roxana there is a very friendly portrait of a Jew. Only two, however, of the great doctrines of religion make a great show in his work: i. e., the doctrines of Providence and repentance. The first of these exemplifies the divine side, and the second, the human side of religion. To Defoe, God revealed Himself not so much in the spiritual and moral life of individuals as in the results of the activities of nature upon the lives of individuals, in signs, portents, and especially in remarkable coincidences, such as the fact that Robinson Crusoe was born, taken captive, left home, and was shipwrecked on the same day of the year. Providence then is essentially the divine order-

ing, the external nature, the accidental in human life. This probably expresses the idea better than any other term and here Defoe coincides almost exactly with the average religious consciousness. Providence is a name for the accidental and unforeseen in human life regarded as fulfilling the purpose and will of God. Thus the captivity and shipwreck of Crusoe is providential, so is the loss of Roxana's investment by capture when she is reduced to her last five hundred pounds.

The aim of the activities of Providence is to produce a state which renders repentance possible. Repentance, a hatred of one's former life and a fear of God, takes place according to Defoe, when the sinner has had time for meditation. Robinson Crusoe, according to Defoe, does not repent when he is on ship board in the midst of the storm, nor when he is mercifully cast upon the island, but when a fit of sickness compels him to stay in bed. Captain Singleton repents when he has given up being a pirate and is waiting, unoccupied, for an opportunity to return to England. Moll Flanders repents in prison, Colonel Jacque in the loneliness of his Mexican estate, Roxana, while imprisoned for debt and left beyond all hope. Repentance is a luxury which, like other luxuries, seems to him to involve leisure, since it has for its basis a self-contemplation and self-understanding which only a condition of leisure can furnish.

Nevertheless, the effects of repentance are not very marked. All his penitents seem to act exactly as they did before. Robinson Crusoe is changed more than any other, for he becomes very devout and an exponent of Christian truth and teaching.

Religion, then, though very prominent, is not a dominating element of the ethical structure. This structure may be summed up in the question, "What will an average person do if you cut him loose from social and ethical restriction and leave him 'on his own'?" The two main factors in the development of such a structure of events are the aims and purposes of the average man or woman and the character of the environment in which they are thrown. In Defoe the character varies with heredity and environment. All his characters have energy and personal magnetism, some to a marked degree. Crusoe comes of a deeply religious, well-to-do, Puritan family of the middle class with a

touch of wandering in its blood, for his father is an immigrant and two of his brothers are adventurers. Jacque is the son of aristocratic parents and has been educated in memory of that fact. Roxana, whose main interest is financial, comes from French trading stock, and is married at the age of fifteen to a silly spend-thrift, while Moll Flanders is the daughter of a prostitute, born in a work-house, educated in the moral, but coarse, atmosphere of a children's farm, and brought up among rich, well-to-do people who flatter her beauty and yet do not admit her to equality.

The initial situation, then, is a mal-adjustment of the individual to environment due to factors which are beyond his control. The individual is normal in character. Under ordinary circumstances, he would live a normal life. But heredity and environment prevent. From this follows the complicating factor which is the logical result of the preliminary mal-adjustment or deviation from the norm. Each character follows the course circumstances mark out for him. Robinson Crusoe goes to sea; Captain Singleton joins a pirate ship; Moll is seduced, and after a series of unsuccessful marriages, becomes a thief and a prostitute; Roxana abandons her children and becomes a courtesan; Colonel Jacque becomes a pickpocket.

But this complication contains the germ of the ethical solution, which consists in the attempt of the individual to return to the normal condition of humanity. He is not content to be the victim of nature, fate and his own character. He is thrown on his own resources in a chaotic world. Crusoe is not content until he has transformed his island into an orderly, cultivated paradise, even though he is its only inhabitant. Jacque knows that he is bound to be a gentleman, and intends to become one, even though he has to become a highwayman to do so. Moll wishes a well-to-do and respectable husband, or, if she cannot get that, she wants to secure money by theft so as to be freed from want.

The second element in the ethical solution is the fact that the individual goes too far in this attempt to control environment and lays himself open to Nemesis, i. e., the punishment of the individual by Providence, because of pride. Singleton and Jacque escape because they repent in time. Crusoe, on the other hand, after he has acquired a fortune in Brazil, tempts fate once too

often and is shipwrecked. Although through her dexterity in theft Moll Flanders is put beyond need, nevertheless she steals because she likes to do so to show her skill and daring, and therefore is captured. Roxana, in defiance of her own principles, marries without the settlement which had been offered her before. The result is that when her past life is discovered by her husband she has nothing with which to defend herself and so loses the money which she treasured above all things else.

The third element in the resolving factor is repentance leading to moral and material restoration. Crusoe repents and obtains happiness; Singleton repents and escapes the fate of pirates; Moll Flanders repents and ends her days in prosperity; Roxana's repentance, however, is too late for her material restoration.

The discussion has thus progressed until the problem has begun to emerge. There are two main factors which enter into the consideration of the philosophic attitude of Defoe. The first of these is the one hinted at in the preceding pages, namely, the question of the relation of human nature and circumstance. The second is that of freedom. The same treatment will do for both, since they are practically aspects of the same problem.

It is impossible to divest human nature of the heritage that comes to it by birth and education. No matter where we go, we find our ancestors with us; and the social environment which imparts to even the most ignorant of us, a vast variety of knowledge, is also a constant companion. It is impossible to strip mankind altogether naked in the sense of Job's famous expression. It is, therefore, not possible for an author to depict human nature as it is in itself by means of a mere back-to-nature conception. But it is possible to cut both away from the average man, and arrive at the fundamental impulse at the basis of human nature. This impulse is the instinct of self-preservation. To Defoe it is stronger than love, stronger than hate, stronger than sex, stronger even than religion. Man is in a world governed and controlled by economic forces rather than social forces. As Colonel Jacque says, "What is a temptation which no one can resist?" This is a hard saying but unfortunately Defoe's experience had confirmed it, nor do any of his characters even attempt to resist.

At its behest, Moll Flanders becomes a thief, and at its slightest touch Roxana, a courtesan.

Human nature is so constituted that the feelings, ideas and emotions balance under normal circumstances. Men act in a normal manner under normal conditions. Economic pressure upsets this balance and becomes the supreme fount of evil. Hence, it comes to pass that the economic field is the field of human action in its striving to keep the balance.

Human nature thus finds its goal or aim in the norm or mean between one extreme of circumstance and the other. It lies at the mid-point of human nature and environment. In a famous passage at the beginning of Robinson Crusoe, in which the latter's father is attempting to dissuade him from becoming a sailor, he shows that such an occupation is taken up by men of the upper or lower stations in life. Robinson Crusoe, on the other hand, had been born in the middle station of life "that the wise man gave his testimony to this when he prayed to have neither poverty nor riches—that it was not exposed to temptations from either side, but that in easy circumstances, sliding gently through the world and sensibly tasting the sweets of living without the bitter, feeling that they are more happy and learning by every day's experience to know it more sensibly." He reminded Crusoe of his two brothers who had been killed in the low countries, adding words which Crusoe observed later to have been prophetic, "that if I take this foolish step, God would not bless me, I should be sure hereafter to reflect upon having neglected his council when there was more to assist me in my recovery." Crusoe gives us to understand that all his misfortunes are punishments because of his disregard for his father's advice.

The mean, then, is the key to Defoe's philosophy of life. It is his central position. The normal man is neither highly intellectual nor stupid. He possesses a certain amount of personality and address. He is capable of learning by experience and can acquire much wisdom even though he is endowed with only the average of human intelligence. In fact, no one knows what he can do until he has tried and been tried. Robinson Crusoe would not have succeeded in surviving on the desert island without the salvage from the wreck of the ship. He is destitute of creative genius

and is not touched by the finer and higher feelings of humanity. Thus he is little interested in, and incapable of, great fits of generosity and feeling, yet he is incapable of baseness or treachery. He is far from devoting his life to a great reform, but he can do what the genuine tender-heartedness of his nature dictates in ameliorating the condition of the slaves or preaching the gospel to the savages. He is enthusiastic about the fundamentals of Christianity but has little interest in doctrine or sect.

And the average man lives under average circumstance, at least he was destined by his heredity so to live. Either he is the son of a well-to-do merchant or of a middle-class family like Captain Singleton, or brought up in such a family as Moll Flanders, or, at the highest, the natural son of gentlefolk.

Such a condition Defoe seems to have regarded as ideal. It is the ideal for the cultivation of happiness. It is ideal for religious reasons. It is ideal because it is more conducive to morality than any other state. In addition to all this it is the state and condition of human nature which is specially favored by God and blessed by Him.

Evil, then, would be defined by Defoe as deviation from the norm. External evil would be that which deprived a man of this condition in society. Moral evil is a voluntary deviation from such a norm. The disturbance which may give rise to the deviation from the norm may either come from the free volition of the individual, or from the accident of circumstances, or from the combination of both. To the first type belongs Robinson Crusoe, who willed to leave his home and go to sea. To the second class belongs Captain Singleton and Colonel Jacque, who, by their own misfortune, are led into a circumstance which they cannot overcome; to the third class belong Moll and Roxana, who deliberately choose the way of sin because they originally were under the frown of fortune. The action of Providence which punishes the violation of the fundamental principles of morality, varies the punishment in accordance with the sin. Captain Singleton and Colonel Jacque get off scot free being allowed to retain their ill-gotten booty. Moll, who has striven the hardest to return, is only punished by imprisonment, and the loss of her money made by stealing. Roxana has sinned more grievously, and so dies in

jail, after a life of great good fortune. Strange as it may seem, to the reader, in the mind of Defoe, Crusoe is the greatest sinner of the group, for in the full light of knowledge he had acted unnecessarily against his father's commands. This unnatural crime is punished by captivity, shipwreck, and twenty-six years of solitary exile. This shows us the chief peculiarity of Defoe's ethical philosophy.

Evil, then, lies chiefly in external circumstances which, through the operation upon an individual's instinct of self-preservation, affect the conduct in conformity with it. The activity of the individual is not directed toward a world of other persons, but toward the world of things or human beings treated as things. Defoe found in Crusoe, trying to reduce the deserted island to a place fitted for human life, a fit symbol of his own stormy career. Each of his other heroes and heroines deals with human beings only because it is the necessary element in their acquiring the control over things. If we may except the part Roxana played in the degradation of Amy, the influence of William on the conversion of Singleton is the only example of the moral and spiritual action of one person on the other. Otherwise, the individual goes on as if he or she were the only person in the world, as if he were alone in a world of things as Crusoe was. The human soul is set forth to work out its own destiny alone as the scientist does in the laboratory. Moll Flanders is in a desert more desolate than Sahara—London, where she struggles by the use of her beauty and ingenuity to make a place for herself. Jacque is in the slums of the city without an active friend in the world and only himself to rely on, in his fight against his criminal surroundings. Even Crusoe could not have had a more impersonal problem alone on the island.

The aim of the struggle of the individual is the return to the norm. All that Crusoe learned from his life of wandering is the value of rest; Colonel Jacque, even in his most ignorant and criminal days, felt that he was born a gentleman, a feeling which at once kept him from anything cowardly and mean and at the same time led him into the highway robbery since he thought of it as a road to the desired goal. All that Moll Flanders desired, even while she was at her lowest as a prostitute, was to be put

on a regular kept basis by one of her lovers, while a good and honest husband is her highest desire. Singleton is recalled to his goal by William. With Roxana the goal of the mean, respectable marriage, clashes with the other goal, independence, which constitutes the second element in the mean and result is disaster for the heroine. Her aim throughout her life has been the independence which wealth gives and which has been her position by birth. This she achieves since she is a good business woman as well as beautiful. But she is overcome by her love of the Holland merchant and by her desire for his title. However, it was too late. She could not have both, and so she loses both. She has failed to return to the norm since she has failed to recognize that the norm for her is independence, not respectability. Thus Providence punishes the wicked through their good as well as evil.

But, although evil lies chiefly in external circumstances, the will of the individual has consented to it to a greater or less degree. Guilt has been incurred. To effect the return to the norm therefore and to make it complete, it is necessary to change one's attitude to life and to adjust one's self to the Providential order. The first element, repentance, sorrow for sin and a resolve to live a new life, is the human element. It implies the discovery of the way to the restoration to the norm. The second element, what is commonly called conversion, is the awakening of the religious consciousness and the experience of the actual protection of God. In Robinson Crusoe these were connected in a psychological conversional experience. The effect is described as revolutionary upon his life. From the point of view of this thesis the most significant element in the experience was the complete adjustment to his environment which it effected. Before that time he had bemoaned his fate and had been tortured by the pangs of lonesomeness. But afterwards, "From this moment I began to conclude in my mind that it was possible for me to be more happy in this forsaken solitary condition than it was probable I should have been in any other particular state in the world." Again, a year later; "With these reflections I worked my mind up not only to a resignation to the will of God in the present condition of my circumstances, but even to sincere thankfulness for my condition." In the other works this religious awakening

takes place after reformation and is the final stage of self-adjustment. In these cases the spiritual change follows upon the material and is its complement.

I have thus completed the circle from the norm back to the norm, and, having done this, I may now sum up my conclusions as to the Philosophy of Defoe.

A—(a) The natural state of human nature is a harmony or balance between thought, feeling, and action, on the one hand, and environment on the other.

(b) Prudence is the primary virtue in the natural state of human affairs. It calls for the ordering of one's actions in such a manner that by no act of the self is its harmony with environment disturbed. Prudence includes contentment with the state in which one is, if it is already good, a conduction of one's affairs to this end, and the refusal to sacrifice one's independence to others.

(c) The secondary virtue is benevolence, the refraining from doing unnecessary evil to those around you, the repairing of injuries done when they will not benefit the doer, and the treating with kindness and the improving the condition as far as possible of those under one's power.

B—(a) Human nature, both in its normal and abnormal states, finds its proper and suitable expression in the dealing with and the utilization of material objects or objects treated as material.

(b) Human nature is governed and controlled largely by economic motives. A maladjustment of economic environment results in a maladjustment of the moral personality.

(c) Dislocations of the normal state of human nature are brought about by deliberate violation of the law of prudence, hereditary factors, want, undue love of money or even physical temptation or a bad education.

(d) The aim of the struggle for existence is so to obtain control of the environment as to return to the norm.

(e) But each maladjustment is two-fold, an external one due to circumstances and an internal or moral one. Every sin is the violation of the law of morals and prudence.

(f) Since moral laws have reference to the will of God each return to the norm involves an act of repentance on the part of

the doer, including the development of the virtues of faith, trust and love towards God.

(g) The Divine Will expresses itself both in prudential and religious virtue.

(h) The point of union of the two is the providential order which expresses itself in the natural results of the sin and in the powers of external nature. Pride and over-confidence cause the sinner to go too far and subject himself to the providential forces.

C—Evil is a violation of the mean or the norm; moral evil is the refusal to abide by the norm.

D—The Good is a state of complete adjustment, both externally, by a complete harmony with environment, such as the liberation from economic pressure, and internally, by a state of submission, faith and love to God. One of these states causes the other to appear. Men learn to love God because of prosperity and men attain prosperity because they love God.

Turning at length to the comparison of Defoe with Aristotle, there is found an initial distinction of viewpoints which must very clearly be taken into account. Aristotle deals with man under normal conditions. While under ordinary circumstances it was possible to act in the common manner, Defoe deals, as we have seen, with man thrown out of the normal and equable environment, with men making the best of circumstances. Aristotle recognizes this condition, and the different quality of action involved. "And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched, because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume, becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances *just as the good general employs to the best advantage* the force he has with him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of the leather which has been given him, and all other good artisans, likewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to be. I do not mean to say he will be blessed, should he fall into fortunes like those of Priam."[1] He clearly recognizes the economic

[1]Nechomachean Ethics, pp. 20, 14. Book I, Chap. 10, Section 10-13.

determinism of character. He remarks that "the small pieces of good or ill fortune do not affect the balance of life, but the great and numerous; if happening for good, will make life more blessed, but if for ill, they bruise, as it were, and maim the blessedness; for they bring in positive pain and hinder many acts of working."[1] Indeed, no one can be a noble and good person unless he has external goods. "Why, then, should we not call happy, the man who works in the way of perfect virtue and is sufficient with goods, sufficient for acting his part in the drama of life."[2] The plots of Defoe's stories, as we have given them, both as to artistic and ethical structure, might well be described in Aristotle's words, "No, in truth, is he shifting, and easily changeable, for on the one hand, from his happiness he will not be shaken easily, and by ordinary mischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous" (such as Roxana's total loss of fortune compared with Colonel Jacque's attitude to his deportation) "and on the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a little time, but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during which he has made himself master of great and noble things."[2] It took Robinson several years to master circumstances. It took Moll and Jacque all their recorded lives, but it was a great and noble achievement.

Both Aristotle and Defoe find human nature grounded, in the lower life of nature. The three forces which form the character are nature, custom, and teaching.[3] The first we recognize as the hereditary factors; the second, the social conditions and the environmental. I have illustrated in the first part of this chapter the grounding of character by the example of Moll Flanders. The more immediate ground of human nature is in both, the passions derived from the animal nature. These are to be accepted, but are to be placed under the domain of the moral reason. They are to be utilized for the higher purposes. "We thus rise on stepping stones of our dead selves to higher things." Thus, Moll utilized her animal and physical beauty and sexuality, not for the mere gratification of the moment, but for her material

[1]Book 1, Chap. 10, Section 10-13.
[2]Nechomachean Ethics 1:10, 10-13.
[3]Ibid, p. 257 X-9-6.

prosperity. Again, she uses that material prosperity to advance her social position, and finally, by her use of her social position, she advances to a higher ethical level. She cultivates the inward virtues. Again, Robinson begins with the motive of self-preservation. By doing that he is enabled to advance to genuine constructive work in regard to his environment, and finally, when he has acquired a proper environment, he is in a position to cultivate himself, and then he is in a position to cultivate his man Friday. According to Aristotle, there are three things moving as to choice, "the honorable, the expedient, and the pleasant."[1] We begin with the pleasant, rise to the expedient, and culminate with the honorable.

Both conceive human nature as a unity controlled to an increasing degree by the activity of the practical reason which acts as the intermediary between natural instinct and theoretical contemplation. That which constitutes the aim of such activity is happiness which is to be regarded as the chief good and motive of action. In neither is happiness to be confused with pleasure. It rather implies some objective quality or character in the life. The standard for judgment is objective, not subjective, as in Hedonism. In the case of Defoe a certain type of life is regarded as good because it is approved by God. Nor can a life be regarded as having the most highly desirable character until by means of repentance, it meets with the approval of God. Happiness in the sense used by Aristotle, as describing a life ended happily, can only be obtained in a universe ruled by Providence, God. Aristotle, on the other hand, would make the objective standard be in the rational order of the universe. Pleasure is a sign that the life is well ordered and happy. In both, it is not that which is striven after, but is a sign of the character of the life.

But this life which is both objectively and subjectively happy includes not only moral but physical and material well being. This is the character of Defoe's preaching. On the one hand no one is securely happy until he acts in the right manner. On the other hand no one can act nobly unless he is endowed with material possession. Aristotle is in hearty agreement on this point. He would maintain that while a virtuous life in the abstract is desirable

[1]Ibid, p. 30.

in itself, yet, in the concrete, a virtuous life without material possession would not be desirable. Virtue in the abstract is desirable, but an unhappy life, even though virtuous, would not be desirable. This is true for two reasons. Pleasure is an inseparable part of the good necessary to the constitution. Again, since virtue implies righteous activity, doing good is impossible for one without power to be virtuous. But a slave, for instance, cannot do good deeds since he is not master of his own actions. "Still, it is quite plain that it does require the addition of external goods, as we have said, because without appliances it is impossible, or at all events not easy to do noble action; for friends, money, and political influence are, in a manner, instruments whereby many things are done, for he is not at all capable of happiness who is very ugly or ill-born or solitary or childless."[1]

Turning now to the question of conduct, Aristotle finds a duality between theoretical and practical wisdom. From the standpoint of practical wisdom, all the virtues when examined and analyzed amount, in the end, to Prudence, which he defines as "a state of mind conjoined with reason and apt to do, having for its object those things which are good and bad for man."[2] As we remember, this conception applies equally well to the definition of Prudence in Defoe which we found to be the one fundamental virtue. Moral evil is essentially a deviation from practical wisdom.

But what is the rule or guide in regard to prudential action? And here our discussion must be extended to the doctrine of the mean, which is the most remarkable parallel between Defoe and Aristotle. As usual, they approach the matter from different standpoints. Defoe regards the mean as primarily a state of life, the position of security of a middle-class citizen, between the rich and the poor, which he regards as the norm for human achievement, the state most favorable to virtue and the growth of spiritual life. Aristotle regards the mean as a norm of conduct midway between excess and deficiency. According to his famous definition, virtue "is a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine. It is a middle state between

[1]Nechomachean Ethica, Book 1, Chap. 8, Section 12-14.
[2]Ibid, VI 5-2, p. 13.

two faults. One, in the way of excess on the one side and of effect on the other, and it is so, moreover, because the faulty states on the one side fall short of, and those on the others exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions, but Virtue finds and, when found, adopts the mean."[1] Defoe, however, would agree with Aristotle in this conception of Virtue, for whatever may be said as to the honesty of his heroes and heroines, in regard to the Ten Commandments, they always are neither rash nor cowardly, but courageous, a statement which holds good even of his female characters. The characters of the three Jacques are illustrations of the mean. One Jacque, the Captain, was much too open-hearted, frank, courageous and generous. The other, the major, was cowardly, envious, secretive and stingy. Colonel Jacque, who always performed the right action as he saw it, was courageous, self-controlled, liberal, munificent, kindhearted, and much enduring, yet within the bounds of self-respect. These virtues are the secret of his success, for he ends his days in wealth and respectability.

On the other hand, Aristotle would agree with Defoe in regard to the advantages of the middle state in life for the attainment of the good or happiness. This is defined by Aristotle as "co-extensive with this contemplative speculation, and in proportion as people have the act of contemplation, so far have they also the being happy not incidentally, but in the way of contemplative speculation, because it is so precious."[2] Such contemplation embraces the way of the universe, the nature of man, and all objects not of practical activity. It is the only genuine, personal, religious worship in Aristotle. Defoe is in remarkable, almost verbal, agreement with Aristotle here. Colonel Jacque says when he retires from active life in Mexico and has time for meditation: "And here I found just reflections were the utmost felicity of human life." So Robinson Crusoe finds the chief treasure on his island is the store of meditations in which he was enabled to indulge. And he ends his life in this way. Naturally, the subjects of meditation are different, to a large extent, since Crusoe is a Christian merchant and Aristotle a Greek philosopher, but both

[1]Ibid, Book 2, 6-10, p. 33.
[2]Ibid X 8-13.

agree as to the subjects of meditation in relation to the nature of man, God, and the universe, attributing to the meditation no practical purpose, but asserting that to be valuable for its own sake. Both seem to regard it as the highest form of divine worship. Finally, both are in agreement that external prosperity is necessary to this highest good, but not in excess. Aristotle here agrees with Defoe. "So Happiness must be a kind of contemplative speculation; but since it is man we are speaking of, he will need likewise External Prosperity, because his nature is not by itself sufficient for speculation, but there must be health of body and nourishment and tendance of all kinds. However, it must not be thought because without external goods a man cannot enjoy Happiness, that, therefore, he will require many and great goods in order to be happy; for neither self-sufficiency nor action stand in excess, it is quite possible to act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since, even with moderate means, a man may act in accordance with Virtue. And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power, *but even more*. . . . Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy when he said they were men moderately supplied with external goods and who have achieved the most noble deeds as he thought and who have lived with perfect self-mastery."[1]

We may then sum up the comparison and contrast between Defoe and Aristotle. (A) They differ in that Defoe was a believer in Providence and the Providential ordering of human affairs, while Aristotle was non-theistic in his cosmology and ethics.

Defoe grounds his ethics on Divine Sanctions; Aristotle on rational, while Defoe places a somewhat greater emphasis on Benevolence, yet his ethics are not quite as social as that of Aristotle, which culminates in his politics.

Defoe upholds the doctrine of repentance and moral change which is unknown to Aristotle.

All these differences are due to the fact of Defoe's Christian environment and belief, and also to the different standpoints taken by the two men, the one looking at the question from the standpoint of the good, the other that of evil.

---

[1]Nechomachean Ethics, Book 10, Chap. 8, Section 14-16.

(B) On the other hand, they agree in regard to:

(1) The grounding of human nature in the lower animal nature and its passion.

(2) In the conditioning of human nature and its proper functioning on economic and social adjustments and material prosperity.

(3) In the control and utilization of the lower passions by the higher reason.

(4) In accepting happiness as the good, in making it dependent to a large extent upon external goods, and in making its highest form a life of Contemplative Meditation.

(5) In the conception of moral choice as the rational selection of the means to happiness.

(6) In regarding Prudence as the primary virtue for the life of practical activity and as a necessary condition to the life of contemplation.

(7) In making the mean the standard of moral action, in conceiving evil as departure from the mean; in holding that the Good is attained by approach to the mean in believing that the mean station in life is the most conducive to the Good or Contemplative Meditation.

It is, thus, seen that on those points where Defoe's beliefs are not determined by his religious doctrines, he approaches closely the conception of human nature and its good found in the philosophy of Aristotle.

III.

RICHARDSON AND THE IDEALISM OF THE MORAL WILL.

Beyond all doubt Defoe's position has much to commend it. It has on its side the facts of human life and experience. It makes adequate provision for the religious life of the average man. It holds out hope and a second chance for those down and out. It is a good, workable, every-day philosophy for Crusoe's on desert islands with nothing but cats, goats, parrots or perhaps a man Friday. But here is the difficulty. Men do not live on desert islands. Life is the result of a conflict of personalities. My character makes and is made by those around me. Spirits are in continual process of formation, and if we are called upon to understand such phenomena Defoe will fail us. Nor, after all, can we get along with the average. We have to have that which is above the average. We have to have persons who make circumstances instead of being made by them. The need for heroic virtue is felt by the most common place of human beings. For even in the most exalted models we are enabled to see traces of ourselves which the most photographic of realists cannot help but overlook. It is to those then who seek for an understanding of life in the relation and inter-relation of personalities, ideal because they have been so completely realized by the author, that we must commend the works of Richardson, now that moral edification can no longer be sought from him as its original fount.

Certainly, few can now find much spiritual meat and drink in what Richardson regarded so important in his day, namely, the moral discourses and essays which he was inclined to append to his work, though fortunately the length of Clarissa is not to any extent produced by that factor. We must look for his real ethical teaching elsewhere.

Instead of the humanitarian element which is discovered in Defoe, we have in Richardson the ethic of personal relationships made an object of chief interest. What should be the proper relationship of husband and wife, of master and servant, of parent and child, of a girl to a betrothed? The ethical order Richardson

regards as relationship between persons falling into classes accordingly. In each of these classes there is submission on the one hand and superiority on the other. The superior member of each duality is to be obeyed insofar as obedience does not involve the violation of limits of the inferior's personality and the rights which are attached to it. In this emphasis on the rules of propriety governing personal relationships one cannot help being reminded of the ethics of Confucius. According to Richardson and Confucius the rules of propriety are to be obeyed because they are expressions of the eternal rule of reason or the ethical order.

The relationship of master and servant is one of mutual obligation. On the part of the servant there is the obligation of implicit obedience and almost feudal loyalty. Even the worst of his characters manifest this trait. Mrs. Jukes, bad as she is by nature, nevertheless is devoted to the interests of Mr. B.—her master. On the other hand, despite the demand for deference, the master is not only under the obligation to give good wages and kind treatment, but is regarded as responsible for the servants' moral and religious training. This is one of Pamela's main contributions to the order of Mr. B's household, nor could we expect that Sir Charles would be neglectful of his responsibility.

The treatment of the relationship between a girl and her fiancé is somewhat peculiar. Richardson was inclined to undervalue love between the sexes. He seems to have understood by it little more than mere animal hunger and so was at times inclined to undervalue it at best or to reprobate it at the worse. None of his heroines entertain any notions of high passion. It took the belief that Lovelace was sick unto death to draw any expression of regard from that model of the female virtues, Clarissa. Pamela keeps Mr. B. at a distance lest she lessen her value in his eyes. Man is something to be feared by the unmarried woman. A fiancé is to be ruled and kept at a distance. On the one side one owes obedience and devotion, on the other, faithfulness to the betrothal pledge. Anything more or less decreases the value of the woman and the man, respectively.

The duty of implicit subordination to the husband is enjoined on the wife. In fact, in many cases the claim on obedience is carried to the most extravagant lengths, as is the case of Mr. B.

and Mr. Harlowe. Nor is it based upon any belief in the intellectual or moral superiority on the part of the male, for Richardson had almost as high an opinion of the intellectual abilities of women as Defoe. Clarissa is expert in both Greek and Latin. Pamela becomes quite a scholar. Indeed, his women have much better minds than his men. It is rather based on religious and ethical grounds, on the commands of Scripture and the ethical principle of subordination. On the other hand, there are limits. No woman is obligated to sacrifice her personality or her moral freedom to her husband. Mrs. Harlowe is censured for having been overcome in her judgment by her husband and son. Pamela is perfectly justified in leaving her husband when she thinks he is going to live with another woman. The relationship is mutual.

Probably the principle which is carried to the most extravagant length is that of obedience of children to parents. The proper attitude of children to parents is not that of love and trust, but awe and fear. Clarissa believed, and the author leaves it an open question, that her misfortunes were due to the disobedience to her father, and were the fulfillment of his curse. On the other hand, Richardson blames her father for his insistence on the marriage to Soalms and uses it as a warning against the abuse of paternal power.

In conclusion, Richardson based his practical ethics upon a series of subordinations employing mutual obligation, not, however, of the kind implied by a mutual contract. These obligations are binding, even though one party does not observe them. The nature of these obligations is not grounded in love and affection, but in the moral or ethical order, in the obligation imposed upon the will expressed in the ordinances of the will of God.

Hence it follows that morality is even more firmly grounded in the religious consciousness than we found to be the case in Defoe.

Providence is operative in the affairs of men by rewarding the good and punishing the evil. But it is not a perfectly operated Providence. Sometimes the good are not fully rewarded in this life even though the evil are punished by no means in accord with their merits. The reward of good conduct comes always as the effect of the good conduct upon others. The punishment

for evil conduct is through a like reaction upon others. Providence is active through the wills of the individual. The religious attitude of Richardson is very much that of Defoe. However, he does not introduce dreams, signs, coincidences and special portents. Religion is something which comes as a result of education and spiritual example. Pamela's piety and good character are due to the good training given by her parents and her mistress. Clarissa owes what she is to the training of her aunt. Sir Charles has been educated in piety. Religion is then a growth. Its perfect flower of faith, hope and love is the result of seed implanted in youth. In case such instruction has not been given, the awakening of the religious and moral life comes as the result of the perception of the beauty of such a life in others. Mr. B. is converted by the sight of the heavenly purity of Pamela. Mrs. Jukes' heart is melted by her forgiveness. Mr. Belford is the legacy to the kingdom of Heaven which Clarissa left behind her, while Sir Hargrave Polfexen will owe his place among the angels to Sir Charles and the Divine Harriett. The good moral will is a creative power producing good in others.

With Richardson even more than with Defoe, religion is identified with unworldliness. That is to say, the religious life is not found expressed in the attitude to the world in general, but in the cultivation of moral character, the performance of the so-called religious duties contained in the virtues of faith, hope and charity. Yet, although unworldly in this sense, yet in another it is not so, for Richardson's novels are based upon the hypothesis that moral ideal is realizable in this life, and not only that, but it is the life which is best suited to succeed in this world. The highest type of human nature is also the most successful in dealing with the circumstances which so surround it.

This is what gives the peculiarly ideal character to Richardson's creations. As has been well said, his three works form three books of an 18th century Fairy Queen. The symbolic character is affected not by the process of realizing the ideal as is the method of Spencer, but by the process of idealizing the real, by making the actual presentations so complete and vivid that the character becomes a symbol.

Pamela has aptly been called the legend of Chastity. Chastity

must be invulnerable at all points even to force or fraud. It is, therefore, tested in all sorts of situations and nothing can move her in any one of them. When circumstances seem too strong, heaven intervenes in the form of "fits" and robs the spoiler. Finally, by the very power of its invulnerability, it conquers that which was opposed to it, and transforms it into its own nature.

Clarissa is the legend of holiness or the spiritual life. Her chief desire is to be rid of worldly troubles and cares. But the world will not let the unworldly creature alone. From one evil she flees to another. But even though she is overcome by force and fraud, they leave her unsoiled. In the final scene, the power of her holiness is demonstrated in that even though she dies to earth, yet her death is even more powerful for good than her life.

Sir Charles Grandison may aptly be called the Legend of Magnanimity, the union of all the heroic virtues combining chastity and holiness with invincible power. If magnanimity loses its power it ceases to exist. Therefore, no one can resist. Morally all men bow down and worship it, physically no one can overcome it. The testing of the great-hearted man must therefore come from within. It must have to do with those spots where he is strongest and therefore the most weak. The strongest points of a magnanimous gentleman lies in his honor as a gentleman. If that is true, how will he act if he is called upon to fight a duel which his honor calls for and which his religion speaks against? What, then, is the solution? The magnanimous man meets it in his own way by a personal appeal to the adversary, using the force of his personality to avert a duel. An even harder question, then, to the magnanimous man is that of love versus honor. True to himself, Sir Charles Grandison chooses the latter and only the religious scruples of his betrothed prevent the sacrifice of love.

The ethical structure of Richardson's novels is based on a testing of character by internal and external circumstances, so as to discover the real nature of the individual. Such a testing involves a choice as the initial situation. Each principal character is called upon to make a decision involving the whole moral nature of the individual. In Pemela it is a choice between yielding to a young man, handsome and wealthy, whom she secretly admires, or of resisting him. In Clarissa the more difficult question arises as to

whether one should yield up the integrity of one's personality to one's parents and marry a person most hateful in his nature or escape with a Lovelace. In Sir Charles the choice is between marriage to a beautiful girl with whom one is in love or faithfulness to Clementina to whom he is already engaged.

The complicating circumstance in each case is a clash of wills and purposes. In Pamela Mr. B.'s mere animal lust is soon overcome by the anger of a proud and haughty spirit, not accustomed to having its wishes resisted, much less defeated. In Clarissa this is two-fold. She is held as in a vise between the determined purpose of a stupid and arrogant family and the questioning desire of the intellectual libertine to test her virtue. In Sir Charles the complication is internal, a conflict between emotion and will and the triumph of the latter.

The resolving circumstance or ethical resolution is of a like nature. In Pamela it is the moral effect of her goodness and purity in awakening love in the heart of Mr. B. In Clarissa it follows from Clarissa's determination to keep herself from any further attacks by Lovelace even to the point of suicide. This enables her to escape. The circumstances which follow her escape produce the true resolution, her death and its ethical results, the conversion of Belford and the death of Lovelace. In Sir Charles the ethical resolution lies outside his will, as the complication lay in it. Clementina refuses to marry him because he is a Protestant, thus enabling him to marry Harriett.

Richardson brings us, then, into a world evolved entirely out of human nature in its various relationships. It is not human nature viewed chiefly from the standpoint of feeling. Feeling plays so great a part in Richardson's works as to give the impetus to the school of sentiment which deals largely in that commodity. True, people feel, and feel abundantly, but despite of this they do not act because they feel. They feel because they act as the result of action, or they feel when they do not act, as is the case with Miss Howe and Mr. Belford, who express abundance of feeling but do very little. Nor are actions governed by reason so much. Certainly, his characters are highly intellectual, mostly well educated, but each one would act the same even if he did not know how to read or write. Nor are they controlled by the

vast complex of motives which go to make up the person. His characters are very complex, drawn with a vast variety of shades of distinction in feeling and emotion. But the controls of motivations are not complex.

The basic factor in human personality, then, is the will. Richardson, in accordance with this principle, has endowed all his leading characters with strong and dynamic wills. A strong will involves steadfastness of purpose, perseverance towards its accomplishment and ability to resist outside influence directed against it. The Harlowes are by no means an utterly wicked or inhuman family. But they have convinced themselves that it is best that Clarissa marry Soalms to keep her out of the hands of Lovelace whom they detest. Against the barriers of this determination all Clarissa's tears, entreaties and humiliations melt away, with no effect save to intensify the purpose. Clarissa herself is a girl eighteen years old and tenderly reared, but for two volumes of agony she holds out alone against the combined weight of her family and relations. She shifts her ground, makes evasion after evasion, offers compromise after compromise, even agrees not to marry at all, but she is steadfast on the one point amid all her tears and lamentations. When in the power of Lovelace, she never once loses her head but keeps him at a distance with ever firm determination. And when she lies broken and on her deathbed probably the greatest part of tragedy is that her pride in the independency of her will is humiliated, though it is not broken. Lovelace is even a stronger illustration of this dominance of the volitional element. He is by no means the commonplace sensualist or libertine. In fact, Richardson has not overendowed him with physical desire. He is the incarnate man of action. As he himself says, he could have been a great general. He is a misdirected genius finding its expression in woman hunting. He is overflowing with vitality, intellectual and physical. Even when forced to be quiet he is full of schemes, plans and plots. He goes into elaborate descriptions of his various plots in the past and is continually forming new ones of the wildest character, such as the Howe abduction scheme. He is never content unless he is doing something, carrying out some plan or devising some new one. His ruling motive is the mastery over the wills of others,

the conquest of their purposes by his own. He can go into a room full of hostile people and in a short while turn them almost into friends. Nor does he care to carry out a conquest so long as it lies in his power. In the case of Rosebud, the acknowledgment by the mother of his power over the girl was sufficient to make him yield to her request and let the child alone. Even little Pamela despite displays of emotion, ravings, faintings, tears and hysteria, is perfect master over herself and controls these displays of feeling as a master controls his horses. She can cry, throw a fit, come out of it as need be, whenever she finds the season demands such a display. All the time she has her eye first on delivering herself from Mr. B., then on keeping him off until her marriage, and then upon converting him into a model of religious devotion after she has married him. And although Sir Charles is given no great opportunity for display of will power, yet the description given of his character and his actions put him in that class of individuals.

The secret of human nature lies in the will. The ground and motive of action then must lie in that which is the particular prerogative of the will, freedom. The desire for freedom, the desire of the individual to express his or her inner nature in a manner unhindered by the whims of others is the strongest motive in all action. It expresses itself in various forms. In the fine scorn poured upon the men who call women goddesses and angels before marriage and treat them like slaves afterwards, in the attitude which Richardson shows at times of looking upon marriage as a tribute to human weakness, in the petulant and rebellious conduct of a Miss Howe or a Charlotte Grandison, both to their lovers and husbands, in the serene determination of Pamela, to do what she pleases even when she deals with the autocratic Mr. B., in Clarissa's willingness to yield to her parents on all points except the one on which she has staked her will, in the scorn Lovelace shows to all who would attempt to control him, and lastly in Sir Charles' perfect mastery over himself and circumstances in which we see freedom having its perfect work—in these and many more instances we find the central motive and ground of human action clearly delineated as Richardson viewed it. Such a freedom is not something objective, that is, the removal

of objective barriers (although it may and does express itself at times in such a form), but it is rather the hatred of the feeling of such barriers, no matter how limited the life of a person may be by circumstances of convention or custom, even beyond the ordinary lot of mankind or womankind. Clarissa is quite content if she is allowed to renounce marriage altogether and become a Protestant nun. Miss Howe on the other hand would boil and rage even under the restriction which her easily managed mother attempts to place upon her, while to Lovelace any prohibition, even that of hatred, is a challenge to a struggle.

Human nature, then, attempts to will its own freedom in the midst of the social relationships. The sphere of its activity, Richardson seems to think, does not lie, as with Defoe, in the realm of unconscious circumstance, but in the domain of the personal and moral values. The result is that the task it confronts is much more difficult than that of one dealing with the world of natural circumstance. In the first place, there is spiritual realm of God, the revealer of the religious and moral law who demands the devotion to the practical duties which are peculiar to it. These practical duties form the proper outlet of human nature. These duties are limited and demarcated by the relationships described a few pages ago. But here the problem becomes more complex than the one presented by Defoe. Good and evil are self-propagating entities. Each action or character is but one in an endless chain of characters, one in a series of moral causation. It is this which makes the question of moral action such an intense one. In Clarissa's case we have four generations of ethical propagation; Clarissa's aunt and instructress transmitted their devout character to Clarissa. Clarissa produces a spiritual growth in the life of Belford and Belford raises up his children in the way in which he was changed. In Pamela we have three generations. The simple, homely, saving piety of the Andrews family, Pamela herself rising from the principle of cultivated piety, and Pamela's children and her step-child, Miss Godwin, raised up in her own image. In Lovelace we have three generations. Moral indifference and neglect on the part of his parents, Lovelace himself in defiance of moral and social restrictions, and the inhabitants of Mrs. Sinclare's house sunken in sensuality and degeneracy

through his action. Through the action of moral causation the field of the action of human nature is given a cosmic significance; it is extended to include the whole life of the race. Both good and evil which men do lives after them. Neither is interred with their bones.

If the will is the fundamental or unifying principle of human nature, if freedom is the ground and motive of human action, and if the lives of the self and other selves is the field of its action, what then is the distinction between the nature of the good will and the evil will? For it is clear that on the above grounds evil must be located in human nature, especially in the human will. External things are only relative evils. To the lovers of God all things are worked together for good. Metaphysical evil can, in addition, find no place in a world in which the real corresponds with the ideal order.

Evil, then, is located in the will, in the direction or ground of the will's action. If a will, instead of finding its freedom in accordance with the principles of good, that is, of the law, finds it in the dominance and control of other persons, in the mere exercise of its powers, whether it be for good or evil, we have the essence of the immoral or depraved will. This finds its expression in an immense variety of forms. On the lowest forms it expresses itself in petty tyrannies which grow, as in the case of the Harlowes, into gross indignities, even to one who is loved, when opposition is encountered. On a higher level it finds its expression in the attempt of wicked and debased persons such as Mrs. Jukes or Mrs. Sinclare's girls, to level down a pure person like Clarissa to their moral state. In its highest expression, as in Lovelace, it may find its nature in benevolence and kindness to those who like Rosebud and her mother acknowledge his power. The evil will treats persons as things, mere objects on which to exert its power, finding its chief end and delight in the exercise of such an authority.

As opposed to evil which finds its expression in the exercise of mere power, the good finds its expression in the will to righteousness. The aim of good action is righteousness or moral perfection. The ground or motive of such an action is found in duty in general and in the religious and social duties which form

the limiting ground of action in this world. They include the duty of prayer and the cultivation of the attitude of trust and submission; the natural duties laid down by the law of nature of child to parent, of wife to husband, of servant to master; the benevolent duty, the relief of suffering and the cultivation of piety in others. We have already given examples of each of these in our previous discussion.

Freedom thus finds a content, an expression in the moral will. It regards and treats human beings as human beings, and not as things. The moral obligations are raised from the categories of social duties and are placed within the domain of divine law. It is the will of God for all men for a perfect society that I should so act. Richardson in his final ethical consideration has risen far beyond the realm of feeling and sentiment into the realm of the right.

The good, that which is desirable for human beings, is not to be found in happiness. It is to be found in moral perfection. It does not matter whether the righteous person is fortunate or not, he is still to be regarded as having a more desirable condition than that of the less perfect. Clarissa, slowly dying of tuberculosis in her lodging or cast into the noisesome depths of a London sponging house, is regarded as a greater inducement to right conduct, as in a higher state, in a more desirable condition than Miss Howe in comfort, or even Pamela, after her trials have been rewarded. Richardson makes us feel this through his long description of the last days of Clarissa.

As opposed to the evil the good is a state of character, a conformity to virtue. Such a good deserves to include physical well being. In fact, it deserves to include a state of well being such as is not attainable on this earth. In this respect the ideal and the real orders do not coincide. It is therefore a chief article of religious faith that only by immortal bliss can such a conformity of happiness and virtue be supposed to exist. The Christian faith makes us believe in this. Only heaven is the proper sphere of Clarissa's virtue, yet even if virtue were unrewarded virtue would be the good in itself. Immortality can but illumine and bring into clearer view the virtue of the saint. It can add nothing to it.

An examination of the virtuous character brings to light the details of its conformity. The righteous soul is completely obedient to the commands of duty. All the obligations which are imposed upon it, it cheerfully performs, even to the final demand, the call for a cheerful acceptation of the necessity of death. Hence he is free. There are no external compulsions. The good man or woman accepts the conditions which are regarded as right and hence is not compelled. Finally he treats persons as persons and not as means but as ends. These characteristics, when embodied in the life of a person go to make up the ideal of heroic virtue.

This conception of heroic virtue, a virtue which, as has been seen, rises superior to external circumstances and internal weakness, is not only the conception which distinguished Richardson from Defoe, but is a mark of the ethics of Kant as compared with that of Aristotle. In two places in the Metaphysic of Ethics, Kant condemns the doctrine of the mean as the determining ground between virtue and vice. Genuine virtue, according to Kant and Richardson, is something more than a glorified prudence such as the practical morality of Defoe amounts to. Real virtue is not merely decreasing the quantity of one action in favor of another, but acting on a different principle. Kant, illustrating from the vice of avarice, says that "Profusion and hoarding then, differ not in degree, but they are specifically distinct in respect to their being contrary and inconsistent maxims."[1] In the case of Richardson examples have already been given of this principle of the qualitative difference in an action motivated by duty and one motivated by self-love, as, for example, in the second case, Lovelace's treatment of Rosebud, and in the first, Harriett's forgiveness of Sir Hargrave Polfexen. Both are externally beneficent actions. Only the second, however, is morally good.

Between the absolute ethical teachings of the two there is little disagreement. True, there is little in Kant of the emphasis on the five social relationships which play so large a part in Richardson. But these are not fundamental to the latter's ethical order. Certain of these duties need not be incurred, while in regard to the highest of them, that of parent and child, there are obligations, that of religion and moral freedom, which rise

[1]Kant's Metaphysic of Ethics. II. 1-1-1—2-10. Semple, p. 49.

superior to them. Furthermore, Richardson is in substantial agreement with the individual ethical duties which Kant imposes. The former agrees with Kant in making personal freedom the only birth-right belonging to man by force of his humanity. This emphasis is not to be neglected in Richardson as has been observed in the preceding pages. Both would agree that every person has a right to liberty insofar as it does not interfere with the rights of others. Both find the two-fold moral obligation, the physical and ethical perfection of one's self, and the obligation to advance the happiness of others. Both would lay great emphasis on conscience as the determinant to duty. The resemblance of the two writers is nowhere more clearly noticeable than in the conception of the inner spiritual character of virtue. According to Kant, virtue is marked by inner freedom. "This inner freedom demands two things; the first, that mankind in any unforseen emergency remain master of himself; and, second, that he suffer not the empire of his own reason to be usurped by his appetites and passions. The state and tone of the soul is by such inward freedom, noble and erect; by the contrary, abject and servile."[1] This is illustrated by the examples of Pamela and Clarissa in moments of sudden trial and temptation. The character of the change which came over Mr. B. is illustrated by a comparison with his attitude to Pamela in the first part of that work, and to the Countess, in the second.

In regard to the ethical system expounded by the two writers, there seems to be no essential disagreement. They agree in the conception of suicide, unchastity and gluttony as sins against the self. Nor is there any essential difference as to nature or classification of the vices condemned. Finally, both are in agreement in the denial that virtue is something innate in man since both hold that it is something taught, propagated through instruction and example, and that nothing is more conducive to virtue than the perception of the ideal of heroic virtue. With Kant this is the unembodied ideal. On the other hand, Richardson respects the ideal embodied in a human form. It may be added that the first two of Richardson's works correspond roughly to the first part of the duties one owes to one's self, while the third corresponds

[1]Metaphysic of Ethics. Chapt. 3. Part 2. Introduction 15. Semple, p 225.

to the duties one owes to others. Thus Pamela which, as has been remarked above, is an illustration of Chastity, may be said to correspond to the duties which man owes himself as an animal, while Clarissa, the prototype of holiness, illustrates the duties man owes himself as a moral being. Thus Pamela resists the impulse to suicide, a resistance marking the turning point in her trials. The earlier part is a testing of her chastity. Clarissa, on the other hand, finds that her code centers in humility, holiness and reverence for God as the great Lawgiver and Judge. She is contemplative and meditates on her moral progress. This is the highest form of the virtues which relate to the self. In the case of Sir Charles, on the other hand, the relationship of duty is primarily in regard to his fellow men so as to achieve the happiness of those who surround him.

It would seem, then, that both Kant and Richardson would agree in the conception of "Virtue as the strength of human nature in the execution of duty. All strength is ascertained by the obstacles which it is able to overcome. Virtue has to combat against the physical instincts which these thwart and collide with man's ethical resolves."[1] No better motto could be placed upon an edition of Richardson's works than this. But it raises the question as to what is nature of the human will, and its relation to virtue and duty. This brings us to the conception of human nature.

It may be safely affirmed that both Richardson and Kant agreed in making the will the ground of human nature, and the world order a conflict of wills. It is true that in Kant's earlier work of the critical period, this is not quite clear. In the Kritik of Pure Reason he seems at times to reduce all actions to the sphere of mechanical causality. It seems to offer little hope. In the latter part of the Kritik he advances the doctrine that due to the fact the mechanical order is phenomenal and dependent for its character on the noumenal, a causality of freedom is possible. In the Kritik of Pure Reason he merely shows its possibility. He admits that it is impossible to understand how it could be, but it is no more so than the question of the relation of the noumenal to the phenomenal realm in general. In the Metaphysical Foundations

[1]Ibid, ii No. 9. Semple, p. 211.

of Ethics, he shows the necessity of such a freedom. He identified the practical reason with the will and identified the will with the noumenal self which acts in all cases of free action. "Will is that kind of causality attributed to living agents in so far as possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality which enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes."[1] Every intelligent being possesses this freedom and in holding this Kant seems to identify the noumenal self with the rational will.

The question then arises: Does Kant hold that life is essentially a conflict and interaction of wills? To understand his position in regard to this, it is necessary to consider his interpretation of the problem of evil. Here, as in regard to the question of the nature of the noumenal self, Kant's views become clearer with his later works. In the Kritik of Pure Reason is found a sharp distinction between sensibility on the one hand, and reason on the other, which he identified with the dualism between the two springs of action, self-love and duty. In the period between the Metaphysical Foundations of Ethics and the book on Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason, he seems to have attempted to bridge the gap between the doctrine of the first two Kritiks in regard to the nature of man after the same fashion as he treated the philosophy of nature in the Kritik der Judgment. There are three elements constituting human nature, as a moral person, the sensuous nature, the rational nature and the volitional nature. It follows that there are three springs of action productive of evil. "The first is animality of self-preservation, sexuality, and sociality, which perverted, produce the animal vices; the second, the substratum of man's humanity is comparative self-love for which theoretical reason is required whereby we deem ourselves happy or the reverse when compared with others as a standard giving rise to the civilized vices of envy, ingratitude and malice; the third is man's pre-disposition for personality which consists in such reverence towards the moral law as is in itself sufficient to make the law the immediate spring of will. The first spring of evil is found in the frailty of our nature; the second, in the impurity of our intentions; the third, in the bias to follow merely evil

[1]Metaphysical Foundations of Ethics, Chapt. 3. Semple, p. 57.

maxims and is the depravity of man's nature."[1] All these three elements go to make up man's nature as a human being and their misdirection constitutes the evil in man's nature. The only one good or evil in itself is the third from which the first two derive their ethical character.

It would seem, therefore, that the root and ground of the evil in man's nature lies in self-will, the desire to assert one's own private individual will contrary to the universal law of duty. The exact content of such a depraved will is made clear by an examination of what constitutes a violation of the three maxims constituting the categorical imperative. These are: (a) that one should follow only those maxims which can be made a universal law, (b) that each rational being should be treated as an end in himself and (c) that each person should act as if he were a member of a kingdom of ends. The violation of these maxims would be to establish a law for one's self which is not valid for the entire universe. (b) To treat human nature as if it were not an end in itself but a mere phenomenal being. (c) To deny the moral unity of the universe. What Kant understood by the third statement of the categorical imperative is seen in the book on Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason when the ethical commonwealth in which all the people of God are combined under moral laws is made the goal of moral action. This kingdom of God or society of persons freely interacting in obedience to law would seem then to constitute the ultimate ideal of the categorical imperative. The attempt then of Fichte to reduce the wills to one would seem to be contrary to the teaching of Kant.

But such a society does not yet exist. As it stands in the present order of humanity, the unity is only ideal. In reality there is a plurality of wills falling into two classes, good and depraved. The good are those who have accepted duty as the norm of action, and the kingdom of God, as the ideal. The evil of those who are motivated by the three forms of egoism, the unconscious egoism of common life, the egoism excited by the social relations, and the fully conscious egoism of the perverted will, which uses other persons and its own moral nature for selfish purposes. Opposed to

[1]Kant's "Werke" (G. Hartenstein) Sechster Band, pp. 120-122. Semple. Ibid, pp. 122-126.

this kingdom of evil is the kingdom of good composed of those who are motivated by love and reverence for duty and the belief that the moral laws are divine commands.

It can be seen that the position outlined in the above paragraphs coincides to some degree of accuracy with the conclusions reached in regard to Richardson. All his characters are motivated by the will. Life is an interaction of wills. There is also found the striking contrast between the ideal such as Sir Charles Grandison and Clarissa who are motivated by the sense of duty to the law as a divine command and the others who are more or less controlled by egoism, the desire to dominate other persons, to gratify their desires or their sense of power. Richardson distinguishes quite clearly between all these three grades of evil. In the first place, there are men like Mr. Belford and the other companions of Lovelace who illustrate the perversion of purely animal desire. Again, we have types like Arabella Harlowe and her brother, who, roused to hatred of Clarissa by the comparison of her beauty and charm with their own lack of it, seek an outlet for its gratification in their persecution of her. Finally, we have Lovelace whose chief end is to use other persons as the instruments of his will and the means to his purpose. There is a deepening degree of evil. The first is represented as disgusting, the second, as dangerous, and the third, fearful. Each grows into the other. Lovelace began with the submission to the dictates of sense. The deceit practiced by his mistress gave rise to the dictates of malice against the whole female sex which finally deepened into the third type of moral perversion, which had been the source of the other two being recognized as the end of action. Many times this deepening of moral guilt under the influence of the innate depravity of human nature is noted. Lust is seated hard by hate.

Lovelace is an example of this fundamental perversion of the moral law in all three of its forms. His success and power consisted in the fact that his actions were the exception and not the rule. A world of Lovelaces could not exist. Again he used persons as the means to the gratification of his love of power. Lastly, his action was destructive of the moral order which constitutes the kingdom of ends.

In regard to the good, both Kant and Richardson agree that

moral perfection is the only intrinsic good but that happiness is what every person desires. Both agree that good ought to be rewarded and evil punished, though whether one is rewarded for the good or not makes no difference as to the moral quality of the action. Both base the reason for the existence of a future life upon the reality of the harmony between virtue and happiness.

Having thus shown the essential similarity between the thought of Richardson and Kant, it will not be amiss to sum up their points in common:

A. General Problems.

a. Ethics. Both agree in the acceptance of the ideal of heroic virtue, that is, a virtue superior to internal weakness and external circumstance. Both in doing this, protest against making virtue a matter of degree and not of kind. An action motivated by virtue is an action motivated by good will. In regard to specific ethical problems, we find the same essential agreement.

b. Religion. Both regard religion as essentially ethical. It is obedience to the moral law, regarded as the expression of the divine will.

c. Ethical Structure. Both regard life as essentially a testing of virtue. "All strength is ascertained by the obstacles it is able to overcome."

d. The natural and the moral orders. They agree in the subordination of the natural order to the ethical order. The natural order is the means whereby the ethical order is carried out.

e. Freedom. They agree in the conception of freedom as threefold. (1) As freedom of choice, as independence of determination by sensitive stimulants, that is, independence of external circumstance; (2) as voluntary obedience to the moral law; (3) personal freedom, the freedom of self-expression in so far as it does not interfere with any other person's freedom.

B. Special Problems.

a. Human nature. They agree that (a) the ground of human nature is the will, (b) that it is constituted independently of circumstance, (c) that its proper field of action is the interaction with other wills. The human will necessarily interacts with other wills.

b. Evil.

(a) Location. They agree that evil is located in the whole personality, mental, moral, and physical, but that its essential character is a perversion of the will.

(b) Nature. They hold that evil is essentially self-will or separation from the moral order which expresses itself either as animal impulse, social maladjustment or radical self-assertion.

(c) Good.

(a) Morally Good. They believe that a moral will is the only thing having moral worth.

(b) They believe that the good will deserves happiness. It is thus seen that on all essential points Richardson and Kant are in agreement. Moreover, this agreement could, if one so desired, be pushed into details more than sufficient to justify the parallelism which this chapter has attempted to demonstrate.

IV

FIELDING AND EMPIRICAL REALISM

Despite the immense popularity enjoyed by Richardson, neither Pamela nor Clarissa were suffered to pass uncriticized. The chief attacks were directed against the two presuppositions which lay at the basis of his ethical structure: the idealizing observable in the treatment of his characters, and the tendency to assume that the ideal and the real orders coincide in this life. In Clarissa, Richardson modifies this latter doctrine and recognizes the necessity of a future life for the proper adjustment between virtue and reward. But in Pamela he had seemed to teach the contrary. And it was Pamela which drew forth the attack of Fielding.

According to the latter, virtue is not rewarded as perfectly as Richardson maintained and the purpose of the novel is not to depict characters, ideal either in virtue or vice, but to body forth human nature as it comes under observation in daily life. "Human nature is the dish which he sets before his readers."

In the development of his own position, Fielding mustered the wealth of a philosophic training, unexcelled in his own day. He was, it seems, well read in the ethical controversies of the 17th and early 18th centuries which had produced many thinkers in this field. Chief and most influential of these was the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, to whom Fielding refers and by whom he was greatly influenced in regard to the following elements.

Shaftesbury's system was found on a threefold motivation. In the first place, there was a strong reaction against that type of egoism of which Hobbes is the classic representative opposed to the latter. Its fundamental principle was the social nature of man. Man never did and never could have existed in an unsocial state of nature. It was as natural for him to love his fellows as it was for him to love himself. "And thus in the main sum of Happiness there is scarce a single Article that does not derive itself from social love and depends immediately on the natural and kind affections."[1]

Again, Fielding was impressed by the strong reaction against

[1]Shaftesbury's "Inquiry Concerning Moral Virtue," Prt. 2, Sec. 1, Bk. 2.

intellectualism discovered in Shaftesbury's system as a whole. The moral judgment was like the aesthetic judgment based on a response in feeling to the beautiful or pleasing. "So in behaviour and actions, when presented to our understanding there must be found of necessity an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects. It feels a soft and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here as in any musical number or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things."[1]

Good, then, is beautiful conduct; evil, ugly conduct. But what is the criterion of the beautiful and ugly in conduct? This brings us to the third motive of Shaftesbury's ethics, i. e. the attempt to combine the inner motive with outer expression. The objective criterion of a good action is the good of the whole of the human race which he holds to be identical with the good of the individual. But an action is not necessarily good because it is helpful to the human race. The thing of ethical worth is the motive which produces the action. A chained tiger is not good because he cannot do any harm. "The creature, notwithstanding his good conduct, is intrinsically as of little worth as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort."[2] Only good action produced by the native character of an animal can be called morally good.

The term used by Shaftesbury to describe these springs of action is affections. Probably the best definition of this term is that of impulse of feeling ending in action. Beautiful conduct, then, is such conduct as is motivated by good affections; ugly conduct is that motivated by evil affections. "Whatever is done through unequal affection is iniquitous, wicked, wrong."[3]

There are three groups of these affections; "the natural, which lead to the good of the public; the self affections, which lead only to the good of the private; or such as are neither of these nor tending to any good of public or private, but contrary wise and which may be justly styled unnatural affections."[4] The moral quality of an individual's character depends upon the extent of

[1]Rand; Classical Moralists, pp. 321-322.
[2]Inquiry, Bk. 1, Prt. 2, Sec. 1.
[3]Inquiry, Bk. 1, Prt. 2, Sec. 3.
[4]Same; Bk. 2, Prt. 1, Sec. 3.

the elimination of the unnatural affection and the proper balance between the social and the self affections. Such a balance depends upon the proper functioning of the moral sense which Shaftesbury in certain aspects identifies with Conscience.

The good or happiness of the individual coincides with that of the social group to which he belongs. This is due to the social nature of man which causes each one to find his happiness in the society of others. It is, of course, possible for one to have the social passions too strongly developed, but under normal conditions the three following propositions describe the situation. "(1) That to have the natural, kindly and generous affections strong and powerful towards the good of the public is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment and that to want them is certain misery and ill. (2) That to have the private or self-affections too strong or beyond their degree of subordinancy to the kindly and natural is also to be miserable. (3) That not to have the natural affections is to be miserable to the highest degree."[1] Despite the doctrine of the balance of affections, social love which he seems to understand as the desire of pleasure in the fellowship of others comes to be regarded as almost the fundamental virtue.

It was this emphasis which seems to have impressed Fielding the most in Shaftesbury's teaching. Virtue is something natural to man not imposed from without by the will of God nor found in reason, but in the emotions and by uncorrupted human conscience. That the virtue of Prudence had only a major place in Shaftesbury's ethic seems to have impressed Fielding, also.

Such was Fielding's philosophy as he had learned it from Shaftesbury. On the other hand, he had come from clerical ancestry and had been trained in orthodox Christianity, which he accepted whole-heartedly. He had, like Captain Booth, probably been in his youth a Deist and Hedonist. But he had for a long time been brought back to orthodox belief. To him religion meant three things, the dictates of a kind and benevolent heart, morality and orthodoxy, and other worldliness. Here, as usual, Fielding follows the beliefs of common sense. It is noticeable that along with his contemporaries Fielding did not understand

[1]Same; Bk. 2, Prt. 1, Sec. 3.

emotion in religion. The Wesleyan Movement left him untouched. To him faith meant merely orthodoxy. This is seen in Parson Adams' repudiation of justification by faith. To him it means justification by belief. In essence, then, religion outside of the first usage is an orthodoxy plus a code of ethics beyond that called for by the mere dictates of good nature. Such a code is unworldly, calling for chastity, integrity and honesty. The result is a conflict in the judgment on moral question between Fielding's head and his heart. His head, his religious beliefs, condemned in not uncertain terms unchastity, dueling, and other forms of human weakness. His heart excused them. Thus the dual is exposed to gentle ridicule in the person of Colonel Bath. Jones' honor demands what his religion condemns, and he follows his honor. The pious lieutenant hopes that God will make exception in favor of military men in regard to duels. Jones' first delinquency is due to the girl herself, the second to drink. Even in regard to Captain Booth's indiscretion with Miss Mathews, he points out that the young lady had used "her utmost endeavours to ensnare poor Booth's constancy. Let the reader set before his eyes a fine young woman in a manner a first love, conferring obligations and using every art to soften, to adhere, to win and to enflame, let him consider the time and place; let him remember that Mr. Booth was a young fellow in the highest vigor of life, and lastly let him add one circumstance that the parties were alone together; and then if he will not acquit the defendant, he must be convicted, for I have nothing more to say in his defence." Evidently Fielding acquitted the defendant.

Towards sins of sense, sins of weakness, sins of custom, then, Fielding was the embodiment of leniency. But against sins of venality, hypocrisy, and intolerance he was implacable. So much so, indeed, that he is incapable of understanding or sympathizing with one who is not understanding and sympathetic. He hates hypocrisy to such an extent that his hypocrites and villains are unreal. Blifil is a figure head, Jonathan Wild is a phantasm, a mere collection of odious and hateful traits. To the hypocrite, the villain and fanatic as well as to the hero and saint, Fielding's art does not extend. He can not understand either, although he admits the existence of both. He is also excluded from the higher

reaches of the emotions. The glow of patriotism is singularly absent. Again, in his interpretation of love he does not admit a third between sexual desire and benevolent companionship. He admits the two can mingle and heighten each other, but he fails to make it seem real. He was incapable of comprehending, or rather, giving expression to, romantic passion.

Understanding these limitations due to environment and belief, we find ourselves driven back to the question as to whether the real and ideal orders coincide. Is virtue a possible course of action in this life? That is, is virtue as Fielding, agreeing with Shaftesbury has defined it, good will, benevolence, good nature, and social feeling, controlling at times a way of life which is best adapted to happiness in this world, or, if one prefers the term, success in this world?

In Jonathan Wild he presents this problem by means of a contrast between the good and its opposite, viewed from their most extreme positions. Jonathan Wild is the incarnation of all that is bad and wicked. He is motivated entirely by the self regarding impulses or passions. He is, as Fielding points out, ideally wicked. The author describes his character in the final chapter of the book, "as his most powerful and predominant passion was ambition, so nature had with consummate propriety adapted all his faculties to attaining those glorious ends to which this passion directed him. He was entirely free from modesty and good nature. His lust was inferior only to his ambition. His avarice was immense but it was of the rapatious, not of the tenacious kind . . . The character which he most valued himself upon and which he principally honored in others was that of hypocrisy." Fielding adds to the postscript Jonathan Wild's maxims of which these are a sample. "(2) To know no distinction of men from affection but to sacrifice all with equal readiness to his interest. (6) To shun poverty and distress and to ally himself as close as possible with power and riches. (10) That all men were knaves or fools and much the greater number a composition of both. (15) That the heart was the proper seat of hatred, and the countenance of affection and friendship." Wild always made use of the hands of others to commit his crimes. "Now we come to the second part of this division viz; of those who employ hands for their own

use only; and this is that noble and great part who are generally distinguished into conquerors, absolute princes, statesmen, and prigs (that is, thieves). Now all these differ from each other in greatness only as they employ more or fewer hands. Now suppose a prig had as many tools as a prince or minister ever had, would he not be as great as any prince or minister whatsoever? Undoubtedly he would." In a word Fielding maintains that the same qualities which make for greatness or success in statesmen, conquerors, and rulers, in general, are the anti-social qualities disguised under the mark of hypocrisy. He holds that from this standpoint, humanity and generosity are weaknesses, defects in greatness.

On the other hand, we have the good man, Mr. Thomas Heartfree, who was of an honest and open disposition. "He was of that sort of men whom experience only, and not their own natures, must inform that there are such things as deceit and hypocrisy in the world. He was good natured, friendly and generous to great excess."

The great man, the one best suited for success in this world who uses others to accomplish his own ends, is opposed to the good man, one who comes up to the demands of the right. Certainly up to the end, Wild has advantages on his side. He is successful with his band of thieves whom he rules with fear, betraying to the authorities those who show signs of insubordination. He acquires great wealth through his rapacity, at last he falls within the grip of the law and is hanged only because the law through whose defect he has been permitted to function has been changed and strengthened through producing a change in the conditions of the game. Fielding admits that it is seldom that such a perfect consummation of greatness is attained in this life as the hanging of Wild.

On the other hand, Heartfree, who trusts Wild's character, is robbed, charged with a crime of which he is not guilty, convicted, and but for the break up of the gang which followed Wild's conviction, would have been hanged. His wife went through a series of dangerous adventures and barely escaped with life and honor.

In Joseph Andrews the problem is presented from a new angle. The proposition is advanced that the very good qualities of persons

make for misfortune. The only person who took mercy on Joseph as he lay naked in the road is a boy who was subsequently transported for hen stealing. Joseph himself because of his virtue is discharged from his place. Fanny's love leads her into great danger, while Parson Adams' simplicity of heart and belief in the goodness of human nature causes him to fall into a pig sty, then into a bucket of water and finally to get a beating, all because of his good qualities. On the other hand, Mrs. Bobby who represents the self-seeking and mercenary qualities, suffers little or no inconvenience.

In Tom Jones the contrast is further extended. The contrast is drawn between that hero and the other characters who follow the rule of selfishness. The minor characters, as well as Blifil, are governed by selfish impulses and motives. They remain in prosperity. Blifil, who is the exact opposite of Jones, succeeds in ousting Jones from his position, and only accident brings punishment upon his head. Even then Jones' kindness prevents this punishment from being severe and he has a good position with the chance of making a fortune by means of hypocrisy. Mrs. Fitzpatrick has a good time. On the other hand, because of his very good qualities, Jones almost becomes the victim of circumstances. His genuine love for Sophia is one cause for his loss of favor. His kindness to Black George and his trust in that gentleman is another potent factor, while his resolve to break off relations with Lady Balliston leads, at its accomplishment, to his being thrown into prison, whence he escapes by good fortune. Finally, the honorable character of the lieutenant has not only failed to advance him, but has held him back in his advancement. His lovableness has stood in his way.

In Amelia the case is made more acute. Every action that Booth himself performs, whether good or bad, leads to misfortune. He interferes in defense of a weaker party in a fight and is thrown by an unjust magistrate into prison. He gambles and, of course, loses. He becomes the victim of both his good and evil qualities once the fates seem to turn against him. And in suffering this he involves Amelia who is pure love and beauty of character. Mrs. Ellison lives in respectability, while Colonel and Mrs. James have all the good fortune of a fashionable husband and wife.

It seems that the contrast between the good and the great, between the virtuous and the happy, between those who attain moral success, those who attain success in character, and those capable of success in ordinary affairs, has been so emphasized that Fielding might be said to uphold the position that there is no place for a good man in this world, that to be honest is to be unhappy. The gulf between goodness and happiness has become so widened that it will need some philosophy beyond that of Shaftesbury to close it if we are not to fall into pessimism. But it is a contrast with pessimism that although the accidents lend to misfortune for the good person, yet events finally turn out happily. Poetic justice has its dues despite circumstances. We are thus led to the ethical structure.

As we have seen, the plot structure of Defoe and Richardson was that of action and reaction, the evil forces working up to the central part of the book, and the reaction against evil working toward the latter part. Fielding, on the other hand, at his best adopts the dramatic knot structure. That structure gives an increasing complication up to the end of the book where the situation is so worked out that by one stroke or movement the knot is dissolved. The dissolution begins, where all the threads run together. In Joseph Andrews this is the adventure at Mr. Wilson's. In Tom Jones this is the adventure at Upton. The resolving factor is always something external to the main drift of the plot. The resolution is always introduced extra.

The ethical structure follows in the same manner. There is little of this structure in Joseph Andrews, but in the other three works, it may always be described as a plot of a selfish, self-seeking, evil person against an imprudent, generous, good person. It is a conflict of prudence against benevolence. In this it is usually complicated by the problem of love versus lust. In Jonathan Wild, that person attempts to get possession of Heartfree's money as well as his wife. In Joseph, it is the desire of Lady Booby for the handsome Joseph. In Tom Jones, it is partly monetary, Blifil's main desire being for the estate of Allworthy. In Amelia, it is the desire of the noble peer and Colonel James to possess Amelia.

The complicating element lies in the mistake or error due to weakness on the part of the good person due to imprudence or

sin which leads to unforeseen circumstances. Even Wild had not intended to have Heartfree executed. In Tom Jones this error of the inexperienced judgment deepens into imprudence and the sins of sensuality and weakness. Thus the first affair with Molly Seagrim is the beginning of his trouble, his joy at Mr. Allworthy's recovery causes him to get drunk, which produces his second affair with Molly, and this in turn produces the fight with Blifil and Thwackum, one of the main occasions of his rejection. The affair at Upton causes him to miss Sophia, while that with the Lady Balliston almost causes his ruin. Sensuality and weakness reach their height in Booth, the moving cause of whose trouble is found in his setting up a coach on a small income, his intrigue with Miss Mathews, and his gambling propensities.

A second complicating element lies in the passions of those persons who fall outside of the initial situation. Thus the character of Fireblood in Jonathan Wild, the avarice of Parson Trulliber in Joseph Andrews, the undisciplined anger of Squire Western in Tom Jones, and the drunkenness of Mrs. Ellison, the lust of the noble peer, the touchiness of Colonel Bath in Amelia, are the moving powers in their respective novels.

The resolving factor is always the discovery motive. It lies outside the ethical scope of the characters involved. When hope is about abandoned a discovery is made, a deus ex machina descends and restores things to rights. Thus Fireblood is captured and confesses his perjury to a virtuous magistrate. A peddler discovers that Joseph is the son of Mr. Wilson; certain of the characters repent in Tom Jones and reveal his parentage, while in Amelia an opportune will is found to have been forged and the Booths are brought in the nick of time back to prosperity. It is this which gives the key to the difference between Fielding and later novelists like Hardy. Virtue does lead in the course of things to misfortune and vice to happiness, but the natural course of things does not rule the destinies of humanity, for, as Mrs. Heartfree says, "I now hope by the good offices of the best of men, to end in our perfect happiness and be a strongest instance of what I am persuaded is the surest truth, the Providence will sooner or later procure the felicity of the virtuous and innocent."

Providence then is the solution of the difficulty which the disparity between virtue and happiness occasions.

One is now prepared to turn to the solution of the second of the problems which Fielding has raised, What is human nature? For is it human nature which he proposes as his subject in the first chapter of Tom Jones? It is easier to find out what Fielding thought human nature was not. One must begin then with his polemic.

He first deals with the egoist. Human nature is not motivated by self-love as its chief or only passion as Hobbes and Mandeville asserted. With those "who very much alarmed the world by showing that there were no such things as virtue or goodness really existing in human nature and who deduced all our best actions from pride" he deals severely. He declared that they hunted for virtue in the wrong place: that their researches after truth are the searching, rummaging and examining into a nasty place, into the nastiest of all places, a bad mind." Just because you do not find unselfish and disinterested motives in your own mind, it does not prove that all are so depraved.

> "Certain a soul have I,
> We may have none, he sneered."

In Jonathan Wild he has shown an example of a man motivated wholly by egoism. Such a man is a monster in the form of humanity. In fact, it is much easier to be decent and moderately altruistic, "that a man may go to heaven with half the pains which it costs him to go to hell."

The ground of his position is that of simple experience, that we do find persons acting from other motives. The character of Booth is given as a good illustration of the type of person such a doctrine tends to produce. And certainly Booth is a more human, and, therefore, a more effective text for a sermon against egoism than Wild.

Neither is the orthodox theory of human nature which lays the emphasis upon the will and holds that will to be at present corrupt until redeemed by grace much better. Nor is the opposing theory any better, for intellectualism, which interprets human nature as naturally good, vice, as a disease, and makes the standard

of action an eternal abstract rule of right, neglects the realities of human nature. Fielding embodies these two tendencies in the immortal figures of Thwackum and Square. The favorite phrase of the latter was the natural beauty of virtue, that of the former the divine power of grace. "The former measured all actions by the unalterable rule of right and the eternal fitness of things, the latter decided all matters by authority." Neither of them ever mentioned goodness. Fielding's objection is stated as follows, "Had not Thwackum too much neglected virtue and Square religion in the composition of their several systems and had not both utterly discarded natural goodness of heart they had never been represented as objects of derision in this history." His objection is then that Thwackum had neglected reasoned morality since he based everything upon authority, that Square had neglected religion, i. e., revealed morality, and both had neglected the evident fact that human beings, when they act well, generally act from neither ground, but from the inner impulses of the heart whether they be good or bad. The result is as illustrated in their conduct that Square is more tolerant and amiable and less moral, but in the end is led to repentance, while Thwackum is strictly moral and honest but harsh, cruel and unforgiving to the end.

Human nature then must be based upon the passions. As to their origin whether from education or environment or training he does not inquire. Human beings are endowed with a certain set of passions and impulses whose way of acting remain unchanged through life. Tom Jones from the time we first meet him as a responsible creature, Blifil from our first introduction to his existence, exhibit the same characteristic. Jonathan Wild, even in the cradle, exhibited the characteristics which he was to display through life. Human nature from the viewpoint of its essential passions, is something static. There is no such thing as either moral change or moral improvement in Fielding's novels. But though a character is static from the viewpoint of essential make up, yet it is in continual change and flux. Essentially human nature is defined as a group of impulses or grounds to action. Thus it is easy to predict in Fielding how any given character will react if we know the stimulus. Thus mention or hint a challenge or an affront to Colonel Bath, and he will want to

fight if the challenge comes from a gentleman, but not if it comes from a woman or a clergyman. Show a pretty face to the noble peer and he will go in search of it. Fear and superstition may under all occasions be predicted of Partridge. Sophia is nothing but devotion to Jones. Trulliber's reactions can be predicted as a response to the stimulus of pigs and money. Human nature is to be interpreted in terms of a stimulus-response pattern. The ground of unity in human nature lies in the concurrence of a group of these stimulations-response bonds in one pattern. In a word, the unity is psychological, a psychology not introspective, but interpreted in terms of behaviour. Otherwise there is little unity outside of that given by memory. Consciousness or rather conscious action becomes resolved into a flow of these responses, a dissolving panorama of states of mind. Personality has been reduced to biological individuality.

The passions or impulses are thus made the ground and motive of human action. This is assumed throughout Fielding. From this certain result in the field of religion and ethics, Booth had asked that if human beings were ruled by the strongest passion how could virtue or merit be predicated? Dr. Harrison waves this aside and points out that since this is the case, it is fair to conclude that "religion to be true which applied immediately to the strongest of these passions hope and fear, choosing to rely on its reward and punishments than on the native beauty of virtue." Christianity is true because it makes the strongest appeal to the self-preservative responses the basis of human action.

This account of human nature is adequate for persons like Jones or Wild, Partridge or even Parson Adams. In fact, so long as human beings are to be described and made interesting by their conduct and peculiarities this method is good and satisfactory. It is the method of descriptive science vitalized for artistic purposes by humor and sympathy. But when it comes to deal with persons without noticeable peculiarities, persons who are gifted with self-restraint and internal feelings, it fails to succeed. The result is that a person like Allworthy is nothing but a stick or a marble man, while his female characters, such as Sophia and Amelia, are as utterly lifeless and void of expression. Fielding failed when he tried to depict a person of culture and feeling.

Such persons live a life of inner sensation and feeling which he did not touch.

His characters, then, fall into classes according as they are ruled by one or more types of response. Some, as Colonel Bath or Wild, are dominated by one ruling passion. Others have all the animal responses. Fielding is at his best in depicting such persons who are mere complexes of animal behaviour patterns. The nearer such persons are to the world of instinct and impulse, the more vivid and real do his pictures become. Probably his greatest portrait is that of Squire Western. Never anywhere else in the English novel is the human animal presented with such vigor and truth. To the same group belong such characters as Molly Seagrim, Mrs. Slipslop and most of the wayside characters in his earlier books. The third type are the mixed groups, such as Tom Jones, Adams and Booth, who are subject to partly physical and partly ethical controls. In his last novel a fourth class of characters begins to emerge, those who are ruled by the higher ethical motives. As we have seen, they are not well drawn. To this class belong Doctor Harrison, gruff, rude, egotistic, but dominated by the motives not of mere good natured impulse but by active good will to his fellow men and especially to the Booths. Sergeant Atkinson with his quiet and unfailing devotion to a worse man than himself and to his wife, Amelia herself ruled and governed by love to her children, her husband and her God. Fielding here reaches beyond the psychological into the ethical sphere and has given promise of a different kind of unity than that of the ruling passion or of psychological concurrence, the unity of moral purpose and devotion.

The field of action of human nature then does not lie within the self, it lies in the response area. Every action comes as a response to an immediate present stimulus. There is little or no total reaction of the whole field. It follows that there is no unified field of action or response. Each character does what he does merely for the sake of the action and not for any final cause. They pass from one stimulation to another and from one field of response to another with little connection either in purpose or character. Individuals act from goodness of heart or badness of heart, express these feelings in the field of external action and

pass on to other stimuli. In a word, the field of human action save in so far as it lies in one world of objective perception, is not unified, but falls into a series of momentary fields of response.

Evil, then, lies in the realm of responses. Those responses which tend to injure your fellow creatures are evil, those which tend to help them are good. The opposite of benevolence which is the dominance by the social impulses, is selfishness, the dominance by the self-passions. Evil in essence is selfishness. Jones and Booth, despite their faults, are unselfish; that is, kindhearted and, therefore, good. Wild, Bilfil, James and others, despite all their other qualities, are selfish and, therefore, evil.

Good is both an inner and an outer state. It consists in the willingness to treat others well and in the ability to do so.

It will be remembered that we have shown that Fielding starts from the position furnished him by Shaftesbury's ethic. But although he never leaves it, his novels furnish an implied criticism. He has shown how a person may conform admirably to the requirements of that philosopher's doctrine and yet not only may be unhappy, not only may commit sins which go contrary to the received standards of ethics, but may bring unhappiness upon others, mostly upon the deserving and those dear to himself. In such persons as Allworthy, Atkinson and Dr. Harrison we have seen him go forward to a more advenced conception of the ethical ideal.

In the same way, Hume, in his ethics, to a large extent, furnishes both a criticism and reconstruction of the philosophy of the school of Shaftesbury. His relationship and the temporal coexistence of the two writers is only one of the least important of the parallels between them. In style, the resemblance is so great that Hume might have written Tom Jones, while Fielding might have written the Treatise of Human Nature. Both of these writers agree in the absence of any genuine causality. In both Hume and Fielding is discovered the same way of viewing experience as a succession of impressions with accompanying reactions within the individual, which Hume called ideas. In Fielding we have largely a succession of these incidents given by the descriptive method. The order in them is artificial, imposed by the necessity within the author's imagination.

In regard to the conception of human nature, Hume and Fielding are in essential agreement. Hume grounds knowledge and experience and human nature, in general, not in reason or intelligence, for he had shown that to be untrustworthy, but in the psycho-physical organism. This fact is not commonly and clearly understood. But if we recall rightly, in the famous passage in the Treatise, he bases certitude upon psycho-physical necessity. "Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel."[1] Skepticism is a biological impossibility. "My intention, then, in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis and that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects as derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is more properly the act of the sensitive than of the cognitive part of our natures."[2] Hume reduces cognition to custom or association which stated in modern terminology, is compresence in the psycho-physiological field.

These responses of the organism to impressions or faint images left by impressions, are called ideas, and constitute the ground of the passions. "Original impressions, or impressions of sensation, are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by interposition of its idea. The first kind are all the impressions of the senses and all bodily pains and pleasures; the second, are the passions and emotions resembling them."[3]

The passions are the determining ground of human action. Reason is "a mere judgment of truth and falsehood, and hence cannot influence action. Since reason alone can never produce any action or give rise to volition, I infer that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition or of disputing the preference with any passion or volition. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office

[1]Hume; Treatise of Human Nature; Bk. I, Prt. 4, Sec. 1.
[2]Same. Bk. I, Prt. 4, Sec. 1.
[3]Ibid, II-I-1.

than to serve and obey them."[1] Since the passions are the relation of human nature to ideas associated with them, the will is determined by the strongest passion or motive.

This doctrine of determinism by the character of the passion which controls one (for as Hume had already taught as, individuality is descriptive likeness and succession) is fundamental in his doctrine. For it enables one to recognize and classify the nature and responses of the individual. These responses are determined by the nature of the psycho-physical organism. "The skin pores, muscles and nerves, of a day-laborer are different from those of a man of quality; so are his sentiments, actions and manners. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity of their actions that flow from them and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity."[2] On all these foregoing points Fielding is in perfect agreement. Determination and uniformity of character lie at the basis of his interpretation of human nature. We have already seen his emphasis on the passions as the determining ground of action, and have given examples of the invariable concurrence of the internal idea with the external impression. Squire Western is an admirable example of Hume's doctrine of the part reason plays as the revealer of the grounds for excitation of passion. When Western, who a few minutes before had been raging like a demon against Jones, suddenly discovers that he is a man of wealth, automatically he passes into eager consent to his marriage with Sophia. Western is merely an extreme example of the Humean psychology of Fielding. All the rest of his characters, upon analysis, yield the same results.

It would be possible to push the similarity into details. On two points illustrative of the principle of association of impression and idea the resemblance is almost verbal. Hume defines "benevolence, or the appetite which attends love, as a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, and an aversion to his misery."[3] Fielding defines love or benevolence as an appetite of the same kind. Again, the analysis of sexual love in Hume is the same, or practi-

[1]Ibid, II-III-3.
[2]Same.
[3]Ibid, II-II-6, p. 367.

cally the same as that given by Fielding.[1] The division into the exciting cause, physical beauty, the bodily appetite for generations and the generous kindness or good will, is found in both.

A third illustration of the resemblance is found in association. According to Hume's doctrine, since all men are by nature alike, the foundation of the social impulses is found in sympathy or "the perception in others of an admired and desired quality or the opposite in another person."[2] Upon the whole, there remains nothing which can give us an esteem for riches and power and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except the principle of sympathy by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness . . . From this relation of impressions and identity of ideas, the passion (of love) arises according to my hypothesis. This is admirably illustrated by the incident of the worthy Quaker who when he saw Jones, as he thought out of his senses, urged the landlord to take good care of him. When he discovered, however, that he was not the rich man he thought, he became angry at an affront, which had only raised his pity before. This is purely a case illustrative of sympathy, since the Quaker had not hoped to gain anything by Jones. A second illustration of an opposite character, is the fact that the only person who took pity on Joseph Andrews while he was lying naked in the road, was the *poorest* member of the party, the postilion.

The chief defect of Shaftesbury's ethical system was that it failed to combine the external ground for right conduct with the internal. It omitted a standard upon which the benevolent impulses had to act. This is essentially Hume's objection. In this, Fielding agrees with him. He points out that no matter how beautiful a person may be on the inside, he needs external wisdom and prudence. Hume based the validity of ethical standards in sympathy, but made the origin of and standard for moral conduct public utility. "Public good is indifferent to us except in so far as sympathy interests us to it. They (the virtues) must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those who reap any advantage from them. As the virtues which have a tendency to the

[1]Ibid, II-II-11, pp. 394-396.
[2]Ibid, II-II-5, p. 362.

good of the person so possessed of them, derive their merit from our sympathy with him."[1] To find illustrations for sympathy we have but to read any of the novels of Fielding. The second public utility, is the ground of Allsworthy's superiority over Jones, of Dr. Harrison's over Captain Booth, of Sergeant Atkinson's over Colonel Bath. Both the last were honorable men. Both were courageous gentlemen. But Atkinson used his courage and honor in defending the name and fame of a noble woman and the happiness of her family; Bath, in putting an end to the lives of persons who displeased his over-sensitive disposition.

The essential similarity of Fielding and Hume is now clear. They agree as to

A. General Problems.
   a. The fact that both were influenced by the ethic of Shaftesbury, and both furnished a development of it.
   b. Ethical Teaching. Both accept the commonsense ethic of polite society as the proper code of action.
   c. Nature and Circumstance. Both hold that the highest type of prudence and the highest type of morality coincide.
   d. Both agree in regard to Freedom, believing in the complete necessitation of actions by the passions.

B. Special Problems.
   a. Experience. Both regard experience as a series of appearances not unified by any internal bond but by a continuous succession and likeness through the agency of the productive imagination. There is an absence of any moral causality.

   b. Human Nature.
      1. Ground. Both conceive human nature as grounded in the psycho-physical-organism and motivated by the passions, that is, the internal responses to external stimuli. They conceive character as determined by the nature of the organism.

[1]Ibid, III-III-6, p. 618.

2. Constitution. They conceive human nature as consisting of a group of passions, fixed responses to given stimuli. These passions arise from the association of stimuli with the idea of pleasure and pain.

c. Evil. They conceive evil as ultimately that which is injurious to man. Here, however, Fielding is nearer to Shaftesbury.

V

DICKENS AND HUMANITARIAN IDEALISM

We have thus seen human nature integrated on higher and higher levels of response until in Fielding's latest work we find it integrated around the higher emotions of loyalty, loving devotion, and, in the case of Dr. Harrison, around the love to God and man, uniting prudence and benevolence. There thus arises the conception of personality or human nature as a unified moral whole. There is one step which remains to be taken. Instead of the individual response to a partial situation there is possible a total response to a total situation. With this step, one has crossed the limits of realistic individualism and has been carried within the domain of humanitarian idealism, that is, personality having as its limit of action humanity taken as a whole. This, as we shall see, also forms the transition from Fielding to his greatest follower, Dickens.

The analysis of humanitarianism is the proper key to the understanding of Dickens' work, not so much humanitarianism in the narrow sense of social benevolence, but as used in the wider sense given above. With Dickens, as closely as with Fielding, form and content of thought are linked. As a rule, his leading novels, especially of the later period, are purpose novels; they embody ideas as their soul, the omission of which in some cases leaves them cold and lifeless. So complete, indeed, is this union that the best known and most effective parts of Dickens are those where he is most a preacher. Generally speaking, he is there the most amusing. Those who attended the production of Pickwick last year, will recall how the play languished until it was awakened to screaming life in the rendition of the Bardell-Pickwick trial. The effectiveness of this famous passage is due to its satirical character, based as it is upon some of the evidence in the Norton-Melbourne divorce trial. By far the best known incidents in his writings are Oliver asking for more, Nicholas shouting, "Stop," until the rafters rang, the American scenes, Mr. Macauber's exposure of Uriah Heep, the death of little Joe, and the last scene of the death of Sidney Carton. It is as impossible to separate

the beliefs and teaching of Dickens from his art, as it is to do the same in the Tale of a Tub.

Unfortunately, then, for our modern critics, Dickens' novels are more than they are willing to admit, are purpose novels, or they are nothing. But this purpose undergoes a change and a development as Dickens advanced in life. It begins with an attack upon abuses such as could spring up in almost any country. Starting with the gay and sportive attack upon the abuses of the law courts he turned his attention to abuses in the poor houses in Oliver Twist, and to a special type of schools in Nicholas Nickleby. In the novels of the subsequent period he goes deeper, attempting to analyze the causes of national corruption. In Barnaby Rudge he studies an historical epoc, in Martin Chuzzlewit he draws a twofold indictment against his own country and America, based upon the charges of hypocrisy, avarice and lack of moral earnestness which are the center of the attack on America. Dombey and Son is a study of misplaced pride. The third stage in the development of the Dickensian Purpose novel goes deeper, showing the relationship between environment and the development of the individual. In Bleak House, he began to strike home to the root of moral degeneration in a widespread sore on the body politic; in Hard Times, at the entire industrial system with the theory upon which it was based. In the novels of the concluding period, there is a growing emphasis upon the relation of environment to the individual with more emphasis upon the effect of the latter. In Little Dorrit we have a life permanently marred by misfortune, in a Tale of Two Cities the overcoming of weakness by sacrifice, while in Great Expectations we have a study entirely based on the individual. Due to this constant change and development, it is necessary to give the stages passed through by each one of the elements in our analysis of the treatment of purpose, the form which embodies the spirit of humanitarianism.

From the outside, we find the viewpoint colored by sentimentalism or emotion used for a purpose. Emotion is Dickens' chief weapon, at least in his earlier works. And I think a person must be greatly hardened who cannot appreciate some of these scenes, among them being the Old Man's story of his queer client and the death of the poor debtor in Pickwick, the farewell between

Oliver and his little friend in the workhouse, the death of Smike, a powerful weapon against the Yorkshire schools, the death of little Paul, used against the cramming system, and the death of Jo in David Copperfield.

Instead of pathos or sentiment Dickens comes to use more and more symbols to clothe his conceptions. It is true he had an innate tendency to the grotesque yet, nevertheless, much of the so-called character in his early novels is mere symbolism. Thus he made Squeers ugly and one-eyed to describe the type of school which he managed. This type of physical symbolism persisted through his later work in a more subtle form. To this class belongs Carker's teeth, Uriah Heep's hands, the motion of Blandois' nose and mustache, "With his nose coming down over his mustache and his mustache coming up over his nose." In his later work this symbolism develops in subtlety. This is constituted by the introduction of physical objects and human figures and actions purely for the purpose of expressing an idea. To this class belong "the wild waves" in Dombey and Son, the sound on the ghost walk, the figures of Miss Le Creevy and Krook and the description of the fog in Bleak House, Madame Defarge's knitting and the echoing footsteps in the Tale of Two Cities. In all these cases the aim is to impress the central purpose of the work.

Dickens' satirical manner passed through a similar development. It begins in burlesque of the broad and farcical type of which the Eatenswill Election is probably the best known example, and becomes subtler by the effect of slight exaggeration of the emphasized points. The process is best seen by a comparison between a series such as Bumble, Pecksniff, Bagstock, Harold Skimpole, Pip, and the Veneerings in the order mentioned. The satire in Dickens has as its goal the more generalized social types.

It is hard to separate the satire against wrong from the moral earnestness and indignation into which it is continually overflowing. This earnestness and indignation probably reaches its climax in Bleak House, Hard Times and the Tale of Two Cities, where, at times, it prevents fairness, but at others, flames into genuine illuminating lightning. Indeed, this earnestness for the ideas

which he believed in, is quite the most dominant characteristic in much of the work of Dickens.

Thus far the formal conditions—The material conditions of his work or the point of union between the author and work are not quite as evident. Probably the most potent is the factor of sympathy or the subjective vision of character and incident. It is this which distinguishes the humanitarian spirit. Nothing, no material, passes through the mind of the writer unchanged. All material is made to partake of something of the writer's feelings or ideas. An illustration of this is the strange and curious comparisons which Dickens uses, and which he introduces on all occasions, such as the varnish of Mrs. General, the selection of peculiar attitudes and gestures which he chooses to regard as symbolic, such as the constant reference to Mrs. Bounderby's being born in a ditch. Each character is given a twist, slight as it may be, whereby the interest of the author takes hold.

Closely connected with the factor of sympathy or the emotional attitude of author to character and incident, is the principle of identification between the consciousness of author and character. In this, Dickens follows in the track mapped out by Jane Austin and later developed by George Eliot, Meridith, and James.

Last and most important is the genetic character of his work. He interprets character and incident in terms of growth and causation. This, too, is a development in our writer. Although he begins with the birth of Oliver Twist, this is merely a necessary condition for the story of a workhouse child. It does not affect character. Neither does the origin of the Yorkshire school have any effect on anyone. But the times and circumstances surrounding Barnaby do have a great deal of effect on him. Dickens traces, as well as a statesman or an historian, the origin of the riots. In Martin Chuzzlewit, Martin's character is impossible to understand without reference to origin and development. Bleak House is nothing if not a genetic study. Hard Times derives all its characters from such factors, and Great Expectations is a study in moral growth.

Hereditary factors play an unimportant part in Dickens. In only two of his works do they play any part. In Barnaby Rudge, Barnaby has a birth mark and a prenatal fear of blood, which

has been impressed upon him before birth. In Bleak House the Smallweed family have all an hereditary resemblance to each other. No child has been born in the Smallweed family, they are all little men and women.

Nor does he assign much more importance to original disposition. Most of his characters seem endowed with pretty uniform natural disposition. In Little Dorrit we have a girl, Tattycoram, endowed with a naturally passionate disposition, which finally overcomes her.

It is, then, chiefly environment which is the determining factor in the development of character. Of these, the ones chiefly responsible are surroundings or education. Education occupied a great place in the philosophy of Dickens. He views it as the formation of character, not as the imparting of information. The two rules that ought to govern it are freedom to develop the natural endowments of man, and sympathetic kindness in the process.

The third element in growth is moral choice or moral causation. This takes an increasing importance in his later work. We have a first sign of it in the case of Martin Chuzzlewit's liberation from selfishness by the kindness of other persons to him in a fever. Mr. Dombey's conversion through the influence of misfortune is of a lower character. (In this case the softening of the heart approaches softening of the brain, as Chesterton well remarks.) The degeneration of Richard Carston is of a higher type of causation. Sidney Carton's victory over himself by sacrifice is another form, while the most typical form is the increasing snobbery of Pip.

Structurally, Dickens' novels exhibit a constant evolution of form and complexity. They, as a rule, contain a vast array of characters and incident. In its early forms, this is unified only by the presence of the leading character. Later, the unification is developed by means of a definite plot. The structure is genetic, taken as a rule. That is, the initial situation is neutral, in that it is not an interaction but an individual acted upon. The first step then is circumstances acting upon the individual. Thus, in Dombey and Son, Florence and Paul are passive instruments used to advance the house of Dombey. David is but a spectator of the events which affect his destiny in the remarriage

of his mother. Little Dorret is content to work to help her father. Esther is conscious of her own deficiencies and suffers the harsh treatment of her aunt. The involving situation is the interaction of character and circumstances. Mr. Pickwick refuses to pay the fine; Nicholas knocks down Squeers; Oliver asks for more; Paul's personality begins to develop; David bites the hand of Mr. Murdstone. In the later novels, this activity or interaction between character and circumstance becomes changed into the working out of the meaning of the initial situation. The initial situation contains the story in germ. The hero becomes powerless to effect it. Thus, neither Mr. Jaundice nor Esther, neither Mr. Talkinghorn nor Lady Deadlock, attains superiority over the movement in Bleak House. The inner necessity rules. The crime of Tim Gradgrind is the mere logical sequence of a bad education. Neither Clennam nor Amy is responsible for the happy solution to the story. The condemnation of Darney is as logical as anything can be; as necessary as the echoing footsteps of fate; nor does Pip advance the outcome of Great Expectations. The hero has disappeared. The solution, as in Fielding, comes from without, that is, outside of the hero's control, but not, as in Fielding's case, outside of the initial conditions. Only seldom does Dickens resort to accident, as in the deliverance of Oliver by new acquaintances, or the death of Mr. Bray. Generally, it comes from a necessary minor character as the result of the logic of the situation. Thus Mr. Pickwick's release comes from the character of Dodson and Fog, who originally started the ball rolling. Dombey is punished in the person of Carker, who had ministered to his pride. In fact, the dissolution of the plot comes in the discovery by a minor or key character of a point where the web of circumstance is weak with the result that the dissolution is as logical and inevitable as the chain. Thus, Bleak House comes to an end because the Chancery suit has used up all the property and so cannot go on any longer; Great Expectations ends because Pip's benefactor comes to England, thus ending Pip's delusion. We thus are led to the ethical situation.

The initial ethical situation, as was observed above, is a man or a group of men, acted on by circumstances. These circumstances, involving either an individual or a social situation, are

of a character which, taken as a whole, hinders growth or freedom, yet which one is powerless to overcome? Thus the child Oliver is set over against the poor house authorities. Nicholas is obliged by poverty to seek employment, while Ralph, his uncle, selects Squeirs as the best way of getting rid of him. Martin Chuzzlewit finds himself involved in the same condition. The Dombey children are from birth the victims of middle-class pride. David is involved in the web of religious fanaticism. In Bleak House, the Chancery suit enslaves the minds and souls of the whole group of characters. In a Tale of Two Cities, there is a social structure built upon injustice. In Hard Times, there is the whole utilitarian culture, built upon the ignoring of emotional values and the denial of brotherhood.

In regard to such a situation, four attitudes may be taken. One may attempt to change it, one may attempt to escape it, one may accept it and do one's best to make the best of it, or one may accept it and approve of it. The first solution is followed by few of his characters. Although Dickens wrote novels for the purpose of social reform, they are not social novels. The most that is done by any here is Nicholas knocking down Squeers, Darney's renunciation of the estate and Clennam's attempt to get the Circumlocution Office to move. But in each case the result is ineffectual. The individual is powerless before circumstance so far as changing it goes.

The third solution is that of Dickens' female characters. They recognize that they are faced with the inevitable, feel that their duty lies in its acceptance and try to live a life of happy resignation to circumstance and service to others. Dickens believed that it was woman's special gift and privilege to extract joy from sorrow, happiness from resignation, and love from service. These are, to be sure, not very popular characteristics nor highly-praised ideals for modern thought, but they constitute one way of meeting circumstance. Women have, in his opinion, a higher degree of the quality, of loyalty, than men. In fact, filial devotion is their chief characteristic. Of this Madeline Bray, Agnes, Little Dorrit, and Florence Dombey are good examples. All have fathers who are unworthy and contemptible, but who possess their profound love and devotion. Little Dorrit has been born in a debtor's

prison and brought up there, but has risen above it by the fact of her virtue, purity and devotion. Esther Summerson is probably the most ideal of Dickens' heroines from this point of view. She has a firm faith in her own inferiority. She has been told that she has reason to be ashamed of her parentage. But she concludes from these two facts that as she is not clever, that she must make up for it by causing people to love her. And in the acceptance of these facts of her life and character she attains happiness through the cultivation of that in which she is strong. She follows the path of resignation and service.

The fourth solution is the way of moral decadence. The decay starts when a person not only is resigned to circumstances, but accepts them as right, and the goal and maxim of his life. There are degrees of this corruption. Like Squeers, he may be aware of the evil, but may, like the devils, have accepted evil as his good. He may be under the conviction that the evil is the good. Sir Lester believed that other persons were inferior animals and that the squire only was ordained of heaven. The Barnacles probably believed the Circumlocution Office was for the good of the nation. The gentleman in the white waistcoat (in Oliver Twist) believed in the poor law system. Mr. Gradgrind was a high-souled believer in utilitarianism. The third class are those who, although they disbelieve in the conditions, yet through weakness, are drawn in either consciously or unconsciously. Richard Carston accepts gradually the moral standards of the Chancery Courts. Mr. Dorrit, from being merely weak and amiable, comes to glory in his position in the debtor's prison, as Father of the Marshalsia, and begins to live on the contributions given to him by the inmates. Pip comes to accept the standards of the snobs among whom he lives and to be ashamed of his humble friends. There are thus three types of individuals who accept circumstances; the bad man who profits by them, using them consciously to his advantage, the good man who believes in them, and the unfortunate man who is corrupted by them.

The second attitude, that of escape, is the leading one in Dickens. it is the moving cause in his works. But for the attempt to escape, there would be no story. The moving force is the attempt to escape. It may be from physical tyranny, as with Oliver, Nicholas,

and David Copperfield, or moral oppression and slavery, as with Esther and Lady Deadlock in Bleak House, Louisa in Hard Times, Clennam from degenerate Calvinism in Little Dorrit, from the tryanny of his past life as with Pip and Sidney Carton, or the tyranny of circumstance, or from things which hinder the expression of self, or general social evil, as with Stephen Blackpool and Darney.

The mode of escape varies with the type of oppression. In most cases it is that of flight. You cannot resist circumstances, seems to be Dickens' opinion. The only way is that of flight. It may be a physical running-away in order to get into a new environment. This motive occurs in over three-fourths of his novels, in ten of them in fact. Flight is not only effective against physical evil, it is the only way. Darney can escape the corruption of Aristocratic France which he loaths. Escape is comparatively easy where it is from external oppression, but it becomes hard when one has to flee internal foes. If, as in the case of Sidney Carton, evil has fastened on one's whole nature by the way of habit, the only escape is through the grave. The end of life is the only escape from life.

The ethical dissolution or goal of action consists in the completion of escape, or in the dissolution of surrounding circumstance, or the dissolution of the hold of circumstance on the individual. The second type is more characteristic of Dickens' earlier works. Thus, Squeers' school is dissolved forever, and Squeers is punished. Bumble is thrown out of his job and Fagan's gang is broken up. On the other hand, in the works of the middle period, the ethical dissolution is considered as the completion of an escape or separation between the individual and oppressive circumstance. Thus, Martin leaves America, but America remains the same. David escapes from the Murdstones, but the Murdstones remain and go on their way in the same manner as before. Thus, the Chancery suit which holds every one in Bleak House in its grip comes to an end of itself. Sissy Jupe frees Louisa from the hold of the utilitarian forces which go on. Carton saves Darney from the danger of the revolution and enables him to break the bond, which finally holds him. It is thus seen that the individual active for others in the first stage is active for

himself, and finally is passive in both ways, but is liberated by forces external to himself. But in either case, the result is complete escape, thus constituting Dickens an optimist. The bonds which have held human nature and its freedom have been completely loosed.

Dickens' conception of human nature begins where Fielding's left off. He begins with a description of behavior as his starting point, but he goes on further. By use of the method of sympathetic identification he succeeds in conveying not a mere amusing reproduction of externals, but infuses it with life derived from feeling. Passion has become transformed into emotion. Human nature must be interpreted in the terms of emotion, not in terms of reason or action.

Against opposing views, Dickens directed strong blows in his later books. He is severe upon those who maintain that a child is born with a definite ethical character especially against the believers in total depravity, who hold that character is wicked. Such a theory upheld by the Murdstones in David Copperfield, and by Mrs. Clennam in Little Dorret, is not only contrary to the facts of child character, but is an excuse for an incentive to cruelty, a justification for the mistreatment of those who are assumed to be wicked.

In Harold Skimpole, he deals with pseudo-emotionalism which cultivates feeling purely for its own sake without any moral result. Such a theory is a prelude to moral irresponsibility.

But he is especially severe upon intellectualism, that conception of human nature which regards the essence of man to be in the logical intellect, and condemns the imagination and feelings as not worth cultivating. In the description of Dr. Blimbers' school, he had delivered his first blow. But the main attack is made in Hard Times. According to Mr. Gradgrind, "You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon facts; nothing else will ever be of any use to them." No decoration can be used unless it is a picture of reality. "You must discard the word Fancy altogether," says the government examiner. "You have nothing to do with it. You are not to have in any object of use or ornament that would be a contradiction in fact. You don't walk upon flowers in fact; you cannot be allowed to walk upon flowers in

carpets. You don't find that foreign birds and butterflies come in and perch upon your crockery; you cannot be permitted to paint foreign birds and butterflies upon your crockery. You must use for all these purposes combinations and modifications (in primary colors) of mathematical figures which are susceptible of proof and demonstration. This is the new discovery. This is fact. This is taste."

Such a theory starves human nature, dwarfs the emotion, and by destroying the springs of action, perverts the character.

The feelings and the imagination are the essential factors in human nature. As to original endowment, this nature is largely plastic. It is what education and treatment will make out of it. It is natural for the child to respond with hate for ill-treatment and love because of good treatment. But love is much more natural than hate. Affection, i. e., the demand to be loved and the demand to love, is much the strongest impulse that human beings are capable of. Even a person cannot be made genuinely wicked without somebody caring enough about him to make him be so. Jonas Chuzzlewit, one of Dickens' most monstrous villains, is the result of the efforts of a loving father in the direction of selfishness.

The essence of human nature consists in the social instincts and the imagination. The first demands and seeks love and sympathy from one's fellow creatures. Even in a work house, Oliver found it in the little consumptive child. Smike found it for the first time in Nicholas. Even Barnaby had to have his raven and Mrs. Clennam, who was about as hard as any one could be, was kind to Little Dorret. Even Bill Sikes needed his dog, though he did kick him. The imagination furnishes the outlet, the mode of escape to those who are hedged in by circumstances. Especially with children is it active, for children are more limited in their outlook and freedom. The limiting ground of human nature is education and environment. A perfect education, that is, one which takes hold of all the elements in human nature, would completely determine the character. Each individual is the result of his education, taken in the widest sense. Thus, Jonas is the perfect product of his father's training in selfishness. Uriah Heep comes from an environment, father,

mother, and schooling, which trains in false humility. The boy in the Haunted Man who has grown up on the streets, is nothing but a wild animal. An imperfect education leaves the emotional impulses to form the character as best it may. If one lives with nature one will have the brightness of sunlight.

The ground of action, then, is the feelings and impulses with which one as a human being is endowed, formed into a whole by conditioning of circumstances. But these circumstances are much more than the mere environmental conditions. Or, rather, with Dickens, environment is the sum total of conditions. In the first place, the first condition is the principle of humanity taken as a whole. Each person is a representative of the whole of the race. The fundamental assumption is that persons deserve to be treated as such, not because they are members of any nation or any social class, but because they are human beings. The second general condition is the organization of political and social institutions, the social standards of ethics existent at the time, and the social beliefs and customs which prevail in the general groups.

The ground of action, then, is the sum total of conditions. The field of action is determined in the same manner. It is defined with respect to human beings, as human beings, and not as the members of the same group. Human beings express the spirit of good-will. Esther Summerson is loved by even the most hardened because she loves them. Dickens' characters have the capacity for making friends. This gives them a universal quality. Mr. Macauber would be friendly and kind to an Australian bushman as well as to an Englishman. The more poor and friendless they are, the more his characters take to them. The feeling of unity and brotherhood sets Dickens alone among English novelists. One might read many of his best novels and he would be unaware of the social distinctions which play so great a part in other writers. In fact, it is as little in evidence as in those of a modern American writer. Humanity is the only limit either for Dickens or his characters.

From what has been said in the foregoing pages, one can deduce the nature and location of evil. Evil may be defined as that which prevents the freedom and happiness of human beings. It is located in the social group which immediately conditions the per-

sonality. We take the second point first. Human beings are really pretty good to get along with individually, but when one takes them in their social relations, then the trouble arises. Evil persons exist beyond all doubt, but they would be powerless were it not for the good persons who give them a chance. Thus, in Pickwick Papers, the real enemy is not Dodson and Fog, but the state of the laws on legal practice. Squeers is to blame, but not nearly so much as the lack of interest in the welfare of children which prevails in society. The workhouse law gives persons like Bumble their opportunity, while Fagan would be a harmless member of society were there no persons willing to be led and organized into a gang of thieves. Lord George Gordon would be but a harmless lunatic if the people of London were not almost savage barbarians to start with. The social character of evil is emphasized in Martin Chuzzlewit. Dickens' indictment against America is not quite understood. It was in point that the nation as a whole had no sense of moral responsibility, that it exhibited no moral earnestness and no depth, that the whole outlook was standardized on a low standard of shallowness. He did not deny that there were found persons who could not be described under these categories, but that it was true on the whole. The men at table talked of nothing but money-making. Even when he went among people who exhibited every mark of culture, Martin's mention of the negroes and their wrongs drew forth nothing more than a laugh and a giggle from the charming young ladies to whom a negro, in whatever relations viewed, was nothing but something funny. The nation's social conscience was morally indifferent. Martin himself is a product of such a group consciousness. The whole Chuzzlewit family is actuated by no higher motives than envy, selfishness, and the love of gain. In the admirable opening chapters describing the assembly of relations downstairs waiting for their relative's departure, this is shown in a very fine manner. In Jonas this flowered into crime. In Martin we have merely unconscious selfishness, selfishness which was only curable by the greatest sickness and hardship, and Mark Tapley's example of unselfish devotion.

His later works furnish further illustrations of this principle. Uriah Heep is the typical product of social and educational ideas.

Uriah is only harmful where such ideas prevail. No character in Bleak House can be really called bad or wicked. The Lord Chanceler is very amiable. The Lawyers are playing the game, taking care of their families, or, like Mr. Vohles, their aged mothers. Sir Lester is honorable as sunlight. With the exception of Harold Skimpole, who is not involved, they are all honorable men. The two real villains are the court of chancery and the squirearchy, two institutions which overwhelm the individual. In Hard Times this indictment is directed against the whole industrial system. The Tale of Two Cities gives another illustration of the individual against institutionalized evil. But here we are assured that the time will come when such institutionalized evil will fall because of its own weight, of its very weakness. Men will no longer believe in it.

Anything is an evil which suppresses the freedom of the individual. The ideal for the individual is that he should be allowed to seek happiness, should be allowed to express himself in love and affection, to develop the imagination with liberty. Anything which blunts or suppresses this is an evil. It may take the form of physical oppression as with Squeers or Bumble, or moral oppression as with the Murdstones or Mrs. Clennam, or it may take the form of egoism which treats the others as the means to some ulterior end as with Mr. Dombey, or even in mere neglect as with Mr. Dorret in the case of his daughter. It may consist in sacrificing an individual for the benefit of an institution as in Bleak House or the Circumlocution Office in Little Dorret. It may take the form of Humbug as a mask for roguery. In all cases the evil consists in the humiliation of the growth and self-development of human nature.

Good, then, lies in happiness. But happiness is the equivalent to freedom, the right to express freely the higher and nobler portions of one's nature. Negatively, the good consists in freedom from oppression of all kinds; positively it consists in a state in which one is loved and loves, does good and is done good to, helps and is helped. Such a state is happiness. But it can be realized only proximately unless the union between organized evil and the life is broken. The good in the last analysis is a social

group, a humanity enlightened to recognize its brotherhood, and freed from organized evils and social superstitions.

Thus we arrive at a position to state the thought of Dickens in an organized manner.

1. a. Man is essentially a social animal, that is, he finds his good and his evil in fellowship with his fellows. Man is also an individual or solitary animal since he finds the expression for his life in the imagination.
   b. Human nature may, from the first standpoint, be defined as the resultant of the inner emotions conditioned by the outward environment.
   c. The ruling inner emotion is love or the desire for the fellowship.
   d. The conditioning factors of environment are education, early affections, social institutions and customs.
   e. The character of the individual is determined by these two factors.
   f. Imagination is the inner life of the individual, the inner freedom.
2. The good for the individual consists in affection or the proper social environment on the one hand, and inner freedom on the other.
3. Evil is essentially a social phenomenon. It consists in the organization of a social group to the disadvantage of the individuals composing the group. The only dangerous form of individual evil consists in the utilization of the evil in the group for selfish purposes.
4. Good consists in the separation of the individual from the source of the socialized evil, either by escape or the ending of the relationship. In essence it is an enlightened social order of freely developing individuals.

J. S. Mill stands in about the same relation to Hume as Dickens does to Fielding. The method is essentially the same. Only the results are deepened and strengthened by the recognition and acceptance of deeper ethical categories. We have in Dickens the same reduction of narrative to a series of perceptions or representations, the same pluralistic mode of the interpretation of expe-

rience. On the other hand, both in Mill's and Dickens we have the advance from the merely biological conception of human nature, to the sociological. The character of the individual is largely determined by his social environment. This is especially true of the moral character. It is the direct result of education. "As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being should be a selfish egoist devoid of every feeling or care, but those which center in his own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this is sufficiently common even now to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the public good are possible though in unequal degrees to every rightly brought up human being."[1]

Both Dickens and Mill are agreed as to the nature of the good. In the first place, both conceive it as happiness, and both find it, objectively considered, in a perfect social order. Mill regards the greatest good as only attainable by application to the greatest number or the whole of mankind. As evil is a social phenomenon, the good is obtainable by means of social action. No one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits."[2] It would seem, then, that good, objectively considered, is a perfectly adjusted, social order in which virtue is predominant. As with Dickens, also, the elements which enter into the virtuous and happy life are social feeling or love and inward cultivation of the feelings and the imagination. "To those who have neither public or private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death; while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have cultivated a fellow feeling with the collective interests of mankind retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death, as in the vigour of youth and health."[3] The second element is inner cultivation of the feelings and the imagination. "Next to

[1]Rand: Classical Moralists, J. S. Mill, p. 656.
[2]Ibid, pp. 655-656.
[3]Ibid, p. 657 (Rand: Classical Moralists; J. S. Mill).

selfishness, the principle cause which makes life unsatisfactory is the want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature the achievements of art, the imagination of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their prospects in the future."[2]

To both these elements, however, there is necessary freedom. Social evil and political tyranny restrain man both inwardly and outwardly.

Men get along the best when persons outside of them allow their individuality to develop.

To sum up, Dickens and Mill agree on almost every issue.

In their outlook on the world of phenomena.

In their conception of man as a social animal determined in his nature and habits largely by education, and external environment.

Both regard the inner life as part of the human ideal.

They consider evil as essentially a social phenomenon, capable of being removed by social action and proper education.

In viewing the good as happiness for which liberty, both of inner and outer development, is necessary.

In finding a chief virtue of the individual in unselfish fellowship.

In finding the good in a perfected universal society.

Finally, in their viewpoint, they agree in the combination of the social or utilitarian viewpoint with the belief in the cultivation of the higher feelings and the imagination.

---

[2]Ibid.

VI.

GEORGE MEREDITH.

It will have been observed by the reader of this discussion that there has been a steady progress in the conception of human nature. Each author has proved a reaction to the one gone before, and an approximation to the one to come after. Generally this influence is conscious, Fielding's first two novels are reactions against Richardson, while Amelia, though greatly influenced by that author, is a nearer approach to the spirit and ideals of Dickens than any novel before the time of Pickwick Papers. One has but to compare the prison scenes in that latter book with the opening chapters of Amelia to see the similarity of the two. Finally, Meredith may be ranked in his earlier period (before he developed a system of ideas all his own) as the greatest of Dickens' disciples. Meredith's earlier female creations, whose later developments form perhaps his greatest contribution to the portrait gallery of fiction, resemble those of Dickens. Lucy, Dahlia Flemming, and Rose are to be put in the same group with Florence Dombey, Esther Summerson and Little Dorret. The male characters have as much in common. Not to mention the Cogglesby Brothers, Evan himself, his mother and sisters, as well as many others in the earlier books, might have stepped out of the pages of Great Expectations. The same resemblance can be noted in the ideas and thought circles of these earlier works. The educational motive of the Ordeal, the snobbery motive of Evan, the peculiar class of which Rhoda Flemming is a picture, are essentially Dickens' motives. But it is Dickens with a difference, motivated by the defects of Dickens' position. On the one hand there is the over-emphasis on the emotional element in human nature, a too great emphasis on its plastic character, and too little ground of unity other than that of environment. In regard to the question of evil, Meredith admits that evil may be socialized, but that does not express the full truth. The question is, "What is the basis of that form of evil which is not socialized in individuals, and what is the ground in human nature for the existence of socialized evil?" . . . And if human nature and

evil are different, the idea of the goal must be different. Mere freedom of growth and loving understanding becomes raised to something higher. In fact, Dickens has so over-socialized human nature that the internal life has not yet been given its full place. Nature again must have its place in the relationships of human nature. The chief task of Meredith is the deepening of the internal life and individuality of the characterization.

Of the vast array of Meredith's work, the limitations of our subject exclude the poetry, although it is the chief source of his metaphysical doctrine. The purpose of this discussion will have little to do with either the Shaving of Shagpat, since it is not a novel; Rhoda Flemming, since it is not a typical work of Meredith; or Sandra Belloni, and its sequel, Vittoria, dealing as they do with historical material. We find that his work for our purpose falls into two main divisions, the first beginning with the Ordeal and ending with the Egoist, the other with Diana and ending with the Amazing Marriage. The second group is characterized by the liberal or radical treatment of the woman's rights question and the relation between the sexes. They are written from the woman's standpoint. For the earlier group, on the other hand, the themes and manner of treatment are modeled after those of the Victorian period and the standpoint is that of the man. The Egoist combines the two interests and the two standpoints.

Meredith's earlier novels present a series of problems in conduct. The first is the Ordeal of Richard Feverel and is based upon the question of the complete plasticity of human nature in the presence of education. Is it true that a good system of education can make anything it chooses out of a child? Meredith's answer is "yes" if one were an omnipotent and all-knowing observer and orderer such as Sir Austin aspired to be, a kind of invisible Providence over his son's affairs. In the narrow limits of the growing mind, this may work right well, but not unless one recognizes the growing complexity of the problem. Human knowledge, human wisdom and goodness break down in the face of the nature of the person and the accidents of circumstance. And in such training as Sir Austin devised, no allowances are made for accidents of such a nature. Such an overweening arrogance of knowledge is pride, which nature punishes.

Evan Harrington presents the problem in a new fashion. A boy has been trained in a snobbish manner by his father and sisters. His mother, on the other hand, after his father's death, demands that he continue in the tailor's shop and pay his father's debts. Love demands the first; duty the second. In his struggle to maintain his place in polite society, he involves himself in difficulties of a moral character (an anonymous letter about his rival). The inherent honesty of his nature breaks out, makes him confess his error, and he goes back to the tailor's shop. He does not lose anything, thanks to a rich uncle.

In Beauchamp's Career, study is made of quixotism, a noble character uncontrolled by the guidance of reason. His life is a continuous series of anticlimaxes. A waif on a mud bank is the only thing that is left of Beauchamp. In Harry Richmond, the evil effects of the admiration of a son for a brilliant but erratic father is shown leading him over the edge of dishonor more than once.

The Egoist is almost entirely an ethical study. A completely self-centered character is a product of generations of trading. But it is a new product, nevertheless. At its deepest stage, egoism becomes so united to the persons' nature that it is unconscious. The one affected may excite admiration and the semblance of love for a while, but in the end no one can remain long in love with such a character. When it reaches its highest point, egoism defeats itself.

The second series opens with a scathing picture of the wrong kind of woman. According to the Tragic Comedians, women are so educated to shallowness of thinking and feeling that they become shallow-hearted and incapable of making a choice for the best when the opportunity comes. Diana of the Crossways shows the woman who makes the right kind of choice. One of Our Conquerors pictures the man who made the choice badly, who cared more for reputation and social position than his wife did. The result was disaster for himself and all his. In Lord Ormont the woman is pictured as one who mistook admiration for love, and the man as one who refused to treat his wife as his equal. When she does leave him he forgives both her and her lover. In the Amazing Marriage the woman deserted by her husband learns

self-sufficiency. She is content with herself and her child and refuses to receive him back.

One may now sum up the ethical teaching of Meredith—the chief characteristic is intellectualism. This is not so striking in his earlier works, but in his mature works it is the prevailing teaching. The emotions are all right and necessary, but they should not be allowed to rule over the nature of the person. If they do, they distract from the clear judgment of life and character. Richard Feverel goes to wreck because his father had taught everything except self-control. Rhoda prevents her sister's marriage, from an impulse of fear and hatred. Beauchamp is unbalanced on the side of generosity. Alvan is led to his death because of his passion for an unworthy woman and the hatred of his rival. Richmond Roy is primarily unbalanced in intellect—a teeming imagination. Diana is led by the impulse of fear due to the insult which had been put upon her to marry the first man that came along. She was led to her almost fatal mistake of selling the secret to Mr. Tonans by overwork and emotional stress which darkened her clear intellect. In the cases of Meredith's love affairs, the ones which are attended by the least emotion are the happiest. His hero almost invariably marries the woman for whom he does not care. Thus Harry marries Janet largely out of admiration. Beauchamp's wife has been married by him, and she is fallen in love with afterwards because of her good qualities. Clara Middleton marries the man she loves. Diana marries Redworth because she has to marry someone, the latter because she feels that she ought as a payment of an obligation. In the case of Diana, romantic ideas twice caused her to disbelieve that Redworth was in love because he had self-control and honor. Meredith seems to have been convinced that all these were happy because they entertained no very high notions of romance to start with.

The second characteristic of this ethical teaching is individualism. Most of his leading characters are self-sufficient. This is the basis of his feminist tendencies. To Meredith, as we have seen, women were the victims of a system of education and training which was destructive of individuality. It was to an ideal the direct opposite of that, one of self-sufficiency and independence, to which he directed his attention.

In consequence of his individualistic attitude the chief virtue in the ethical category becomes wisdom, the capacity for right choice, and selection of the good. Strangely connected with this is the virtue of truth or honor, for they are the same type of virtues. It is the violation of truth which brings punishment upon Diana. It is truth and honor which redeems the character of Beauchamp and turns him into a hero. The same type of the true man of honor is found in Vernon Whetford in The Egoist, a man who marries a woman unworthy of him rather than let her be dishonored. In Redworth this trait is almost overdeveloped. He refuses to propose to Diana because he cannot convince himself that he has exactly the right amount of money to support her. Diana can always rely on him whenever she is in time of need. The sin of Evan was a violation of this virtue, by his pretended gentility. His redemption came through the acknowledgment of his fault and his return to the way of truth. Sir Willoughby Pattern is an example of the man who has become thoroughly corrupted in the matter of truth. He is self-deluded and yet, in a sense, he tells the truth though unconsciously. Clotilde's character finds its chief defect in that respect. She never could be certain of anything she wanted. She was a dillettante in emotions, seeking to become acquainted with Dr. Alvin because she had been told that she shared certain ideas of his, yielding to his love, yet without having a genuine passion for him sufficient to hold her true.

Closely connected with the above is the virtue of unselfishness of Austin, Wentworth, Vernon, Redworth, and Nevil Beauchamp, in whom it verged upon the quixotic, but never upon the ignoble.

So far we have dealt with the ethical teaching of Meredith; we now turn to his ethical structure.

In his works there are three types of such structure. In the first, we have a character situation. One character is dominated and controlled by another, not by physical power contrary to the will of the individual, but by the moral dominance expressed in love and admiration to the ruler. In the relation of Sir Austin to his son, Richard, we have a remarkable example of it, expressing itself in the free-will of the ruled party. Thus Richard is led voluntarily to ask pardon of the former, to consign his poetry to

the flames, and even for a time to give up Lucy. His regard for his father keeps him waiting in London while he yearns to return to his wife. The high moral sense, the product of his father's training, keeps him away from Lucy after he has been unfaithful to her, and leads him to the dual which cost him so much. The case of Richmond Roy and his son, Harry, is another example in point. His father caught Harry's love and admiration by his stories and impersonations. Thereafter the discovery of his father is the absorbing passion of his life. His father allows him to spend his money like water, and to plot openly for the hand of a German princess whom he attempts to compromise in favor of his son. Not until Richmond burns up the manor house along with himself, is the incubus of brilliant irresponsibility lifted.

The second main type of initial situation is that between what Meredith called nature and circumstance. By nature Meredith understood the nature of man as a human being psychophysically conditioned by the law-abiding and productive forces of nature. By circumstance he understood the conditions incident to man in society, chance, accident and environment. Nature is an individualistic concept; circumstances, a social concept. The demands of human nature and the demands of environment ought to coincide. Meredith himself brings out the problem when Victor Radnor, who had left his first wife and had practically married Nataly, attempts to establish his union upon the social level of respectability. Nature coincided with his union with Nataly. Circumstance was against it. "There was in his heart a dramatic dialog between the veteran antagonists, nature and circumstance. When they, whose business it should be to be joyfully one, furiously split and the Dame (Nature) is up with her shrillest querulousness to inquire of her offspring for the distinct original motive of his conduct. Why did he bring her to such a pass? And what is the gain? If he be not an alienated issue of the great mother he will strongly incline to her view." But it is asked by the disputant, "If we had followed her exclusively, how far could we have traveled from our starting point? We of the world and its prizes and duties must do her an injury to make her tongue musical to us and her argument unworthy of attention. So it seems. How to keep the correct balance between these two testy wranglers

that rarely pull the right way together is as much a task for men in the grip of the world as for the wanton youthful fry under the dominion of their instincts."

The dualism between nature and circumstance is strongly marked as the critical ethical situation in more than one of Meredith's books. In Evan Harrington we have a boy by nature and education a scholar, and a gentleman bound by duty to the tailor's trade and compelled by his sisters to conceal the obligation. On the one hand, circumstance demanded duty; nature, on the other, called for gentility. In Rhoda Flemming we have Dahlia by nature marked for love and happiness, involved in the wrong kind of love which does not lead to happiness, set over against a hard sister and a shifty lover. In Beauchamp's Career this contrast is even more strongly marked. Nevil Beauchamp is by nature an idealist, a quixotic radical, as for example, his act of challenging the French guard because they had insulted his country. He comes of a hard fighting, aristocratic, conservative family, preservers of game. He is a citizen of a mercantile, utilitarian country. In One of our Conquerors, as we showed before, this contrast comes out in recognized form. Victor Radnor is by nature a man of a loving disposition, optimistic and energetic, and qualified for social and political leadership. So long as he keeps these talents under a shade, Mrs. Burnham, his legal wife, keeps quiet but refuses to divorce him. As soon as he attempts to undertake an advance, he is threatened by her.

The third type of initial situation is that involving a choice. The two other factors mentioned above are present. In the Tragic Comedians there is the overshadowing of personality and the influence of social environment, but the initial situation contains something more, i.e., a possibility of choice. Clotilde is not bound to obey her father, not bound to follow conventions. There are other conventions, other groups, in which she can move if she keeps true to Alvin. In his own words, "Barriers are for those who cannot fly." To Beauchamp the social structure of England is hard and unchangeable. Clotilde, however, can fly over the barriers. In this third group of works Meredith describes persons who have the opportunity of flying. In The Egoist Clara Middleton has become engaged to Sir Willoughby. Her infatuation has

cooled and she sees what kind of man he is. The critical situation is, will she choose to be strong enough to refuse him? The ethical situation is, will he be free or bound? But this choice is understood as a mischoice, a fault in judgment. Clotilde had believed that she was the kind of woman to be the proper mate for Alvan. Clara thinks that Sir Willoughby is the man for her. Diana makes a double error. She, in her moment of romanticism, condemns Redworth, and then in another moment of impulse, marries Warwick, because he is practical. Aminta misjudges her feelings of admiration for Lord Ormont for love, while Carinthia Jane makes the mistake of accepting the first man who proposes to her, while the Earl of Fleetwood keeps his promise through a mistaken notion of honor. In this group, then, the initial situation is a misjudgment, resulting in a mischoice.

The ethical complication in each of these cases is the revelation of the inner nature of the situation. In the first case, Sir Austin discovers that his son has an individuality of his own which rebels against his system. The conflict between the affect of the system and the independent individuality brings a divided nature and interest into view. Harry gets into deeper and deeper trouble, as the result of the activities of his father. In the second case, we have a series of defeats of the individual in the presence of circumstance, or at best, partial victories. With Evan, nature is divided. Part of him calls for honesty and thus, though defeated in his attempts on society, he finally wins. Dahlia is completely crushed. Her lover deserts her, her sister forces her to marry a villain and when she is freed and her lover restored, her heart is crushed and dead within her. She cannot marry for want of desire. Beauchamp is beaten all along the line. The girl he is in love with refuses to go with him, he is beaten for Parliament, the only victory he achieves is the forcing of his uncle to ask pardon of his friend, the doctor. He has a few months of married life and an heroic death—that is all we have of Beauchamp. Victor Radnor loses out, his wife dies, and he himself does not survive. The second stage of the ethical structure is the struggle against circumstance. Evan strives to free himself from the double load of dishonesty and tailordom. Dahlia gives in, and is the victim of any person with sufficient energy. Beauchamp makes a series

of attempts to make himself a force for reform. Victor Radnor tries to break down social prejudice. The ethical complication in the third group begins with the discovery of the mistake in judgment, and the attempt to remedy it. Clotilde discovers that she does not want to be free, but wants someone to do her thinking and acting for her, so that when Alvan's situation forces her either to die or give him up, she follows the latter course. Clara finds out the real character of Sir Willoughby, and strives to free herself. Diana discovers what she wants is not merely to be the respectable wife of a gentlemanly official. She wants to live her own life. Aminta discovers that she no longer believes that she loves Ormont. By being left to herself, Corinthia discovers her self-sufficiency.

The ethical dissolution in each of these groups is of a like character. In the first class, it consists of the deliverance of the enslaved from dominance by the father. In Richard's case he escapes hardly alive. With Richmond, where the control has been less severe, the damage is only to his material fortunes. He has gained in experience. In the second group, a genuine ethical dissolution is impossible. In Evan's case although honor has triumphed, yet happiness comes only by the gift of circumstance. In Dahlia's case a life is broken; death is the only release from a broken spirit. With Beauchamp, an heroic death is the only favor circumstance gives, while Victor is broken in his struggle.

In the third group, however, a second chance rules. Clotilde marries a man suitable for her. Willoughby's egoism over-reaches itself, thus giving Clara a chance for a second choice in Vernon Whitford, who is by nature suited to her. Diana discovers the right kind of love with her awakened insight. Aminta discovers the same, while Carinthia Jane discovers that it is best for a woman like herself to dwell alone.

It is possible to unite these three types of ethical structure into one. The initial ethical structure in all of Meredith's works is an erroneous conception of the nature and purpose of the self. Thus, Sir Austin believes that human nature will take any form a skillful workman will put upon it. Evan holds to a belief in the dishonorable character of a tradesman's work. Diana conceives the aim of life as romantic love.

The second step is disillusionment. Harry discovers that a girl like Janet Illchester, with common sense and self-control, is the girl that he really wants. Evan discovers the virtue of duty and hard work. Clara discovers the fact that both Sir Willoughby and herself are egoists.

The third step is the discovery of the true conception of human nature and its field of action.

The conception of human nature and its purposes is then bound into the ethical structure of Meredith's work.

Meredith impresses us by the richness of the internal life of his characters, and the poverty and inconsequentiality of their actions in comparison. Almost all are rich in feeling and ideas; gloriously endowed with purposes. But this richness forbids any adequate performance. Meredith sought to give expression to this activity by the device of books of maxims such as the Pilgrim's Script and Captain Kerby's maxims for men. It is this discovery of the inner life (for it is little less than a discovery, having been but of small importance before his time, except in Jane Austen), which gives at best a singular richness to his work. Most of his most famous characters would be uninteresting in their external actions. The mild literary angels set down Sir Willoughby Pattern for a rich, handsome, respectable country baronet and would let that be all since they find nothing in his actions to excite further interest. He is famous neither in love nor war, poetry nor politics, subjects which form the common literary pabulum. But the demons of comedy who delight in the perversities of the hearts of men see a soul naked and sensitive because of the disease of self-love, shrinking from the contacts of the world, even from politics, for fear of injury. They reveal a soul sensitive to the extreme, capable of understanding the most delicate shades of thought and feeling, obtaining acute pleasure from the praises and admiration of his worshippers and getting acute pain from the lack of such worship. This very lack of action is to Meredith more significant than any action would be. This high sensitivity and richness of inner experiences is shared by most of his important characters, especially in his more mature works. The Egoist and One of Our Conquerors is largely made up of the mental impressions and feelings of Clara Middleton

and Victor Radnor. This inner world becomes organized in them into an organic whole which tends to have a separate existence from the active consciousness, yet which tends to determine it.

This changes the conception of the organizing principle of conduct which becomes transformed from a determination to act or produce an effort, to choice, the act of making a selection, whether of internal or external courses of conduct. A distinction must be made between choice and effort of the will and its operation upon impulse or necessity. Thus Richard Feverel chooses to return. He has before him two alternatives, to remain abroad or to return to his wife. He is no longer acting upon the impulse of passion as he did in the case of his marriage with Lucy, nor in accordance with an intellectual director or belief, as is the case of his father. Either alternative is open. Either involves sorrow. He selects the one which nature dictates. Evan has to choose between two equally distasteful courses of action. Diana after a long series of actions, dictated by passion, has now the choice of marrying Redworth. As she says, "I am going into slavery to make amends for presumption. Banality, thy name is marriage." Choice here is on the dead line between the acceptance of things as they are in a disagreeable situation, and the undertaking of an effort to move into a new situation. It is the crossroad where one turns off to freedom, even though one may think it leads to slavery. Here Meredith stands apart from the novelists whom we have been reviewing, in that in the others the action is determined by an inner or outer necessity. Crusoe had to do something or perish. Lovelace did not have any inducement to do any other thing. Booth could not do otherwise; it was the natural instinct of a healthy boy for Oliver to run away, but Carinthia could have chosen to go back to her husband instead of to Spain to take part in the Carlist revolt. No passion moves her, she chose her brother rather than her husband. Human nature, then, has the power at crucial moments of selecting among several courses of action. Freedom, then, is possible.

If freedom is characteristic of human nature, the self, then, is autonomous. It is self-ruling, an independent life apart from the formative powers of heredity and environment. This is what Sir Austen forgot. He conceived human nature simply as a machine

which can be constructed out of whatever materials he thought best. Thus, one individual could be made the projection of the personality of another individual. "I find," Sir Austen remarked, "there are fathers who are content to be simply obeyed. Now I require not only that my son should obey; I would have him guiltless of the wish to gainsay my wishes—feeling me in him stronger than his undeveloped nature up to a certain period, where my responsibility ends and his commences. Man is a self-acting machine. We cannot cease to be a machine, but though self-acting, he may lose the powers of self-guidance and in the wrong course his very vitality hurry him to perdition. Young, he is an organism ripening to the set mechanic diurnal round and while so he needs all the angels to hold watch over him that he grow straight and healthy and fit for the mechanical duties he may have to perform." But Meredith asks how can one develop character if one does not choose. Sir Austen had forgotten that element in man's life that one cannot be said to have a character without autonomy, self-rule, nor can one be self-ruling unless one is allowed to develop a personality of one's own. This gives a clue to the puzzle which is likely to arise in the mind of the hasty reader of the Ordeal. Sir Austen's system succeeds in the earlier part of Richard's life, and yet something is the matter with it. The answer is clear. In this matter Richard preserved his freedom, his autonomy. He had freely to choose an apology to Farmer Blaize. It is as Meredith indicates, the same type of conflict which was involved in returning to Lucy, a magian conflict between moral alternatives. But Sir Austen failed to see that. To him it was the mere exercise of his own power. When in forcing Richard to destroy his verse, he exercised his moral authority without any compensating gain on Richard's part, and so destroyed all real confidence between father and son. Sir Austen had violated the inner freedom of his son.

The freedom and autonomy of human nature implies its rational unity. It implies a unity of feelings, thought, choices, impulses, and purposes organized around a rational will. It implies that at a certain period human nature can become a whole, can emerge from the state of impulse and desire, and become unified. It is the essential tragedy of Richard Feveral and Dr. Alvin that they

never realized wholeness. One perished from a false sense of honor, the other from the impulse of anger. It is the comedy, as well as the pathos of Sir Willoughby, that he did achieve such a rational unity, but of the wrong kind. It is the unity given the most refined kind, egoistic hedonism of a man whose sole aim is to fiddle harmonies on the strings of sensualism, not sensualism of a primitive character, but of the delicate imaginative character. It is the epic character of Nevil Beauchamp which furnishes the unity around the heroic and sacrificial character of his life. At length we have a unity not merely psychological or descriptive, but internal and all pervasive. Such a unity corresponds pretty well to the philosophical conception of personality.

Personality, then, is the key to the interpretation of Meredith. Already, in Richardson, we have come near this conception, but the essential ideal character of his creation and the lack of an inner rational uncommunicable life, forbids us to ascribe the discovery of that principle to him. His characters know themselves too well and communicate this knowledge too freely. The inner life, thus, falls on the outside. The moral will becomes something external to sensibility to the self. Hence, in Meredith we have personality made the distinct keynote. All Meredith's doctrines and creations it is necessary to read in the light of the fact that they have reference to the better understanding of the nature of the person, and its function in the world system.

But personality *is a progressive activity*. This is mainly understood in relation to his earlier work. In these, and in some others, he represents the transition from one ideal to another. Yet in this, he has grasped the essential unity in the whole process. Richard Feveral who burnt his haystack, and the Richard who walked by the side of the Rhine or courted Lucy, is a transformed and changed Richard, yet despite the development and transformation, Meredith conveys to us the unity.

Heredity, environment, and education, are, then, to be treated as the conditioning factors of personality. Heredity does not play a very important part. Environment is of much more importance. This, connected with education, is the principal factor in character-making. Carinthia Jane is a good example of these. She exhibits her father's directness and energy of character, but she

has been brought up by him and has embodied his book of maxims into her life and conduct. They are always upon her tongue. Yet, at the start, they are mere maxims, interesting ideas to her. Her father is the abiding presence in her life. But after trial has revealed her own vocation she accepts these maxims as part of her inner life in compliance with her freedom.

One of the chief agencies in the formation of personality is the influence of nature and natural objects. To Meredith free personality is the highest expression of the inner life of nature. Nature not only conditions, but gives birth to personality, as its true goal and product. Thus, the animal faculties are not to be regarded as hindrances to the higher faculties of the soul, neither are they to be thought of as joined externally to the life of the individual as something apart from the rational moral life, but they are to be regarded as fore-shadowings, first expressions of the higher life of nature. Richard's early love affair is to be regarded as a moral education. "Let us remember," Meredith says, "nature, though heathenish, reaches at her best to the foot-stool of the highest. She is not all dust but a living portion of the spheres. In aspiration it is error to despise her, forgetting that through nature only can we ascend. Cherished, trained, and purified, she is partly worth the divine mate who is to make her wholly so. St. Simeon saw the Hog in nature and took nature for the Hog." Even "sensual faith in the apparent glories is something." Even the early sensuous blossomings is better than no bud at all. Better to see an angel in a young girl than not to see an angel. The Hog does not express the true goal and purpose of nature. It is thus that the influence of nature tends to draw over into the path and freedom. It calms the judgment. allays the passions in the presence of higher powers. As Richard found out in the rain and storm, in nature his highest nature speaks. Carinthia brought up in the freedom of the Alpine heights, walks even in English commons with the free step of a mountain girl. The moral influence of nature does not consist with Meredith in any so-called imitation of nature, but in the harmony of natural influences with man's highest impulses. She leads up to the foot-stool of the Highest.

The ground or motive of action is the freedom of self-expres-

sion. This type of freedom differs from the freedom we discovered in Richardson on the ground that it has transcended both. One has superseded the freedom from outer restraint and the freedom of the moral will, and has emerged into the freedom of self-realization. This is the ground of human action. There are thus four fields of human action, four fields in the expression of the self:

The internal life of the self.
The external life of the self.
The internal life of other selves.
The external life of other selves.

All these four are necessary aspects of life and fields of action. The first demands the cultivation of the internal, moral virtues of truth, disinterestedness and honor, as well as culture and refinement. The second implies the proper performance of the demands of business and society. The third demands love and understanding for the other. At its highest it demands friendship and love between husband and wife. The fourth demands the acts of honor and benevolence, the treatment of persons with sympathy and kindness, and with children, a proper educational environment. Thus Redworth is an illustration of the proper balance of these four fields. A man of inner refinement, honor and culture, he had a self-respect and reverence for Diana that he allowed no one to discover. As Diana expressed it, "love was his bread and butter." In his outward life he was an honorable and prosperous business man, a man of courage and a good athlete. In the external life of others he acted like a true lover to Diana, rescuing her from mistakes like a true friend. Finally, by his passion, he obtains the realization of love in her inner life. A completed realized soul is one who finds his life realized and properly functioning on all four of these planes.

Since personality possesses freedom over the external events of the world, it follows that evil must be located not outside of the individual but in the personal life. Even if one is oppressed with circumstances it is possible to adjust one's self so far, and when further adjustment becomes impossible, either to refuse to obey or to make one's escape. Evil is located in the functioning of the self.

The nature of evil consists in an overbalance or maldevelopment of the self, on one of the four levels of personal activity. Thus, an overdevelopment of the self on the level of internal life tends to produce an impractical character or a quixotic disposition. Such a character is Nevil Beauchamp, or Victor Radnor who tend to disregard external affairs and conditions. Overdevelopment of the external life of the self tends to produce what is called selfishness, worldliness and snobbery. When the development is on the external life of other persons we have the imperious disposition such as that of Lord Ormont. When we have the development too far in the direction of the internal life of other persons, we have egoism in its finest manifestation, especially when this is combined with the development in the inner life. Thus, according to Meredith, the early Egoist satisfied himself with emphasis on his own outer life and that of others. But Sir Willoughby is a social egoist. He is highly developed in his inner life. He, therefore, demands satisfaction in the inner life of those around him, especially in the love and sympathy of loving women. This is self-destructive. For in too great self-revelation, he destroyed love—"He slew imagination. There is no clearer disaster in love than the death of imagination. He dragged her through the labyrinth of his penetration in his hungry coveting to be loved more and still more, more still until imagination gave up the ghost and he talked in her plain hearing like a monster." An egoist, then, is one who lives both in the self and others. Thus, despite his deep love for his son, despite the fact of his good start, Sir Austin becomes an egoist because of this concentration. He could not overcome the limitations of his human nature and one of these is that one cannot get beyond himself. "If immeasurable love were perfect wisdom, one human being might almost impersonate Providence to another. Alas, love, divine as it is, can do no more than lighten the house it inhabits, must take its shape sometimes—intensify its narrowness, can spiritualize but not expel the old life-long lodger above stain and blow." Sir Austin did not realize this. He began with an overconcentration on the certainty of his reason and results in scientific humanism, confirmed as these were by their earlier effects. "By such pride fell the angels." His next step was the violation of the inner life and freedom of his

son through failure to understand or try to understand his nature. The third stage was the pleasure in the exercise of his power over the outer life of his son, crude egoism of the external type.

Evil, then, in its primary form, is a mere misdirection on one level which the thinker, the man of action, the reformer, the educator, and the lover, are liable to fall into. When combined with one or another of the others, they become forms of egoism, on the one hand, and folly on the other. Egoism and folly are the two primary vices; the one afflicting the heart, and the other the head. The first is incurable under normal conditions; the second is curable by experience or when the clouds which obscure the judgment have been cleared away.

As we have seen, nature and circumstance ought to be fundamentally at harmony. This harmony is disturbed by evil. The only way to restore the balance between them is to discover the good and achieve it. It is easy to see, then, what and where the good is. It cannot be outside of the person, for external evil, the disharmony of nature and circumstance, is a product of evil. Good consists in self-realization, a character defined in terms of the harmonious and equal functioning of personality on all four levels of its existence. Such is the character of the person whom Meredith regards as the most admirable. Men like Redworth and Austin Wentworth, and Vernon Whitford, especially Redworth, as the most perfect union of prudence and goodness, are to be regarded as Meredith's ideal. Such a union is that which the nature of man and the universe dictates and is that which restores the harmony between circumstance and nature. This brings us to our conclusion.

Two factors enter into the make up of life and experience. These are designated by the terms nature and circumstance.

Nature is here used for the unity of psycho-physical organism which forms the self-conscious individual, considered as the biological representative of the race.

Circumstance is that which is external to the self as embodied in the social group.

Human nature is grounded in the nature of the universe. It is conditional upon it and its highest expressions are in harmony with it. The highest expression and end of nature is personality.

Personality may be defined as the proper and harmonious functioning of the self in the realms of the inner self and outer self, inner non-self, and outer non-self.

The four elements which make up personality are inner development, outer freedom, a good will or benevolence, and love.

Evil may be defined as the inharmonious development on one or more of these levels and finds its primary expression in subjectivism, worldliness, dominance of other persons, and selfishness. On their secondary levels they may be reduced to two: Lack of wisdom, and egoism in its various expressions. The following table may be illustrative:

I

LACK OF WISDOM

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Inner Self: Misjudgment of one's character (Clotilde).	Outer Self: Imprudence in worldly affairs (Roy Richmond).	Inner Non-Self: Failure to understand the characters of other persons (Kelvan, Diana).	Outer Non-Self: Quixotism (Beauchamp).

II

EGOISM

Inner Self: Pride of intellect (Sir Austin).	Outer Self: Selfishness (Evan Harrington and his Sisters).	Inner Non-Self: Sentimentalism (Sir Willoughby).	Outer Non-Self: Autocracy (Lord Ormond).

1. Lack of wisdom implies a lack of knowledge of, and a defect of judgment in regard to either (a) one's own character, or (b) the character of others, or (c) defective sense as to what course of action is best for one's own happiness in worldly natures, or (d) what course of action best advances one's own ideals; (b) implies lack of knowledge of the best way of advancing one's own interest; (d) implies a lack of knowledge of the best way to advance society's interest; (a) and (b) represent the defect in wisdom from the egoistic standpoint; (c) and (d) from the altruistic standpoint; (a) and (c)

as representing failure in regard to person, are the most serious.

2. Egoism implies either (a) an exaggerated faith in one's own intellectual powers and beliefs, or (b) a disregard of the humanity of other persons and their rights, that is, the equaling them with physical instruments to advance one's material welfare, (c) or a recognition of the humanity as well as the personality of the other person and the treatment of the inner life as a means to personal satisfaction. This is spiritual vampirism. Or, finally, egoism may express itself in the exercise of power over the outer life of the person. Dominance neither arises from pride of intellect, nor does it seek material or emotional pleasure from those dominated, but merely gratification of its own sense of power through the control over the outer life of the subject. This is benevolent autocracy. (a) and (b) fail to recognize the personal rights of other individuals. They represent individualistic egoism. (c) and (d) represent social forms of egoism, (b) and (d) are the most odious, but (a) and (c) are the most dangerous, since they have to do with the inner life of the person.

3. Of course, nowhere are these forms of evil to be found isolated. They are always to be found in connection with other forms of misdirection. Thus sentimentalism is found combined with, and, indeed, leads to, misunderstanding of other persons, as Sir Willoughby learned to his sorrow. But in each case the one given is primary, the source from which the others radiate. Again, Clotilde besides suffering from lack of knowledge of herself, is afflicted with sentimentalism or egoism of the inner non-self. Sir Willoughby suffered from all the other forms of egoism and folly. In each case there is one source of evil, however. The good may be similarly outlined as wisdom, and altruism or benevolence.

I

WISDOM

Inner Self: Self-Knowledge.	Outer Self: Prudence. Business ability.	Inner Non-Self: Ability to understand other persons.	Outer Non-Self: Social Judgment.

II

Altruism or Benevolence

Humility - Generosity - Love - Idealism

The good may be summed up as wisdom and benevolence united in free personality.

Wisdom implies ability to judge the character of the self, the good of the self, the characters and goods of other selves.

Benevolence implies a sense of one's own true value, generosity, affection, and sympathy, with other natures and wishes and a whole-hearted desire to advance the common good.

Freedom implies ability to pursue the good. It is voluntary, for it lies in everyone's power.

Nature or personality, and circumstance are naturally harmonious. This harmony is disturbed by evil. Good restores the harmony between human nature and circumstance.

The series of antithises which have arisen in the course of the preceding pages, forming, as they do, the foundation of a dialectic, naturally call to mind the spirit and method of Hegel, whom Meredith resembles in more ways than one, especially in regard to his source of inspiration and the motive of thought.

Both were inspired by the theories of development which, beginning in the realm of astronomy with the work of Kant and under his influence developing in Herder and Schelling, widened their scope into the fields of History and Biology. The theory of Evolution, especially as found in the work of Spencer, represents a higher stage in the same movement. Meredith is the poet and novelist of the later developmentalism, as Hegel is the philosopher of the earlier.

Moreover, both agree in regard to their opposition to certain conclusions which were drawn from the doctrine of man's unity with nature. Both in Hegel's and Meredith's day there were sentimental romanticists who were inclined to undervalue universal reason in favor of their own subjective emotions. This, according to both philosopher and novelist, is a far worse form of egoism than that of the bald hedonistic type, since it insinuates itself under the guise of noble sentiments and high sounding

phrases. To Hegel it is a mere "phrensy of self-conceit." To Meredith the sentimentalists "fiddles harmonies on the strings of sensualism." Or to change the figure, he is an egoist whose egoism has struck its roots into his soul.

Returning to the question of the dialectic, the first step will be the proof of the dialectical nature of the artistic structure of Meredith's work; the second, its presence in his ethical structure; and finally its presence in his philosophical beliefs, properly so-called.

As is well known, the principle of the dialectic is the doctrine that if any abstract truth is worked out to its logical conclusions, it becomes transformed into its opposite, while if this latter is examined and tested, a higher truth is discovered embracing that which was valid in the foregoing truths. Although the dialectic was first discovered in the field of logic, it was in the fields of history and the History of Philosophy that its greatest triumphs have been attained. The first stage of the dialectic is the abstractly rational, the universal, disregarding the inner life and feelings of the individual. The second stage is the individual, the particular, with the emphasis on the inner life. The form which these antithesis takes most often is found in the conflict between man and society, or to use Meredith's phrase, Nature and Circumstance.

Now the artistic structure of Meredith's works represents a working out of some phase of this problem. His two most famous novels, "The Ordeal of Richard Feveral" and "Diana of the Crossways," are examples of this dialectic and it can be discovered less clearly in his other works. In the Ordeal is found an example of a tragedy in which the thesis and antithesis are so far apart that reconciliation is impossible. The dialectic, like the dialectic in all tragedy, is imperfect. These two elements are clearly marked by Meredith as two testings followed by a conflict between the lower and higher natures. In the first testing, the boy, Richard, is described as innocent of conscious wrong, possessing little or no personality and dominated by his father. This is followed by revolt and the burning of the haystack, ending in the restoration of moral character on a higher level of knowledge, and conscious obedience. The antithesis is marked by the transition from the innocence of adolescence into the passionate in-

nocence of young love, followed by the antithesis of revolt, separation, sin, and ending in spiritual victory and reconciliation. The following diagrams will serve to illustrate the structure of the two novels.

1

THE ORDEAL OF RICHARD FEVERAL

The testing of a man and a theory under the Influence of Hate and Love.

A

Thesis

Hate

The Burning of the Haystack.

(a) Thesis The Innocence of Boyhood as a natural non-moral Being.

(b) Antithesis Burning of the Haystack (destruction of unconscious innocence).

(c) Synthesis The Apology and its results.

1. Struggle (Pride vs. Honor). "The Magian Conflict" between good and evil in Richard's soul.
2. Surrender and Apology.
3. Moral Progress (conscious obedience and innocence as a moral and spiritual being).

B

Antithesis

Love

(a) Thesis—Idyllic love.	(1) Th. Adolescent Innocence
	Peace
	(2) An. Idyllic Love
	Storm, ending in
	(3) Syn. False calm
(b) Antithesis—Revolt.	(1) Th. Marriage with Lucy
	(2) An. Separation from Lucy
	(3) Syn. Sin and flight

(c) Synthesis—Return
- (1) Th. "Nature speaks" to Richard through her soothing beauty.
- (2) An. Return
  - (a) Magian Conflict
    Love vs. Honor
  - (b) Resolution to return
  - (c) Challenge
- (3) Syn. Reconciliation with Lucy
  - (a) Reconciliation
  - (b) Resolve to fight dual
  - (c) T r a g e d y and no moral Progress

2

Diana of the Crossways is a perfect example of the dialectic theme: Genius in search of self-realization through love and marriage.

A

Thesis

First Misconception: Marriage as matter of social protection and convenience.

(a) Thesis—Freedom of Girlhood

(b) Antithesis—Marriage with Warrick
- (1) Th. Need of protection
- (2) An. Marriage
- (3) Syn. Attempts to aid Husband through Lord Dannisborough

(c) Synthesis—
- (1) Tyranny
- (2) An. Divorce Suit
- (3) Syn. Liberation

B

Antithesis

Second Misconception of Marriage: The Ideal of Romantic Love.

(a) Thesis—Freedom and Authorship

(b) Antithesis—Romantic Love
  (1) Th. Friendship
  (2) An. Proposed elopement
  (3) Syn. Proposed marriage

(c) Synthesis—Disillusionment
  (1) Nervous strain and monetary embarrassment
  (2) Betrayal of Secret
  (3) Rejection by Lover

C

Synthesis

True Solution: Marriage as the Union of the Romantic and Practical.

(a) Thesis—Reaction from Romanticism
  (1) Th. Prostration, Moral and Physical
  (2) An. Acceptance of Position as a widow
  (3) Syn. Acceptance of Redworth

(b) Antithesis—Acceptance of Redworth's Passion. The true conception of Love

(c) Synthesis—Motherhood

The second stage in this comparison is the discovery of the dialectic in the ethical structure. According to the earlier part of this chapter, the ethical structure of Meredith amounted in the end to (a) a misconception of the nature and field of the self, (b) a disillusionment and (c) a discovery of the correct ideal. The initial situation or problem may be reduced to misconception of the relation of nature and circumstance and of the nature of freedom. His standpoint is usually that of abstract right and morality and can be summed up in Hegelian language in the words, "Be a person and respect others as persons."[1] Meredith is equally emphatic in regard to the emphasis on the second element in the dialectic of Right, that having to do with the choice of the good or inner morality. These two aspects of the good life are outer freedom and inner unselfishness. The first has to do with the external relations of the self in its natural environment as a person exclusive of other persons. The second, or un-

[1]Philosophy of Right, Sec. 36.

selfishness, is an inner virtue finding expression in morality. We have already seen in Diana how the movement from outer wisdom to inner development has taken place. This is united in motherhood which combines them both.

Meredith is thus not content to remain merely on the standpoint of outer freedom and inner morality, but feels that he must move on to something higher, the realm of the ethical order. Tragedy in Meredith consists in the failure to advance out of the first realm into the higher. It is the tragedy of Richard Feveral that this transition is not made. He fails to realize his life either in the family or the state. He is broken before he is completed. Nor is the transition clearly made in One of Our Conquerors, or in Rhoda Flemming. The aim of the former is to show how the maladjustment in the self and in society prevented the hero who had been successful in the civic community from making the transition to the state. In Evan Harrington the point of the work is found in the acceptance by Evan of his place in the Civic Community of the duties which are attached to it. In the Egoist, whereas in the earlier part of the work, Sir Willoughby had looked upon marriage from the individualistic viewpoint, in the latter he is forced to accept it, even though unwillingly, as a two-sided compact, having relation to the Community. The Amazing Marriage may be regarded as a study in the Progressive Self-Realization of the heroine in the various stages of the ethical order. The first stage deals with various expressions of the principle of abstract right. She begins as an individual left alone by the death of her father and the departure of her brother, a product of nature, guided and controlled by reason. The two elements which enter into her spiritual make-up are her mountain training and her education by her father, to correspond to the natural and rational elements in experience. Her only outside relationship is a suit over property with the loss of which she has been threatened. She understands marriage as a matter of common sense convenience. Her engagement to Falkland follows. The latter, through a mistaken sense of honor, keeps the letter of his promise but breaks the spirit in deserting her. In the second main division she is thrown back upon her father's maxims, which she had accepted intellectually before. With the birth of the child she enters

the ethical order but with that event the marriage is dissolved. But she finds a higher field of self-expression in the Carlist insurrection, and through her labor for the prisoners she participates in the inner and outer destinies of nations and enters into World History. Finally, the gap in the social relationships which had been opened by her separation from the wrong kind of husband, is closed by her marriage to the right and the process is concluded. The following diagram will illustrate the outline:

A. Abstract—Right
   (1) Property: Law Suit
   (2) Contract: Promise of marriage by Lord Falkland
   (3) Wrong: Desertion after marriage

B. Morality
   (1) Precept: Her father's precepts
   (2) Good conscience
   (3) Obedience and loyalty to husband even while wronged by him

C. Ethicality
   (1) Family
      (1) Marriage Recognition
      (2) Means: Support of her by Husband
      (3) Dissolution of Family—Birth of Child
   (2) Civic Community: Carinthia in Wales
   (3) State Carlist Insurrection

The final goal of Meredith's ethic, then, is the realization of the individual's life in higher ethical groups.

This clarifies Meredith's conception of freedom. In this he again is in agreement with Hegel. The latter discovers the following: Freedom is that which accrues to one as a person, the right over one's self and over external nature. The second stage is the freedom of moral choice of obedience to duty. The third is the unity of Right and Duty. The slave can have no duties and only the free man has such. "Were there on the one side, all rights, on the other, all duties, then, would the whole dissolve itself." Meredith agrees with him here. Before one can have the higher freedom, one must have the lower. The higher presup-

poses the lower, while the full value and meaning of the lower can only be realized in the higher.

In conclusion Meredith and Hegel agree in regard to

A. I. Inspiration and influence. Both reacted from Romanticism and Egoism. Both were influenced by theories of development.

II. Structure. Both recognize the dialectical character of experience.

III. Nature and Circumstance. Both find the dialectic to arise through the conflict between universality or the logical, and particularity or the abstract individual.

IV. Freedom. Both regard freedom as fundamental and have a threefold conception of it as the Freedom of personal right, the freedom of obedience to the moral law and the freedom which unites the first two, the freedom of self-realization in a rational social order.

B. I. Human nature

(1) Its ground. Both conceive the ground for human nature to be the cosmos considered as a spiritually evolving organism.[1] This organism represents the synthetic unity of opposites, empirical nature, and rational logical law.

(2) Both conceive human nature to be constituted as a progressively integrating unity of thoughts, feelings, actions and choices.

(3) Proper field of Action. Both find the proper field of action to be the self and other selves.

II. Evil

(1) Its Location. Evil with Hegel is a relative matter. In each phase of the dialectic the incomplete element is evil relative to the higher phases of the dialectic. Thus, in the sphere of Ethics, evil is located in the inner or the outer activities of the self. Here Meredith agrees with him.

---

[1]Hegel's Encyclopedia, Part 3, pp. 379, 380 and 549.

(2) It consists in a one-sided under or over development of the self. With this position Meredith is in agreement.

III. Good. (1) Both are agreed in the nature of the good as the union of individual freedom with moral freedom in a free society.

VII

HARDY AND THE DUALISM OF WILL AND IDEA

It will be clear to the reader of the foregoing chapter that the position elaborated in it is one of personalism, a conception of human nature as a balance between the inner and the outer life in an organic whole. This balance lies between the unity of the outer physical universe and the plurality of inner experiences. There is only one world in which action is possible and common to all. But there are many of these experiences. The postulate of the personalist is that of freedom. Circumstance is plastic to nature if nature so wills. If it is not, it is due to some misdirection on the part of nature.

But here the question arises as to the things which do not lie in our power. The more one studies these the more their number increases. The external events of our lives are to a large extent beyond our control. Even more is this the case with the influences of heredity. Our actions are not in our power, but are at the mercy of our environment, weaknesses, impulses, instincts, which in the words of Hardy are "neither expected nor desired." "Where," says the determinist, "is freedom?"

These two problems, then, form the inspiration of Hardy's thought. Is the conception of personality a valid one? Is there such a unity between experiencing and willing as Meredith would suppose? Is there anything which lies in human power?

It seems quite clear that Hardy was influenced deeply by Schopenhauer. The resemblance between their conscious teachings has been shown to be impressive. On the other hand, the influence by Von Hartmann, save in the later period, is by no means so evident. In fact, the "Philosophy of the Unconscious" and Hardy's earlier works were well nigh contemporaneous. In his later works Hardy refers to Von Hartmann's doctrine.

The starting point of Hardy's thought was, it seems clear, Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea." Schopenhauer began with an affirmation of Kantianism interpreted in its most subjectivistic manner, through a sharp distinction between appearance

and the thing in itself. Under the first is classed the phenomena of space, time and the logical categories. Under the second, is placed the will which constitutes the thing-in-itself. Since space and time are merely subjective forms of perception, and since they constitute the ground of individuality, individuality is illusory. Nothing really exists but the will to live. All else is determined in accordance with mechanical law. Teleology and rationality are thus denied to phenomena. In regard to a mere appearance, nothing ethical or purposeful can be affirmed. On the other hand, the will cannot be logical or rational since those categories imply temporality and spaciality. We have thus the world of illusory appearance, in which no one can receive satisfaction since it is merely mechanical and irrational. On the other hand, there is the unconscious will, the ground for the existence of this world, willing nothing but its own existence.

Now to will means to lack something, i. e. to suffer. But the will can never receive satisfaction in an irrational world, and there is none other. Hence to live is to suffer. We are at the mercy of a blind will to live, willing in a universe which is governed by irrational chance and which can never satisfy.

The sole chance of escape from this torture house of existence is by renunciation of the will to live. If action is determined by the will to live in accordance with mechanical law, the only way out is by renunciation of action. The one from whom the desire for life has vanished, has started on the road to salvation. Miss Garwood in her essay on this subject has pointed out these parallelisms so well that it is needless here to dwell on them. In general it may be said that Hardy's fundamental conscious conviction upon which his novels are based is the irrationality of the universe. The problem, then, is "do his works present this appearance or are they illustrations of a deeper and more advanced principle?"

It is necessary, therefore, to turn to the structure of Hardy's novels. Viewed from this standpoint there is discovered the greatest degree of structural complexity yet attained in English fiction. It is said that the Mayor of Casterbridge has the best constructed plot of any novel in the language. The work is thoroughly unified

around a central conditioning character. In Far from the Madding Crowd this character is Bathsheba Everdene, in the Return of the Native it is Eustacia Vye; in The Woodlanders it is Grace Melbury; in the Mayor of Casterbridge it is the Mayor; in Tess, Tess, and in Jude, Jude Fawley. The initial situation is the relation of the central to the other characters. These fall into active characters who consciously affect the plot and passive characters who are acted on. Thus, in the Return, Thomasene Yoebright is essentially a passive, an acted on character. It is necessary to distinguish between the central or unifying, and the central interpretative character. In some of his works, Hardy introduces one or more characters which are the repositors of values. They are passive, they affect the action little, but they furnish the ideal for action which others lack. In Jude and Tess the central and the interpretative characters are combined. In the others, they are distinct. Thus Gabriel Oak's character is the background of Far from the Madding Crowd. He acts in accordance with right and marries Bathsheba, but the plot is not advanced by his presence. In the Return, Deggory Vann attempts to influence the action, but his efforts are in vain. He marries Thomasene in the end. In the Woodlanders, Giles Winterborne and Marty have the same function, while in the Mayor of Casterbridge, Elizabeth Jane is the moral norm. In Jude and Tess the moral and actional centers are combined, the central character being passive and ideal in a sense.

The initial situation, then, from the artistic structural point of view, is a central character in relation to a group of others. Several diagrams may aid. Thus:

1. Far from the Madding Crowd.



2. The Return of the Native.



3. The Woodlanders.



4. The Mayor of Casterbridge.



5. Tess of the D'Urbervilles.



6. Jude the Obscure.



The double line indicates initial relations, the single ones those which are introduced to complicate matters. The (c) indicates the central character; T, the interpretative characters.

The structural complication is the introduction of new personal factors and the unforeseen and unpredictable results which arise from the introduction. The non-personal factors are those of environment, heredity, and chance, which, however, are conditional upon the new personal factors. Thus, Clem's appearance on the scene and his love affair with Eustacia, is the complicating factor, while the time, circumstance and other factors are the work of chance. Bathsheba's first meeting with Troy is the effect of chance, so is the offence which Giles gives to Mrs. Charmond. The chance element in the complication is reduced to a minimum in Hardy's later works, disappearing in Jude altogether. The environmental or local condition and the hereditary condition are even more marked. Thus, the attitude of Eustacia and Clem to Egdon Heath is a determining factor, as is Tess' family and her heredity. Nevertheless, without the characters, these would have no effect. Thus, in *Far from the Madding Crowd,* Troy is the new factor; Clem, in The Return; Mrs. Charmond and Dr. Fitzpiers, in The Woodlanders; Lucetta, in The Mayor of Casterbridge; Angel Clare, in

Tess, and Sue and Time, in Jude. This new introduction disturbs the relationships of the characters and gives an opportunity for the advent of the unforeseen and unpredictable.

This introduction of the unforeseen and unpredictable flowing from the changed relations of the characters brings the dissolving element in Hardy's structure, which, however, in Hardy's conception of the situation, is only the logical revelation of the relationships in their inner nature. That Boldwood's mind would ultimately break down and lead him to violence was highly probable under the conditions given; that it would lead him to shoot Troy, is a matter of circumstance which is useful for the plot. That Clem and Eustacia should have found their marriage to end unhappily is inevitable, considering their characters; that it should involve Mrs. Yoebright and Wildeve was highly probable. Sorrow was inevitable. Fate lifted it to the dignity of tragedy. The outcome of the Woodlanders could hardly have been anything but sad under any circumstances. In the case of the Mayor, Tess, and Jude, circumstance plays but a small role. If we assume that Angel acted in character when he left Tess (which I don't believe, from the description), knowing Tess and her past as we do, little less than tragedy can be expected.

It is a curious fact that in the novels under discussion, the author conforms to the most strict laws of poetic justice. Taking the mere plots of the stories into consideration, they might be regarded as tracts for the promotion of piety, after the manner of Defoe and Richardson. Only Hardy interpreted his facts in such a manner in his comments that every one is unaware of the resemblance. Thus the Mayor is punished in strict proportion to his crime against his wife, his mistreatment of his step-daughter, and his selling bad grain to the poor. Take the mere outline of Tess without Hardy's comments and read them in the eighteenth century manner. She sins with Alec and is punished by the desertion of Clare; she is unfaithful to her marriage vow and later commits murder and is hanged. Jude yields to sin and is punished once. He lives with a woman not his wife and becomes an infidel. He is punished with the loss of his children and his loved one, and finally dies, because he cannot get rid of his desire of somebody else's wife. Treated in this manner, how pious

and moral it seems. The bad are punished, and the good rewarded. Of course, heaven cannot reward a man like Giles or a woman like Marty, but for ordinary persons there seems to be a fairly proportionate reward if viewed from orthodox standards. But if one does not so view the matter (as Hardy did), on what ethical grounds would he deny the poetic justice of the outcome of his stories? We shall see later.

It is thus easy to cross to the ethical structure. As we have seen, Hardy always constructs his novels, at least the more important ones, around a person, a character. He is not interested in social progress or political action, but he is intensely interested in the individual person. He thus concentrates his ethical interest on one person. The initial situation is an individual under difficulties. There are two types of these difficulties, which, however, approximate and merge. In the first, we have an individual out of harmony or unity with environment. In *Far from the Madding Crowd* this is only slight. In Bathsheba we have a woman of great executive abilities, yet with a passionate temperament, trying to be a farmer. She had the brain of an Elizabeth and the passions of a Maria Stuart. She wants both to rule and to be loved, in a queenly way. Such a connection is impossible in the Wessex sheep country. In The Return of the Native we have a complete maladjustment of environment. True, Eustacia has grave moral defects. She is selfish and voluptuous. But, on the other hand, she is capable of ruling men, of making them love her. She has beauty and charm more than sufficient for a king's court. She "was the raw material of divinity. On Olympus she would have done well with a little preparation. She had the passions and instincts which make a perfect goddess, that is, those which make not quite a faultless woman." Yet, with this temperament, intended for action, she is placed on Egdon Heath—Grace Melbury is another example of this kind. She has been educated outside of her social rank, for a cultured and learned society. In the woods she is out of place and unhappy. She believes, because of her education, that Giles will not be suitable for her. But there is another and inner defect in Grace. She has an inner shallowness that keeps her from taking love too seriously. But when more strengthened and intensified such a defect might be

serious. The second group of characters have defects in their nature which are all pervading. In speaking of Fitzpiers, he says: "Had his persistence equalled his insight instead of being the spasmodic and fitful thing it was, fame and fortune need never have remained a wish with him." Michal Henchard, the Mayor of Casterbridge, has gone to the other extreme. He is subject to all moods, but once started on a purpose, he will carry it out to the bitter end. He knows not the meaning of reason and moderation. Energy and persistence are his, but they are misdirected and uncontrolled by the moral and the practical reason. Once set in a given direction by a species of moral inertia, he keeps on going. In Tess we have the best example given in modern literature of a person with what is called an inferiority complex, which not only embraced a profound sense of her own unworthiness as compared with other persons, but a lack of ambition and enterprise. "Such high contentment with such a slight and trivial performance as having started towards a means of living, was a part of the Darbeyfield temperament. She resembled her father in being content with immediate and small achievements and in having no mind for laborious effort towards such petty monetary and social advancement as could be effected by a family as heavily handicapped as the once knightly D'Urberville's were now." This inner defect colored her whole conduct, and made her take the reproaches of Angel Clare without a murmur as her just due.

With Jude we have a person strikingly lacking in moral earnestness and fixity of purpose. Although he is by no means an overpassionate or oversensual man, he allowed himself to be drawn and moved by the passions, as if he were; moreover he had in no period of his life any strong consuming purpose or wish which alone could achieve his desire.

These two forms, the outer maladjustment and the inner defect, are united to form the initial situation of the ethical structure. Of the first the individual is conscious vividly at times; of the second, one is only partly or wholly unconscious. Bathsheba with her unharmoniousness of intellect and passion set in a rural environment, Eustacia, selfish and voluptuous with no opportunity save passionate love-making to gratify them on the wilds of Egdon

Heath; Grace with her culture set in the Woodlands; the Mayor more suitable by nature for a mechanic, raised to dignity; Tess from a family of decayed blood, receiving the taint of her environment; Jude set to overcome the difficulties of a humble condition with energies not suited to the task—all these are examples of this double union of outer maladjustment and inner defect which makes the necessary condition for tragedy.

The moving force or ethical complication is the attempt to escape from the outer circumstance. For the characters do not recognize the inner defect. In one case Jude (given as he is to introspection) believes his fondness for women and drink as his besetting sins, but never goes deeper to the root of his trouble. Bathsheba tries to achieve romance by her marriage with Troy, Eustacia, by her marriage with Clem. The Mayor tries to undo his sin against his wife, first, by his reform, and secondly, by his remarriage to her. Tess tries to escape the effect of environment by going to the D'Urberville household, and later by employment in the dairy and marriage to Clare. Jude attempts to go to the University, and later in the lower ministry, and finally seeks social freedom in his union with Sue. The ethical complication thus falls into a kind of testing or struggle.

The ethical resolution comes as the result of the failure of external effort by the internal defect. For it is the defect as we have seen which causes the defeat and not mere brute chance. Against the strong man and the wise man, chance is a mere chance which cannot overcome him. No one could have imagined the marriage between Eustacia and Clem to be a happy one, even if Mrs. Yoebright had not been turned away from the door. Chance deepens the mere common, all too common, unhappiness of a mistaken marriage, into tragedy. The depth of the tragedy in Hardy is proportionate to the depth of the defect. Thus, Bathsheba escapes after much unhappiness, and marries Gabriel Oak, a good man, who loved her. Grace escapes after a like unhappy marriage. Although there is no physical tragedy with her, yet there is a moral one, in her return to her husband and her forgetfulness of Giles. Disaster waits upon the footsteps of Eustacia, for although, as Hardy assures us, she would have made a good woman, but only under favorable, very favorable, conditions, a

happy and successful one. With her we have the outcome a physical tragedy. Even deeper is the fall of the mayor who falls victim to his own temperament, whose energy had no stronger basis than that of temperament. When his nervous energy is gone, he is worn out and through, incapable of anything. Tess lacked this fundamental energy and self-assertiveness, a lack which is the greatest sin in the eyes of nature. Jude's tragedy is the deepest of all, since in many respects he was the ablest and his defect was the deepest. Humanity did not take the trouble to hang him; it just let him die.

This gives the main elements of the structure. To balance the picture of the central character, Hardy gives the other aspects of the problem in three static groups who represent the distinct attitudes. On the other hand, as opposed to good or near good struggling in the grip of self and circumstance, we have evil and near evil. The shallow, the selfish, the Epicurean. To this clan belongs Troy, who lived only in the day, to whom the past was gone and over, and the future not yet come. In this group belongs also Wildeve, Fitzpiers, and probably Alec D'Urberville. In that class also comes Arabella and Sue, the two women who determined Jude's career, the first the physical egoist, the second, the spiritual egoist; the one loving material pleasure, the other an Epicurean in spiritual things. Such persons as those above do more harm according to Hardy's treatment of the theme, than a downright wicked man or woman, since they enslave frequently the soul as well as the body, and in neither case are touched by society.

The second group are the vast array of commonplace persons who feel no conflict between the self and circumstance because they are adjusted to their environment. In this group are the group of rural characters in his earlier works, the Durbeyfields in Tess and Phillotson in Jude. Such persons are numerous and unimportant and are exempt from fate.

The third class are those persons who affect the action little, but are set up to represent the moral goal or norm. Gabriel Oak, Deggory and Thomasene in The Return; Giles and Marty in The Woodlanders; and Fairfrae and Elizabeth Jane in the Mayor of Casterbridge, represent those who have achieved the state of

resignation and self-sacrifice which in some respects is the highest moral goal. They have, in a sense, achieved perfection, or are well on the road to it.

The four classes of persons described in the above paragraphs furnish a tolerable outline of human nature. The egoist and sensualist lives almost wholly in his or her feelings or emotion, that is, nearly in the outer life. When, however, the outer life is swept away, he has nothing left except himself, but while this remains intact he is forever the same. Experience and sorrow cannot teach him. The common person also lives under ordinary conditions in the outer sphere. The heroic person has to take refuge within himself from the grip of fate and thus is saved. The weak or defective person can learn and may learn inner wisdom, but it is the tragedy of life that he either does not, or, when it happens, it is too late. It was thus with the Mayor. "But the ingenius machinery contrived by the gods for reducing human possibilities of ameliorization to the minimum which arranges that the wisdom to do shall come paripassu with the departure of the zest for doing—stood on his way."

To seek the true nature of man merely in the will, therefore, must be regarded as an error. Certainly not in the moral will, for how can one know how one's actions are going to turn out? One may, with the best intentions in the world, like Dr. Fitzpiers, cut down a tree to save a man's life and find the result to be his death, and the resultant disaster to a dozen innocent families. Certainly, Tess acted according to the rule of right, the best ethical will in the world, but it results in ethical disaster. Neither can human nature in its essence be found in outer activity, the responses to environment, for these are mechanically determined in accordance with psychical and physiological laws. It is a snare and a delusion to believe that a person can find a proper life for the self in external action. Such a man will, at best, be like the Mayor of Casterbridge, and when disaster comes he will have nothing. Neither can it be found in the will to live despite the predominance of that motive in human life, for the will to live is a mere psychophysiological urge which drives one on in spite of disaster and sorrow, despite the oft-repeated lessons of experience to the contrary; nor can one find human nature in the

intellect, for the intellect does not answer the oft-repeated question of why the sun shines equally upon the evil and the good. The intellect only leads one to see that one is but one of many.

What, then, is peculiar to man? Hardy finds what is peculiar in human nature in an organized system of experience. Human nature is not active in its essence, but contemplative. Its business is to learn lessons and to widen its outlook and viewpoint. Experience is the lessons learned by the soul in its relations to life, become a part of the soul. Viewed from one standpoint, Hardy's novels are studies in the growth of experience in minds capable of it. Without experience, one is a mere collection of emotions. Before she met Alec, Tess is described as "a mere vessel of emotions, untinctured by experience." This is one's own peculiar possession. It is the only real self. "She was not an existence, an experience, a passion, a structure of sensations to any one but herself. To all human kind, besides, Tess was only a passing thought."

Experience is not achieved by action, but by being acted on. It is the inner response to external action. The result was that in Tess' case the offence of Alec resulted in inner spiritual life. It provided her with new feelings. "Almost at a leap Tess thus changed from a simple girl to a complex woman. Symbols of reflectiveness passed into her face, and a note of tragedy into her voice. Her eyes grew larger and more eloquent. She became what would have been called a fine creature, her aspect fair, arresting; her soul that of a woman whom the turbulent experiences of the last year or two had quite failed to demoralize. But for the world's opinion those experiences would simply have been a liberal education." This experience is to be judged by its intensity rather than high duration. "Tess' corporial blight had been her mental harvest."

This same feeling of the results of experience is found in the life of Marty who is described as having "touched sublimity at points and looked like a being who had rejected, with indifference, the attributes of sex, for the loftier quality of abstract humanism." In Clem Yoebright, in Jude, in Giles, and in many others, the goal of life becomes experience.

The inner life so highly developed produces a decrease in the

more energetic outer activities. The inner and the outer tend to become exclusive. There thus arises a dualism between the two worlds. The mayor, before his misfortunes, lived entirely in the outer life, moved by passion and impulses. When he learned through experience, his outer life was paralyzed. He had lost his zest. Elizabeth Jane felt greatly but it was not visible in her actions. We are told that "the quiet bearing of one who brimmed with an inner activity," characterized Elizabeth Jane at this period. Grace finds non-action the logical result of her state. "I am quiet because my sadness is not of a nature to stir one into action," she tells her father, adding this insight into the philosophy of Hardy, "I am what I feel, father . . . If I have anything to bear, I can bear it in silence."

But what if this is carried out as long as one lives, one must act? One cannot help it. The logical conclusion would be to follow the line of least resistance, drifting according to impulse or necessity, while the soul enjoys the freedom of experience. With Tess, this went so far as to result in the actual separation of experience and emotion from impulse and action, causing a complete paralysis of the moral sense. The dualism began in the separation between the self submitted to Alec and the self which revolted against him. The one was her old self, the other her newly-developed self of experience. "An immeasurable social chasm was to divide our heroine's personality, hereafter from the previous self of her's who had stepped from her mother's door, to her fortune at Tanbridge poultry farm."

The second step was the continued development of the effective self through her love affair with Clare, and their separation. So much emotion and so little action in which it expressed itself widened the gap, until, when pressed by necessity, she gave her body over to Alec a second time. Hardy recognizes this stage. "But he had a vague consciousness of one thing, though it was not clear to him till later, that his original Tess had spiritually ceased to recognize the body before him, as hers, allowing it to drift like a corpse up the current in a direction dissociated from its living will." The final step is that of complete ethical perversion, the destruction of the moral sense. Before, she had been too kind-hearted to hurt a fly. Now, she kills D'Urberville with-

out the least compunction. Why? Because the latter had insulted her ruling passion, her love for Clare. "His horror at her impulse was mixed with amazement at the strength of her affection for himself and at the strangeness of its quality which had apparently extinguished her moral sense altogether."

Although, in no other case, did dualism go so far, yet in more than one of Hardy's characters is it visible. Jude, when Sue leaves him, does what the impulse directs. Outward action or want of it, has become indifferent to him. Clem Yoebright goes blind and retires into himself save for his lectures to the people.

On the other hand, we have human nature governed by the passions of sex, hate, anger and the other emotions as the one or the other rises in response to stimulus. On the other hand, we have the world of inner experience, which is wholly private, which finds its field in the contemplation of life, in the enjoyment of nature, in the sensation of pleasure, derived from the feeling of love and passion. Enjoyment, in the highest sense of the experiencing of life, whether in its good or evil aspects, without the desire of affecting it, is the field proper and suitable for the exercise of the distinctive function of human nature. All else is under the bondage of the will to live.

Let us look at the active side of the dualism. Hardy is rightly impressed with the universal striving for life and happiness which lies, as he believes, at the basis of all human action. He clearly sees that it is not a mere will to live which motivates the actions of men, but a will to live happily. He also sees that the will to happiness is individual. It must, of necessity, be a human motive for the self. On the other hand, leaving out of account the metaphysical foundations, the will to live is biological, that is, grounded in the nature of man as a member of the race. The first is largely conscious, the second is unconscious, expressing itself in the devious and mysterious workings of the sexual and other maternal impulses. These two impulses, to be happy and to live, in reality are opposed, but unconsciously, for therein lies the tragedy of the human situation, for the biological impulse conceals itself frequently under the disguise of the desire for happiness. Thus, the three milkmaids in love with Angel Clare are the victims of the impulse to live, even if that impulse is,

as they recognize, impossible to fulfill. Jude really thinks he wants pleasure and enjoyment with Arabella. In reality, it is the biological impulse.

It is thus seen that the active side of human nature is strictly determined. Once one's character (character being defined in this case as the responses in actions under given conditions) is given, no genuine transformation is possible. Jude did not develop a single new trait from the time he was eleven years old. It was the same Jude who, when he discovered that the grammar book did not contain a magic spell for learning, enabling one to do without work, "wished he had never seen a book, that he might never see another, that he had never been born"; and on his deathbed repeated Job's curse against the day of his birth. Tess refuses to believe that Alec has been converted because, in her opinion and that of Clare, such changes do not take place.

So strict is this determination, that the very fact that the D'Urberville blood is worn out (whatever that may mean) is enough to bring about the destruction of Tess. Because Jude's father had trouble with his wife, Jude must have trouble with his wife, too. It follows that human nature from the standpoint of activity must be interpreted in terms of biological and psychological behavior. From the standpoint of the inner life, it must be interpreted in terms of experience, knowledge, feeling and wisdom, the desire, the wish, the aspiration. These two aspects of human nature are independent, to a large degree, of each other. They cannot be said to interact.

From the standpoint just elaborated there must be at least two conceptions of evil which, in all likelihood, may come into conflict with one another. From the standpoint of the inner life, viewing as it does everything in the philosophic manner, nothing in the outer life may be regarded as absolutely good. Only those who have not developed the inner standpoint see anything in the world worth having. Such a standpoint causes one to lose the zest and desire for enjoyment. Life, i. e., outer life, viewed from the standpoint of pleasure, must be regarded by wise men as physically evil. The unwise man is of little importance, for it is better to be wise than happy. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the outer life of impulse and passion, of the will to live and

enjoy, there is no such thing as moral evil. This cannot be, for moral evil must imply external freedom and such cannot exist under the conditions described in the foregoing pages. Hardy is singularly indifferent to the external actions of his characters. No one is to be blamed for his or her actions, because no one could have helped them. Alec D'Urberville was possessed with a strong animal nature. It is his nature to act as he did to Tess. Eustacia was selfish and voluptuous. How can her conduct be described as morally evil, since, as Hardy takes care to explain, she was born that way, endowed with that temperament? It is absurd to blame Jude for his conduct with Arabella, or for his getting drunk, for that is his obedience to the twin impulses to life and happiness.

The true evil of the inner life lies in feeling, thought and motive. Pride is one of the chief roots of sin. For it means an over-valuation of one's own trifling possession and personality in the presence of others. The mayor sins in that manner. He lacked love, and hence was a moral as well as a material failure. Hate is morally destructive. As in Meredith, vices fall into two classes, those caused by the lack of wisdom, and those caused by the over-attention to the self. Angel Clare is an example of the first class; Sue Bridehead is an excellent example of the second.

Turning to the external life, we find that we must have another criterion than the moral, for the definition of evil. There, biological law rules. Evil, in this sphere, may be defined in a two-fold manner, as defect and as non-adaptation to environment. Considered from this viewpoint, Hardy's later novels may be conceived as studies in Darwinian premises. A thing is evil because it is inimicable to the preservation of the race. The laws of nature work much more certainly than the moral laws. If an individual is lacking in the will to live, or is defective, or is over-developed in some characteristic which is not biologically advantageous, we have an example of evil, which is pretty certain to be eliminated. An example of the first class is Little Time, Jude's son. He has merely Jude's own characteristics intensified to the highest degree. He has no pleasure in and no desire for life. Jude has little either, so nature eliminates Time by his own hand, and to make a good job of it, and to see that no more of the same stock survive, eliminates

the other children along with him. Tess is an example of the defective. Her race is worn out, lacking in energy of will and purpose, or, as Hardy says, in self-preservative selfishness. If Tess had been a little more selfish, she would have easily overcome the attitude of Angel Clare. Sue and Jude are examples of the third class. They have an over-developed sensitiveness of feeling, an over-keenness of perception which produces unhappiness and sorrow. Nature is not favorable for such a temperament, and endeavors to eliminate it.

This brings out clearly the question of purpose and chance. True, there is no purpose which has for its end the happiness of individuals. Here Jude and Sue were mistaken. Happiness is not the intention of nature. But there is a purpose present in nature, the purpose of developing individuals adapted to their environment. Nature works in diverse ways, including the way of chance. Chance, fate, necessity, works only in the biologically evil in Hardy's novels. They are naturally out of harmony with nature, and nature is hostile to them and strives to get rid of them as soon as possible. In a word, the question in the examination of any misfortune or disaster is not whether the individual was morally deserving, but whether such a person is biologically sound.

The question lies in the nature of the good. Hardy expressed the question in the words, "Nature's lack of sympathy with a state of grace." Biological good and moral good do not coincide. There are three types of the biologically good. There are persons like the rustics in the Far from the Madding Crowd and the Return who live a life from day to day close to nature without reflective thought or purpose, not striving to get beyond the narrow limits of their environment. Such persons have neither too much nor too little feeling. They do their work well, but do not strive to advance their situation. Granther Candle, who danced a jig at ninety and was happy as the day is long, is a good example. The second class consists of men like Gabriel, Oak and Diggory Venn, women like Elizabeth Jane and Thomasene Yoebright, who have by nature a perfect balance between feeling and action. They are not troubled by the passions, possess the ability to control the self, as Giles Winterbourne had, not only in regard

to its actions, but also in feelings. They live and act like commonplace persons, since they lack ambition, but they feel like heroes. The third class are those endowed with the gifts of leadership, energy and personality. There are not many of these in Hardy. Fairfrae in the Mayor of Casterbridge is the best example. Such a person must possess the capacity for taking hard knocks, must have a level head, and, above all, clearness of mind and sanity of judgment. And he must not be overcome in spirit by any of the stings and arrows of outrageous fortune. In a word, the qualities favored by nature are energy, vitality, clearness of judgment, and a thick skin.

From the point of view of the inner life, moral goodness finds its highest expression in purity of desire and motive. Tess is a good and a pure woman, because she never *desired* to live impurely. Next to this comes openness and liberality of mind, the willingness to receive new impressions and ideas which constitutes the essence of the capacity for inner self-development. Finally comes sympathy and kindness of heart for all persons and things, the placing of their interests above one's own.

It is seen that Hardy has a two-fold standard of good. On the one hand there is nature favoring and giving her highest rewards to those possessing the self-regarding virtues; on the other there is the ethical ideal exalting altruism, kindness and tenderness as the goal, and there is no genuine way out. True, at one place the two coincide. Those who possess outward strength and inward purity and depth, though they cannot rise to the highest places, yet can survive in this testing which is called life. To act even though there is no desire for action; to accept the nature of the universe, even though one does not rejoice in it; to practice resignation and helpfulness to others, even though there is little hope of general amelioration; to sacrifice one's self as Giles did, even though the one sacrificed for is unworthy—such is what remains. Probably no better statement of what remains as the best moral possibility in Hardy's world is found, than the description of the activity of Elizabeth Jane's latter days; "And as the lively and sparkling emotions of her early married life cohered into an equable serenity, the finer movements of her nature found scope in discovering to the narrow lives ever around her the

secret of making limited opportunities endurable, which she deemed to consist in the cunning enlargement by a species of microscopic treatment of those minute forms of satisfaction which offer themselves to everybody not in positive pain which, handled, have much of the inspiring effect upon life as idler interests cursorily embraced." Hardy's final counsel, then, is to acquire the honest zest for doing what we can, a solution which he combines with inner depth and vitality of perception as the goal of the spiritual life. The final word must be inner freedom and the submission to external necessity.

In the foregoing exposition the following points have been brought out in regard to the thought-world of Hardy:

I. (a) Let it be admitted that in the world in which Hardy lives chance plays an important part. But it is not a blind or irrational chance. True, the gods do not care for human sin and suffering, but that is because they are interested in other things. Beyond all doubt this world had better not exist, but nevertheless the purpose found in it is two-fold, the testing and elimination of the undesirable and the perfecting of those who are desirable.

(b) Nature is not in sympathy with a state of grace with moral virtue merely as moral virtue. Nature strives to eliminate two classes of persons: those who possess capacities for higher things, but lack strength and energy of will and purpose; and those who, having such strength and energy, direct it to individualistic and irrational purposes.

(c) Nature favors two classes of persons. First, those who keep to the mean of common life, the undeveloped and the commonplace; second, those who have submitted to the order of the universe.

II. Human nature is to be regarded as having a two-fold ground; the will to live dominating and controlling the actions, and the thinking and contemplative experience viewing the action of this will.

The proper field of action of human nature is thus two-fold, that of contemplation and action.

III. There are three standards for the conception of evil. In the first place life itself is an evil. Again, there is the biological evil, and, finally, moral evil.

IV. Good is found in submission to the nature of the universe and the acceptance of its ends as one's own ends.

It is thus clear that Hardy has transcended the philosophical position of Schopenhauer. Indeed, between the two there intervened movements which transformed the intellectual atmosphere of the later 19th century. On the one hand there arose the increasing tide of the social consciousness in which the individualism of the 18th century was overwhelmed. On the other hand this was aided by the development of the evolutionary theory. It follows that if salvation is to come, it must come to the whole race. Von Hartmann shares with Hardy these influences. Both may be said to be disciples of Schopenhauer under the influence of the Evolutionary and social movements.

One of von Hartmann's innovations in Schopenhauer's philosophy was that in the conception of the universe, he placed the volitional and the rational elements on a par. The world is ultimately Will which furnishes the ground for its existence, and Idea or Reason which furnishes the rational order present in it. Since the Will is irrational, the essence of the universe is irrational, but since the Idea is rational the content is rationally ordered. Will is the primary element responsible for the existence of the world, and while the Will works unconsciously, the logical element is thus subjected to it. Under these conditions no hope for the cessation of sorrow is possible. In order to overcome this and free itself, the rational element in the Unconscious individuates the will and produces consciousness, thus giving rise to an increasing control of the irrational by the rational. Man is thus under the joint control of will and reason. As we have seen, this is substantially Hardy's position. We have observed the duality approaching to a dualism which has arisen in his characters. Jane and Tess find their life of reason and experience separated by a great gulf from their ground of action. Naturally, this duality is not to be discovered in the characters who have not yet arrived at full self-consciousness, or those who are under the domination of the animal will. The development of the rational elements is only a cause of sorrow. Both are agreed that the higher the reason of the individual is developed, the greater the suffering.

Compare Granther Cantle with Clem Yoebright and one can easily see that the former had the greater amount of happiness.

Hardy's world order like that of von Hartmann's is rationally ordered. This has been shown in the preceding pages. The reason, however, is not one which seeks human happiness.

Both look on the development of the higher consciousness as the aim of evolution. The purpose of this is to produce a state in which renunciation of the will-to-live is the end desired. Most of Hardy's leading novels end with this renunciation. Tess was glad that her life was to come to an end. "It is as it should be. I am glad, yes, glad, I have had enough, and now I shall not live for you to despise me." Jude, too, feels the same way. He deliberately puts an end to a feverish life which ought not to have been begun. The climax of this renunciation is found in Jude's son. Time, who has never experienced anything, yet feels the desire not to live. He kills himself and Jude's other children and the comment made is "that there are such boys springing among us in the last generation, the outcome of new views of life. They seem to see all its terrors before they are old enough to have the staying power to resist them. He (the doctor) says it is the beginning of the coming universal wish not to live."

But this does not represent the highest form of action. Suicide does no good. Neither does the refusal to live. There is no hope for humanity (according to von Hartmann) in such individual efforts. Even if every one committed suicide, the Unconscious would have to do it all over again. In the distant future humanity may simultaneously resolve to stop willing, but at present, until that moment comes, "one must accept life and its pains and not in cowardly renunciation and withdrawal is anything to be achieved for the world process. The reflecting reader will also, without further suggestion, understand how a practical philosophy erected on these principles should be shaped and that such an one cannot contain the disunion but only the full reconciliation with life."[1]

This reconciliation with life as we have seen is the final message of Hardy. His highest characters like Oak, Giles and Marty realize the utter hopelessness of the struggle after happiness and

[1]von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, translated by Coupland, Vol. 3, p. 134.

yet go forward laying the foundation of their lives and actions upon that basis. The greatest good attainable, after all, is submission to the universe.

Hardy and von Hartmann we have thus seen agree on almost every point.

I. a. Both were influenced by Schopenhauer and the social and the evolutionary movements.

b. Both regard the world as essentially irrational, though rationally ordered.

c. Both deny freedom and uphold determinism by the irrational will.

d. Both regard the ordering of the events of circumstances as something over which human nature has little or no control.

II. a. Both ground human nature in the will and reason or experience. Both find the proper field of action in the will controlled by reason, not in the search for individual happiness, but in the life outside the self.

b. Both conceive the nature of life as painful and therefore as evil located in the nature of the will.

c. Both regard good as located in the reason and regard moral good as the renunciation of individual aims.

d. Both regard the renunciation of the will to live as the desired end.

VIII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The comparison between Hardy and von Hartmann brings this thesis to its conclusion. A certain continuity of development has been observed between the various parts of the exposition. Since each novelist, as well as each philosopher, has to do with the same world as each other novelist and philosopher, it is clear that the same problems will of necessity arise to be treated in accordance with each individual's outlook upon life. In order to show this continuity and at the same time bring out the parallelism, the proof of which was the primary purpose of this thesis, I shall now give a synoptical outline of the solutions of the respective problems proposed in the introduction, as well as of others which have arisen in the course of the exposition. By this means a mass of detail will be eliminated and the true extent of the parallelism clearly shown.

These conclusions fall into: (A) General Problems; (B) Special Problems.

(A) I. Formative Influences on the thought world:

a. Defoe: Protestant Theology; Mercantile-Economic Theory; personal experience. Aristotle: Classical Greek Theology; Platonic Philosophy; personal scientific investigation and thought.

b. Richardson: Protestant Theology. Addison (Papers in regard to poetic justice, etc.); Locke (Educational Theory). Kant: Protestant Theology, a variety of philosophic influences; Stoics, Shaftesbury, Leibniz, Wolff, etc.

c. Fielding: Shaftesbury, positively; Hobbs and Maudeville, negatively; Chubb and the Deistic Controversy;[1] Plato and the writers of the Spectator. Hume, the same.

d. Dickens: Personal experience; readings in Social Science; Carlyle; The Utilitarians both positively and negatively. J. S., Mill, the same as Dickens, except in the case of

[1]See Cross—Chubb was the original of Square in Tom Jones.

Carlyle, and a greater influence by the philosophers, especially Bentham and James Mill.

e. Meredith: The Feminist Movement; the Evolution Controversy; Theories of Education; Bentham, James Mill, etc. Hegel: The whole preceding Idealist movement, especially Kant and Schelling. The scientific developmentalist movement of Kant; Baumgarten; Herder; La Place; The French Revolution, positively and negatively.

f. Hardy, Kant, Schopenhauer, etc.; also Darwin, Huxley and the evolution movement. Von Hartmann, the same.

II. Ethical Structure.[1]

a. Defoe: A return to the mean.

b. Richardson: A moral testing through a conflict of wills.

c. Fielding: A person possessed by the social affections plotted against by a person possessed by selfish affections who uses the faults of the former as an opening for his plots, the good saved by Providence.

d. Dickens: An escape from socialized evil.

e. Meredith: An achievement of freedom through the discovery of the good.

f. Hardy: Testing through outer misfortune ending in disaster through inner defect.

III. Nature[2] and Circumstance[3].

a. Defoe: Nature and Circumstance naturally harmonious. They mutually determine each other. Through Providence and conflict between them is designed for the good. Aristotle: Same, except no belief in Providence. World, however, rationally and teleologically ordered, agrees with Defoe here.

b. Richardson: The world of Circumstance designed as a testing place for virtue.
Kant: Same.

---

[1]Comparison with philosophers impossible here due to the fact that the ethical structure is formed in narrative not in the expositions of general principles.

[2]Human nature taken in the sense of isolated individuality.

[3]Generally used to denote social environment; taken generally as all conditionaling factors outside of the self; environment in general.

c. Fielding: At their highest they coincide; on the lower stages, a conflict between benevolence and prudence to be solved only by Providential interference.
Hume: Coincides with exception of belief in Providence.

d. Dickens: Nature determined by circumstance, especially through environment and education.
Mill: Same.

f. Meredith: Nature and Circumstance are normally at one. Conflict due to the misapprehension of the nature of the good on the part of human nature; progress possible only through this conflict, however.
Hegel: Same.

g. Hardy: The desires of the individual and the order or purpose of the universe completely at odds. The only hope for the former is by resignation and submission.
Von Hartmann: Same.

IV. Freedom of Choice, Necessity to Action.

a. Defoe: Freedom of choice, necessity to action.
Aristotle: Same.

b. Richardson: Freedom of individual right. The freedom of the moral will in obedience to duty.
Kant: Same.

c. Fielding: Complete necessitation of action by the passions.
Hume: Same.

d. Dickens: Power to free one's self from external restraints; such freedom necessary to happiness.
Mill: Same.

e. Meredith: Freedom as the freedom of personal self-expression; the freedom of moral obedience; the freedom of self-realization in the social relationships.
Hegel: Same.

f. Hardy: Complete determination of action. Inward freedom of thought and feeling.
Von Hartmann: Same.

(B) Special Problems.

I. Human Nature.

(1) Its ground.

a. Defoe: The animal organism in its social and economic environment.
Aristotle: Same.

b. Richardson: The Will.
Kant: Same.

c. Fielding: The psycho-physical organism.
Hume: Same.

d. Dickens: The Social group.
Mill: Same.

e. Meredith: In nature as a rational spiritually evolving organism.
Hegel: Same.

f. Hardy: The universal will to live.
Von Hartmann: The unconscious as the union of will and idea.

(2) Its Constitution:

a. Defoe: A harmony of thought, feelings and actions directed to the pursuit of happiness through the struggle with environment.
Aristotle: Same.

b. Richardson: Constituted by the character of the acts of the will.
Kant: Human nature insofar as it is not merely an animal and sensuous organism, but a rational and accountable personality is constituted by the character of the acts of the will, that is, the character of the will.

c. Fielding: The animal organism in its psycho-physical reactions to environment. Human nature is a complex of impulses and reactions.
Hume: Essentially the same.

d. Dickens: Social individuality expressing itself in outer actions and inner feeling.
Mill: Same.

e. Meredith: A personal and progressive unity of feelings, actions, thoughts and choices.
Hegel: Same.

f. Hardy: A duality of inner experience and outer action.
Von Hartmann: A duality of thought and volition, i. e., ideal and will.

(3) Proper Field of Action.

a. Defoe: The pursuit of happiness both in the external environment and through internal contemplation or worship.
Aristotle: Same.

b. Richardson: The wills of other persons divine and human.
Kant: The cultivation of inward perfection and the happiness of other persons.

c. Fielding: Proper adjustment to the immediate environment through the cultivation of sympathy and benevolence.
Hume: Same.

d. Dickens: Fellowship with other persons; the welfare of the social group limited only by humanity; and the cultivation of the feelings and the imagination.
Mill: Same.

e. Meredith: The internal and external life of the self and other selves.
Hegel: The whole field of human activity.

f. Hardy: Inner resignation and outer helpfulness.
Von Hartmann: Same.

II. (1) Location.

a. Defoe: Environment.
Aristotle: Both environment and internal defect.

b. Richardson: The will.
Kant: Same.

c. Fielding: Unsympathetic feeling and conduct.
Hume: Same.

d. Dickens: In a social consciousness dominated by selfish interests.
Mill: Same.
e. Meredith: Personality.
Hegel: Same.
f. Hardy: In existence itself.
Von Hartmann: Same.

(2) Nature.
a. Defoe: A defect from the mean both in environment and conduct.
Aristotle: Same.
b. Richardson: A will directed toward selfish purposes.
Kant: Same.
c. Fielding: Conduct controlled by selfishness and lack of social sympathy.
Hume: Same.
d. Dickens: A social maladjustment utilized by selfish interests.
Mill: Same.
e. Meredith: An over-development and over-balance of personality on any one of its four spheres of activity, expressed in the vices of lack of wisdom and egoism.
Hegel: One-sidedness of development, either in the internal or external life.
f. Hardy: External evil-maladjustment to environment due to internal defect. Internal evil—selfishness, its source, Human Nature.
Von Hartmann: Man's nature as an unsatisfied will.

III. The Nature of the Good.
(1) The Morally Desirable.
a. Defoe: Wisdom or prudence with the ability to engage in contemplative meditation.
Aristotle: Same.
b. Richardson: A will controlled by duty and the law of God; heroic virtue.
Kant: Same.

c. Fielding: A heart controlled by social sympathy and the prudence to choose the right course of action.
Hume: Same.

d. Dickens: An active social conscience controlled by good will.
Mill: Same.

e. Meredith: A self-realized personality.
Hegel: Same.

f. Hardy: A life of outward service and inward resignation.
Von Hartmann: Same.

To the above but little can be added. The parallelisms so briefly outlined in the preceding pages could be expanded beyond the lengths given in the original exposition. But such an expansion would hardly do more than increase and intensify the points of resemblance. However, I trust that in thus showing the philosophical character of certain of the great creative English novelists, an inspiration may be given for a more elaborate study of the manifold relations of philosophy and the novel. Such a study would not only attempt to trace the philosophical influences which have affected world fiction, but would attempt to present the parallelism not only between the English novelists and a few philosophers, but between all the world's great writers of fiction and their philosophical compeers in the domain of abstract thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, translated by D. P. Chace, 1915.

BAKEWELL: Source Book of Ancient Philosophy.

CROSS: Life and Times of Henry Fielding.

DANIEL DEFOE:

Captain Singleton.
Colonel Jacque.
Moll Flanders.
Robinson Crusoe, Pts. I and II.
The Fortunate Mistress.

CHARLES DICKENS:

Barnaby Rudge.
Bleak House.
David Copperfield.
Dombey and Son.
Great Expectations.
Hard Times.
Little Dorrit.
Marten Chuzzlewit.
Nicholas Nickleby.
Old Curiosity Shop.
Oliver Twist.
Our Mutual Friend.
Pickwick Papers.
A Tale of Two Cities.

HENRY FIELDING: Collected Works.

Especially.
Amelia.
Jonathan Wild.
Joseph Andrews.
Tom Jones.

HELEN GARWOOD: Thomas Hardy as an Illustration of the Philosophy of Schopenhauer.

THOMAS HARDY:

Far From the Madding Crowd.
Jude the Obscure.
Mayor of Casterbridge.
The Return of the Native.

Tess of the D'Urbervilles.
The Woodlanders.

G. F. C. HEGEL:
Philosophie des Geistes.
Encyclopedia (Part three).
Phinominologie des Geistes.

J. H. HUGHES: Dickens as an Educator.

DAVID HUME:
Philosophical Works.
Treatise of Human Nature (Green's Edition).

JANET AND SEAELLES: History of the Problems of Philosophy.

I. KANT:
Kritik der Praktichen Vernuft.
Metaphysic of Ethics (3rd Edition 1871), trans. by Semple.
Religion Within the Bounds of Pure Reason, trans. by Semple, 1838.
Saamtlische Werke (Hartenstein).

GEORGE MEREDITH:
Beauchamps' Career.
Diana of the Crossways.
Evan Harrington.
Lord Ormond and His Aminta.
One of Our Conquerors.
Rhoda Fleming.
The Amazing Marriage.
The Adventures of Harry Richmond.
The Egoist.
The Ordeal of Richard Feveral.
The Tragic Comedians.

J. S. MILL: Utilitarianism and Liberty.

JAMES MOFFAT: Introduction to the Study of the Novels of Meredith.

ARTHUR MURRAY: Essay on the Life and Genius of Henry Fielding.

SAMUEL RICHARDSON:
Clarissa Harlowe.
Pamela.
Sir Charles Grandison.

A. K. ROGERS: English and American Philosophy Since 1800 (1922).

BENJAMIN RAND: The Classical Moralists.

SHAFTESBURY: Characteristics.

VON HARTMANN: The Philosophy of the Unconscious, trans. by W. C. Coupland, 1884.